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SUMMARY
National preparedness plan for an infl uenza pandemic. Helsinki 2007. 191 pp. (Publications of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, ISSN 1236-2050, 2007:10)
ISBN 978-952-00-2326-3 (PDF)
In the face of an increasing threat of an infl uenza pandemic, WHO has repeatedly urged its 
member countries to update their pandemic preparedness plans, and published strategic and 
technical instructions and recommendations for their guidance. Preparedness for a fl u pandem-
ic has recently been discussed on a number of occasions in the various organs of the European 
Council. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health set up a Working Group on National Pandemic 
Preparedness on 21 April 2005, whose remit was to draw up a national pandemic prepared-
ness plan. Its objective is to confi ne the harmful effects of a potential infl uenza pandemic on 
the population’s health and to secure the best possible continuity of the society’s functions. On 
the basis of the proposal, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has compiled a national 
preparedness plan for an infl uenza pandemic. This preparedness plan has been accepted in the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health management group and in the Government Meetings of 
the Heads of Preparedness.
The purpose of the preparedness plan is to set up guidelines for fl u pandemic prepared-
ness at all administrative levels of healthcare and to support preparations in other administra-
tive sectors. 
The preparedness plan paints a picture applicable to Finnish conditions of development of 
a pandemic, its health, societal and economic impact, available means of its prevention, special 
ethical questions, areas of responsibility and special arrangements of healthcare organisations, 
material requirements of preparedness, needs for collaboration between different administra-
tive sectors and special characteristics of organisation during a pandemic, as well as communi-
cation and provision of information. The preparedness plan examines a pandemic from a wide 
perspective, creating a foundation for detailed plans of all administrative sectors. For practical 
reasons, this preparedness plan includes only brief outlines of plans other than that of the Min-
istry of Social Affairs and Health administrative sector. A prerequisite of effective implemen-
tation is integration of the plans of different administrative sectors.
Management relations during a pandemic are determined in accordance with the Govern-
ment model for Government civilian crisis management.
At the municipal level, the organ responsible for prevention of communicable diseases 
plays a central role in pandemic preparedness and during a pandemic. The hospital district phy-
sicians responsible for communicable diseases act as experts in planning at the regional and 
local levels.
A preparedness plan must change with changes in perceived threat, the operating environ-
ment and methods of prediction and prevention. For this reason, a preparedness plan is nev-
er ‘fi nished’, and it will be updated as essential changes occur in the pandemic situation. An 
infl uenza pandemic may be set into motion soon or it may take years, and the virus that will 
cause it is not necessarily a current infl uenza virus subtype. Being prepared for a fl u pandemic 
simultaneously signifi cantly reinforces Finland’s preparedness to repel any other widespread, 
transnational or global epidemic. The set structures for repelling infectious diseases reinforced 
by preparedness support important areas of continuous protection against infectious diseases, 
and thus promote health of the population. Preparedness supports safeguarding of vital func-
tions of society.
Key words: preventive healthcare, quarantine, infectious diseases, inoculation, protection, 
preparedness, infl uenza

TIIVISTELMÄ
Kansallinen varautumissuunnitelma infl uenssapandemiaa varten. Helsinki 2007. 191 s. (So-
siaali- ja terveysministeriön julkaisuja, ISSN 1236-2050, 2007:10)
ISBN 978-952-00-2326-3 (PDF)
Infl uenssapandemian uhkan lisääntyessä WHO on kehottanut jäsenmaita päivittämään pan-
demiaan varautumisen suunnitelmiaan sekä julkaissut tätä ohjaavia strategisia ja teknisiä 
ohjeistoja ja suosituksia. Infl uenssapandemiaan varautumista on käsitelty Euroopan unionin 
komission kokouksissa useasti viime aikoina.
Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö asetti 21.4.2005 kansallisen pandemiavarautumisen työ-
ryhmän, jonka tehtävänä oli laatia ehdotus infl uenssapandemiaan varautumisen kansallisek-
si suunnitelmaksi. Sen tavoitteena on mahdollisen pandemian väestön terveydelle aiheutta-
mien haittojen rajoittaminen sekä yhteiskunnan toimintojen jatkuvuuden mahdollisimman 
hyvä turvaaminen. Ehdotuksen pohjalta sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö on laatinut valtakun-
nallisen varautumissuunnitelman infl uenssapandemian varalle. Tämä varautumissuunnitel-
ma on hyväksytty soiaali- ja terveysministeriön johtoryhmässä ja valtioneuvoston valmius-
päällikkökokouksessa 
Varautumissuunnitelman tarkoitus on ohjata varautumista infl uenssapandemiaan tervey-
denhuollon kaikilla hallinnon tasoilla sekä tukea valmistautumista muilla hallinnon aloilla. 
Varautumissuunnitelmassa annetaan Suomen oloihin soveltuva kuva pandemian kehit-
tymisestä, terveydellisistä, yhteiskunnallisista ja taloudellisista vaikutuksista, torjuntaan 
käytettävissä olevista keinoista, eettisistä erityiskysymyksistä, terveydenhuollon organisaa-
tioiden vastuualueista ja erityisjärjestelyistä, varautumisen materiaalisista tarpeista, eri hal-
linnon alojen välisen yhteistyön tarpeista ja pandemian aikaisen organisaation erityispiir-
teistä, sekä viestinnästä ja tiedottamisesta. Varautumissuunnitelma tarkastelee pandemiaa 
laaja-alaisesti luoden pohjan kaikkien hallinnon alojen yksityiskohtaisille suunnitelmille. 
Käytännön syistä tässä valmiussuunnitelmassa on esitetty vain lyhyesti muiden kuin sosi-
aali- ja terveysministeriön hallinnonalan suunnitelmat. Tehokas toimeenpano edellyttää laa-
jempaa eri hallinnonalojen suunnitelmien integroimista toisiinsa.
Johtosuhteet pandemiatilanteessa määräytyvät valtion siviilikriisin johtamismallin peri-
aatteiden mukaisesti.
Kuntatasolla kunnan tartuntatautien torjunnasta vastaava toimielin on keskeisessä ase-
massa pandemiaan varautumisessa ja pandemiatilanteessa. Sairaanhoitopiirien tartuntatau-
deista vastaavat lääkärit toimivat alueellisen ja paikallisen suunnittelun asiantuntijoina.
Varautumissuunnitelman tulee muuttua uhkakuvan, toimintaympäristön sekä ennusta-
mis- ja torjuntakeinojen muuttuessa. Tästä syystä varautumissuunnitelma ei ole koskaan 
”valmis”, vaan sitä päivitetään sitä mukaa kun oleellisia muutoksia tilanteessa tapahtuu. In-
fl uenssapandemia saattaa käynnistyä pian tai viedä vuosia, eikä sen aiheuttava virus ole vält-
tämättä ajankohtainen infl uenssaviruksen alatyyppi. 
Infl uenssapandemiaan varautuminen tehostaa samalla olennaisesti Suomen valmiutta 
torjua mitä tahansa laajaa, kansainvälistä tai globaalia epidemiaa. Valmistautumisen tehos-
tamat tartuntatautien torjunnan rakenteet tukevat keskeisiä jatkuvan tartuntatautien torjun-
nan alueita ja edistävät näin väestön terveyttä. Varautuminen tukee yhteiskunnan elintärkei-
den toimintojen turvaamista.
Asiasanat: ehkäisevä terveydenhuolto, karanteeni, tartuntataudit, rokotus, suojaus, valmi-
us, infl uenssa

SAMMANDRAG
Nationell beredskapsplan för en infl uensapandemi. Helsingfors 2007. 191 s. (Social- och 
hälsovårdsministeriets publikationer, ISSN 1236-2050, 2007:10)
ISBN 978-952-00-2326-3 (PDF)
I och med att hotet om en infl uensapandemi ökat har WHO upprepade gånger uppmanat 
medlemsländerna att uppdatera sina beredskapsplaner för pandemier samt publicerat riktgi-
vande strategiska och tekniska anvisningar och rekommendationer för detta. Beredskapen 
för en infl uensapandemi har behandlats fl era gånger i Europeiska unionens olika rådskon-
stellationer under den senaste tiden.
Social- och hälsovårdsministeriet tillsatte den 21 april 2005 en arbetsgrupp för nationell 
pande-miberedskap som fi ck i uppdrag att utarbeta en nationell beredskapsplan för en infl u-
ensapandemi. Syftet med planen är att begränsa de skador som en eventuell pandemi orsa-
kar befolkningens hälsa samt att så väl som möjligt trygga kontinuiteten i samhällsfunktio-
nerna.
På basis av förslaget har social- och hälsoministeriet utarbetat ett nationell beredskaps-
plan för en infl uensapandemi. Denna beredskapsplan har behandlats i social- och hälso-
vårdsministeriets ledningsgrupp och statsrådets beredningschefsmöte.
Syftet med beredskapsplanen är att styra beredskapen för en infl uensapandemi på al-
la förvalt-ningsnivåer inom hälso- och sjukvården samt att stödja beredskapen inom an-
dra förvaltningsområden. I beredskapsplanen ges en till fi nländska förhållanden anpassad 
bild av en pandemis utveckling, dess hälsomässiga, samhälleliga och ekonomiska verkning-
ar, tillgängliga bekämpningsmetoder, etiska specialfrågor, hälso- och sjukvårdsorganisatio-
nernas ansvarsområden och specialarrangemang, de materiella beredskapsbehoven, behovet 
av samarbete mellan olika förvaltningsområden och särdragen hos organisationen under en 
pandemi, samt av kommunikationen och informationen. Beredskapsplanen granskar pan-
demier på ett övergripande sätt och skapar en grund för alla förvaltningsområdens detalje-
rade planer. Av praktiska skäl presenteras andra förvaltningsområdens planer än social- och 
hälsovårdsministeriets förvaltningsområdes plan endast i korthet i denna beredskapsplan. 
Ett effektivt verkställande förutsätter en mera omfattande integration av de olika förvalt-
ningsområdenas planer.
Beredskapsplanen bör ändras när hotbilden, omvärlden samt prognos- och bekämpnings-
metoder-na förändras. Av denna orsak blir beredskapsplanen aldrig ”färdig” och därför skall 
man uppdatera den allteftersom väsentliga förändringar förekommer i pandemisituationen . 
En infl uensapandemi kan starta snart eller ta fl era år, och det virus som orsakar den behöver 
inte nödvändigtvis vara den aktuella undertypen av infl uensavirus. 
Beredskapen för en infl uensapandemi effektiverar samtidigt betydligt Finlands bered-
skap att bekämpa vilken som helst omfattande, internationell eller global epidemi. Förbe-
redelserna effektiverar strukturerna för bekämpningen av smittsamma sjukdomar och detta 
stödjer områden som är centrala med tanke på den fortlöpande bekämpningen av smittsam-
ma sjukdomar och främjar på så sätt befolkningens hälsa. Beredskapen stödjer säkrandet av 
livsviktiga samhällsfunktioner.
Nyckelord: förebyggande hälsovård, karantän, smittsamma sjukdomar, vaccination, skydd, 
beredskap, infl uenza
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1 SUMMARY
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health established a National Working Group for Pan-
demic Preparedness on April 21 2005, with a remit to prepare a national preparedness plan 
for pandemic infl uenza. Its aim is to limit the harm a pandemic could cause to the health of 
the population and to ensure continuous functioning of society as far as possible. Based on 
this proposal, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has prepared a national preparedness 
plan for an infl uenza pandemic. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health Steering Group 
and the Government Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness have approved the plan.
The national plan contains a summary of its management and powers, background infor-
mation and methods of monitoring infl uenza and infl uenza pandemics, and an assessment 
of the possibilities of reducing the damage caused by a pandemic. The document identifi es 
the organisations in charge of the preparedness for an infl uenza pandemic in Finland, as well 
as the objectives and guidelines for the operation of the healthcare services in the differ-
ent phases leading to a pandemic. The document includes ethical considerations on the al-
location of limited resources, considers communications and dissemination of information, 
and provides technical guidelines to healthcare professionals. The current status of infl uen-
za pandemic preparedness of other administrative sectors is briefl y outlined in the plan. In 
addition, the document proposes revisions in legislation, as well as other measures and ad-
ditional resources that are required for the implementation of the plan and for maintaining 
preparedness.
Infl uenza pandemic
Infl uenza is a respiratory tract infection characterised by sudden onset and caused by in-
fl uenza virus types A and B, which cause annual epidemics around the globe. During these 
epidemics, 5 to 15% of the population acquires the infection. In Finland, additional mortal-
ity caused by annual epidemics ranges from hundreds to over one thousand during severe 
epidemics. Infl uenza epidemics cause a considerable strain on the healthcare services and at 
worst can disrupt school and work activities over a period of several weeks. The impact of 
the annual epidemics can be limited by vaccination in autumn, before the epidemic season. 
These vaccinations are free of charge for individuals belonging to groups at risk of severe 
complications after an infl uenza infection. 
An infl uenza pandemic is an epidemic of an infl uenza A virus subtype novel to the hu-
man population and spreading rapidly around the world. Morbidity during a pandemic can 
rise to 25 – 35% of the population, signifi cantly higher than during the annual epidemics, 
and the average clinical description may be more severe than that of normal seasonal infl u-
enza. Unlike with seasonal infl uenza, serious illness may develop also in otherwise healthy, 
young individuals. 
Wild waterfowl harbour a large variety of infl uenza A virus subtypes that have not been 
found in humans during the last century and which could potentially cause a pandemic. 
Avian viruses, however, are poorly transmissible to humans. The virus causing the next 
pandemic cannot be predicted, nor when it will emerge. The continuously geographically 
spreading avian infl uenza epidemic caused by the A/H5N1 virus that emerged in Asia at the 
end of 2003 has increased the risk of a pandemic to a considerably higher level than seen 
during the past 30 years. Disease clusters and epidemics in poultry caused by the A/H5N1 
virus have spread from Asia to Europe, the Middle East and Africa. WHO on its website 
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monitors the number of human infections worldwide. Of those who have contracted the dis-
ease between 2003 and 2006, on average 60% have died. With almost no exceptions, these 
individuals have contracted the infection through handling virus-infected, sick or dead birds, 
or otherwise through close contact with diseased poultry. 
According to the WHO 6-phase analysis of the development of an infl uenza pandemic, 
the situation has now reached pandemic alert phase 3. If this A/H5N1 virus, currently pos-
ing the greatest pandemic threat, acquires the ability to spread between humans, it will cause 
small (phase 4) or large (phase 5) disease clusters in humans before the onset of a pandemic 
(phase 6).
Alleviating the damage caused by a pandemic
It is impossible to predict the severity of the next pandemic. However, certain basic assump-
tions concerning the impact of a pandemic are required in order to establish a pandemic pre-
paredness plan. For the current Finnish pandemic preparedness plan, it is assumed that dur-
ing a fi rst pandemic wave of about 8 weeks’ duration, 35% of Finland’s population of 5.2 
million may fall ill with infl uenza, of whom 11,000 to 36,000 may require hospital treat-
ment, and 3,500 to 9,000 may die. Such an impact is considerably more severe than the one 
observed during the Asian infl uenza pandemic (1957) or during the Hong Kong infl uenza 
pandemic (1968), but it would be substantially less than the impact of the Spanish Flu pan-
demic (1918). 
If the morbidity associated with the pandemic is high and the average clinical descrip-
tion clearly more severe than seen during annual epidemics, the impact on society may be 
wide-ranging and substantial. Absences from work may cause disruption in key sectors of 
society, essential for the wellbeing of the population. Rumours and fear may lead to damag-
ing over-reactions by individuals and subgroups in the population. Disturbances lasting sev-
eral weeks or months in all segments of society may cause signifi cant economic loss, both at 
national and international level.
Minimising the impact of a pandemic requires close cooperation between administrative 
sectors and may require fast-track decision-making procedures. For the scenario of a signifi -
cant fraction of the workforce falling ill within a two-month pandemic wave, a key compo-
nent in developing pandemic preparedness is defi ning clear mandates regarding responsibili-
ties at the national level and a detailed action plan for all administrative sectors, in addition 
to advance procurement of materials. This is a particular challenge for the healthcare serv-
ices, where a greatly increased workload needs to be addressed while much of the staff will 
be on sick leave and there is a shortage of hospital beds. The progress of the pandemic may 
be slowed, with a consequent fall in the peak burden on healthcare services, by measures 
that slow down the transmission of the virus in the population. These measures include good 
hand hygiene, appropriate coughing and sneezing practices, and encouraging infected per-
sons to stay at home. Closing of daycare centres and schools may be considered, and non-
essential mass gatherings may be prohibited. 
The most effective measure to reduce the impact of a pandemic would be immunisa-
tion with a vaccine made from the pandemic virus. The production of such a specifi c vac-
cine, however, can only begin after WHO has declared the beginning of a pandemic. Since 
the vaccine manufacturing process takes several months, it is unlikely that such a targeted 
pandemic vaccine will be available during the fi rst wave of the pandemic. During past pan-
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demics, several consecutive waves have been observed. Thus, the availability of a specifi c 
pandemic vaccine would be important during a second or subsequent wave of the pandemic. 
Once a pandemic emerges, the global demand for a pandemic vaccine will be much high-
er than production capacity can meet. For this reason, Finland has signed a contract with a 
Dutch vaccine manufacturer, according to which an annual fee ensures a privileged slot in 
the line of vaccine orders. In addition, Finland has placed an order for prototype vaccine. 
In manufacturing the prototype vaccine, the H5N1 infl uenza virus isolated from birds and 
known to have caused the disease in humans is used. Negotiations have taken place on a 
shared vaccine manufacturing facility for the Nordic countries. 
Early treatment of infl uenza patients with specifi c antiviral drugs may signifi cantly al-
leviate the illness caused by the pandemic virus and thus reduce the impact a pandemic can 
cause for the society. For the event of a pandemic, Finland has acquired 1.3 million treat-
ment courses of the antiviral oseltamivir (Tamifl u). In addition, quantities of amantadine 
(Atarin) and zanamivir (Relenza) have been obtained for more limited use. Other equipment, 
such as respirator masks, have also been purchased. 
Operation of the healthcare services during a pandemic
The healthcare services are under the greatest stress during a pandemic, and on the other 
hand, the impact of the pandemic on the rest of society is largely dependent on its success-
ful functioning. The present preparedness plan addresses a wide range of activities of the 
healthcare services to minimise damage from a pandemic threat and a pandemic. It presents 
the principles of detection of infl uenza cases and epidemics, as well as evaluation and treat-
ment of patients. The plan contains guidelines for exceptional division of functions between 
primary healthcare and specialist treatment facilities and patient placement, and outlines the 
responsibilities of different organisations in the healthcare services and their cooperation. 
Among others, the plan contains guidelines for personal protective equipment in healthcare 
settings. These measures also require the procurement of a variety of supplies in Hospital 
Districts and municipalities.
During the pandemic alert period, the virus may spread from person to person in local 
clusters or epidemics. If human-to-human transmission has not yet been identifi ed in Finland 
during this stage, the main objective of the healthcare services is to swiftly identify infected 
persons entering the country, isolate them and initiate treatment in order to prevent further 
transmission of the infection. Once the pandemic has started, the main objective is to slow 
the speed of its spread and to care for the patients.
The justifi cation of planned actions and the fair allocation of limited prophylactic and 
treatment measures require careful ethical consideration of these issues (see section 9). Al-
though Finland intends to purchase one dose each of the two different vaccines for every 
inhabitant, these vaccines may arrive in different shipments. Consequently, decisions may 
have to be made as to which population groups should be vaccinated fi rst. Likewise, the lim-
ited availability of oseltamivir does not allow for its use in all proven indications. The pri-
mary value of pandemic preparedness is saving years of life. On the other hand, protecting 
healthcare staff treating infectious disease patients is important, both because of their in-
creased risk of exposure and the specifi c burden caused by the situation on healthcare servic-
es. The priority order of protecting other population groups will be determined by the prop-
erties of the pandemic virus. Such information only becomes available when the pandemic 
is already under way.
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With a perceived decline in threat from infectious diseases during 1970-1990s, prepar-
edness to address such threats was not developed. Thus, the organisations to combat un-
expected infectious disease threats and the resources required to address such threats have 
remained scarce. Reducing signifi cantly the impact of a pandemic can only be achieved if 
resources for the surveillance and control of infectious diseases are permanently increased 
at both national and regional levels. 
Under exceptional conditions, operation of the healthcare services can only be successful 
if healthcare staff, the public and society at large are well informed about preparedness plans 
before the onset of a pandemic, and about possible revisions of plans once the pandemic has 
reached the country. This needs to be incorporated also in resource allocation for communi-
cations at national and local levels.
Securing the vital functions of society
The national government has defi ned in a decision of principle the vital functions of society 
that need to be secured under all circumstances. These include state governance, state func-
tion as an international body, military defence, internal security, maintaining the function-
ality of the economy and society, securing the livelihood of the population and its ability to 
function and to cope with the crisis.
An infl uenza pandemic can present a threat to almost all vital functions of society. The 
National Working Group for Pandemic Preparedness has requested each of the ministries 
to identify functions in their domains that need to be secured. Besides social welfare and 
healthcare, such critical services include management systems, energy supply, food supply, 
essential transports, fi nancial and insurance operations, as well as the means for traffi c and 
communications. Severe disruptions in any of these services threaten the functions of soci-
ety. 
During a pandemic, the greatest burden will fall on the healthcare services, but securing 
other vital government functions will also present a major challenge. The present plan con-
tains detailed guidelines for preparedness in the healthcare services, and also provides the 
core information from which other sectors can update their pandemic preparedness plans. 
Governance and competent authorities in a pandemic situation
Leadership relations in a pandemic situation are determined in accordance with the princi-
ples set out in the Government civil crisis management model. Management of civil crises 
is based on the Constitution of Finland, the Government Act, the Government Code of Prac-
tice, and other legislation concerning the authorities, particularly the Communicable Diseas-
es Act. The Cabinet discusses coordination of the functions of the administrative sectors and 
prepares issues for decision by the Council of State. Operative management is the responsi-
bility of the statutory competent Ministry, which in a pandemic situation is the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. Government level governance is based on the duties of the Prime 
Minister under section 66 of the Constitution of Finland. Under section 10 of the Govern-
ment Code of Practice, the Meeting of the Ministries’ Permanent Secretaries is the coopera-
tive organ supporting the work of the Government and the Prime Minister. The Government 
Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness supports the Meeting of the Ministries’ Permanent 
Secretaries. 
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When WHO declares that the pandemic alert has reached phase 4 or at the latest when it 
progresses to phase 5, i.e. the virus is increasingly transmitted between humans, the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health establishes a Pandemic Coordination Group to support its gov-
ernance of healthcare services. The Coordination Group undertakes the tasks not covered by 
the Government Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness. 
The State Provincial Offi ce coordinates preparedness for emergency conditions as de-
fi ned in the Emergency Powers Act by organising the stipulated concerted actions within the 
province (7.4.2000/348). The State Provincial Offi ce is led by the Governor. The Social and 
Health Department of each State Provincial Offi ce ensures that the expertise of the Hospital 
Districts is utilised in drawing up regional preparedness plans, and that their plans and those 
of the local authorities are coordinated into a functional whole, in accordance with the Min-
istry of Social Affairs and Health guidelines. Leadership by the State Provincial Offi ce di-
rected at the local authorities in a pandemic situation takes place through the coordination, 
issuing of guidelines and surveillance of legality outlined above. 
The Communicable Diseases Act defi nes the competent authorities in a pandemic situa-
tion. Under it, the powers demanded by the situation rest with the Government, Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health, State Provincial Offi ce, the local authority organ responsible for 
infectious diseases, and the National Public Health Institute.
The Communicable Diseases Act also assigns obligations to the Hospital District, the 
medical practitioner responsible for infectious diseases in the local authority, the doctor 
treating a patient infected by a generally dangerous or notifi able infectious disease, and the 
National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs. 
On municipal level, the agency responsible for prevention of infectious diseases takes 
a central role in pandemic preparedness and a pandemic situation. Close collaboration be-
tween the leader of the local authority and the senior doctor of each health centre is neces-
sary for good management. However, the competent authorities and decision-making remain 
unchanged.
Communications are a part of governance. The party responsible for governance is also 
in charge of communications.
Execution of preparedness plan and further planning measures
All Ministries must ensure that preparedness plans within their sector are regularly updated 
at local, regional, and national level, and that the resource, legislative and other prerequisites 
are ensured for the necessary measures to increase preparedness. At least once a year, each 
Ministry makes an assessment to ensure that the national pandemic preparedness plan is 
up-to-date regarding the mandate of the ministry, and makes the necessary revisions. Prime 
Minister’s Offi ce coordinates the preparedness plans of all sectors. The Government Meet-
ing of the Heads of Preparedness and the Meeting of the Ministries’ Permanent Secretaries 
support the Prime Minister’s Offi ce.
The Ministry of Justice has drafted the revised Emergency Powers Act. The draft Act de-
fi nes as a state of emergency a very widely spread dangerous infectious disease equivalent 
to an especially serious disaster. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has drafted the necessary amendments to the 
Communicable Diseases Act and Decree required in order to enhance protection against a 
pandemic, as well as those of the Primary Health Care Act and the Act on Specialised Medi-
cal Care. 
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Finland participates in the planning process on possible setting up of pan-Nordic vac-
cine production. The National Public Health Institute prepares the plans on vaccination of 
the population. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, National Public Health Institute, Finnish In-
stitute for Occupational Health, National Agency for Medicines and National Emergency 
Supply Agency assess the necessary additional reserve stocks of respirator masks and other 
healthcare equipment, in cooperation with Hospital Districts. 
The National Agency for Medicines makes contingency plans for distribution, release for 
consumption, delivery to patients and surveillance of consumption of antiviral drugs held in 
reserve stocks. 
Hospital District, health centre and other healthcare services employers must organise 
provision of information and training on occupational health and safety in accordance with 
occupational health and safety regulations, and ensure that suffi cient quantities of protective 
equipment are available in healthcare units. 
The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will jointly pre-
pare a plan of training for employees recruited from other duties and involved in outpatient 
and nursing care of infl uenza patients, and for noting risks from infectious diseases, such as 
those of a pandemic, in basic training. 
The National Public Health Institute will maintain online guidelines related to surveil-
lance of the infl uenza situation, detection of cases, and pandemic protection and control of 
healthcare employees and the public.
The Ministries will ensure that they have the resources for communications concerning 
the pandemic within their own administrative area. Information, instructions and recommen-
dations contained on the websites will be continually updated and the loading capacity of 
online services tested. The Ministries will step up their training and use of the VIRVE tele-
phone network. Each administrative sector makes a plan for enhanced communications and 
prepares relevant material in advance.
International cooperation
The World Health Organization (WHO)
WHO has a central role in surveillance of infectious diseases. It defi nes the point of transi-
tion from one pandemic phase to the next and issues recommendations on necessary action. 
The revised International Health Regulations reinforce worldwide prevention of infectious 
diseases. About 120 national infl uenza centres from more than 80 countries, including Fin-
land, participate in WHO international infl uenza surveillance. One of the most important 
tasks of the WHO infl uenza laboratory network is detection of novel, uncommon infl uenza 
viruses, which in a worst case scenario may develop into causes of a pandemic.
The European Union (EU)
The European Union has developed a surveillance and prevention system of infectious dis-
eases since the 1990s. At the EU Commission, the work is concentrated under DG SANCO, 
the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs. The European Centre for Disease 
19
Prevention and Control (ECDC), established in 2005, is an expert agency with scientifi c 
know-how to improve prevention and control of infectious diseases within the EU. The EU 
cooperation, carried out within the Council, Commission and ECDC working groups and 
committees, improves the preparedness and compatibility of member countries’ pandemic 
plans. Preparedness for a fl u pandemic is the responsibility of each individual member coun-
try. The member countries of the Union are legally obliged to participate in the operation 
of the Early Warning Response System of communicable diseases. Through the infectious 
diseases surveillance and monitoring network, the Commission, member countries and the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control obtain up-to-date information on epi-
demic outbreaks within the EU zone.
Nordic cooperation
The Nordic countries signed the Nordic Public Health Preparedness Agreement in 2002. The 
Agreement commits the Nordic countries to mutual social and healthcare cooperation in cri-
sis and catastrophic situations, taking into account national needs. A widespread infl uenza 
pandemic constitutes a crisis situation as defi ned in the Agreement.
The agenda of Finland’s presidency of the Nordic Council of Ministers in 2007 includes 
active promotion of Nordic cooperation in issues related to vaccines and a possible pandem-
ic. Investigations are currently under way on the possible initiation of joint Nordic infl uenza 
vaccine production.
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2 INTRODUCTION 
During the 20th century, infl uenza viruses caused three global epidemics or pandemics, in 
1918, 1957, and 1968. They had a signifi cant impact on public health, and substantial eco-
nomic, societal and political consequences. Based on increasing knowledge about infl uenza 
viruses and pandemics accumulated recently, it is likely that mankind will sooner or later 
face another infl uenza pandemic.
During recent decades, the World Health Organization (WHO) has established a wide 
network of reference laboratories for the global surveillance of infl uenza. WHO has consist-
ently communicated on the threat of a pandemic and encouraged member states to prepare 
for such an event. Many member states have developed a preparedness plan, but until re-
cently, measures to improve preparedness have been very restricted in many countries and 
did not cover all functions that may be affected by a pandemic, and need to be covered by 
a pandemic preparedness plan. With a perceived decline in threat from infectious diseases 
during 1970-1990s, preparedness to address such threats was not developed. This miscon-
ception was rooted in the successful elimination of threats presented by certain infectious 
agents. Therefore, preparing for extensive infectious disease epidemics has not been consid-
ered important.
The international anthrax threat in 2001, the international SARS epidemic in 2003, and a 
survey carried out in 2004 by the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health have indicated that 
preparedness for biological threats, i.e. large epidemics of infectious diseases or pandemics, 
is inadequate in Finland.
 With the increased pandemic threat, WHO, the European Commission, and the Europe-
an Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), set up in spring 2005, have repeat-
edly encouraged member states to update their preparedness plans and published strategic 
guidelines and technical recommendations. Recently, preparedness for an infl uenza pandem-
ic has been repeatedly discussed by the European Council.
On 21 April 2005, The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health nominated a National Work-
ing Group for Pandemic Preparedness, with the following duties: (1) to prepare a national 
plan for pandemic preparedness; (2) to establish guidelines for preparedness in the health-
care services; (3) to ensure effi cient cooperation between different administrative sectors. 
The Working Group consisted of representatives of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
administrative sectors from the National Public Health Institute, the National Agency for 
Medicines, the State Provincial Offi ce, Hospital Districts, primary health care, the Associa-
tion of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, and civic organizations, as well as the Min-
istry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs, and the Ministry of Defence. The Working Group reported to Liisa Hyssälä, Minister 
of Health and Social Services, on 15 March 2006. After circulation of the proposal for com-
ments, the plan has been updated at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
In addition to the National Working Group for Pandemic Preparedness, many other min-
istries and departments have implemented measures to improve pandemic preparedness.
Research and modelling work related to infl uenza viruses, epidemiology, medicines, 
vaccines and measures to limit its spread is under way in Europe and elsewhere in the world, 
and producing new insights. Preparing for the next infl uenza pandemic is a continuous proc-
ess.
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3 PURPOSE OF THE PREPAREDNESS PLAN 
The aim of this preparedness plan is to provide guidance to all levels of the healthcare serv-
ices for pandemic preparedness, and to support activities of all other administrative sectors. 
Adapted to the specifi c Finnish context, this preparedness plan presents a possible sce-
nario for the development of a pandemic, its impact on health, society, and economy. Fur-
thermore, it addresses measures that are available to reduce the impact of a pandemic, ethical 
issues specifi c to a pandemic situation, the areas of responsibility and exceptional arrange-
ments for healthcare organisations. The plan identifi es the needs of procurement of materi-
als for improving preparedness, the need for cooperation between the different administra-
tive sectors, requirements for exceptional organisational arrangements during the event of a 
pandemic, and needs of communications. The plan addresses a wide range of issues related 
to a pandemic, thus providing the basis to other administrative sectors when preparing their 
detailed pandemic preparedness plans. For practical reasons, plans of administrative sectors 
other than social affairs and health are presented only briefl y in this document. Effi cient im-
plementation requires integration of plans prepared by the different administrative sectors.
The preparedness plan needs to be continuously adapted to change in threats and func-
tional environment, change in possibilities to predict further developments, or when control 
measures become available. For this reason, the preparedness plan will never be “ready”. An 
infl uenza pandemic can emerge at any time, within months or within years. It can be caused 
by a virus currently presenting a pandemic threat or by any other infl uenza A virus subtype. 
Preparing for an infl uenza pandemic concomitantly enhances Finland’s ability to cope suc-
cessfully with any other large international or global epidemic. Strengthening structures for 
combating pandemics at the same time improves core areas of infectious disease control and 
enhances public health. Preparedness supports securing the vital functions of society.
Primary responsibility in the preparedness of healthcare services rests, apart from the 
municipalities, in the regional organisation, in which Hospital Districts and the Provincial 
Offi ces jointly guide the planning and implementation for preparedness in public primary 
healthcare, social services and private healthcare services. The function of the regional or-
ganisation is to create a regionally adapted organisation and command structure, and a plan 
that incorporates regional and local characteristics. 
A key objective of the plan is to ensure equal services to the population in different ar-
eas of the country even in the exceptional conditions of a pandemic, although organisation 
and implementation may differ from region to region. Incorporated in this plan are a number 
of specifi c technical guidelines addressing issues essential during the current phase of pan-
demic alert. These guidelines may have to be adapted when new knowledge accumulates. 
Resources permitting, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and its expert organisations 
will support other administrative sectors in the development of preparedness plans for infec-
tious disease threats and their implementation.
It is desirable that the present preparedness plan is widely used for training to improve 
preparedness, and in the preparation and implementation of adapted local plans. This plan 
also provides the base for strengthening the resources needed in different organisations. As-
sessment of the economic impact of an infl uenza pandemic will continue during the imple-
mentation of the preparedness plan.
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4 INFLUENZA 
Infl uenza is an acute infl ammatory disease of the respiratory system, caused by either infl u-
enza viruses A or B and occurring annually in wintertime in epidemics. The reason for re-
peated epidemics (seasonal infl uenza) is that the superfi cial structure of both viruses is con-
stantly mutating, and they are thus capable of evading the immune reactions created in the 
population during previous epidemics. Infl uenza A viruses occur as numerous subtypes in 
other animals and particularly in waterfowl. The letters H and N are used to describe the cru-
cial surface proteins of the virus in terms of both transmissibility and human immunity, hae-
magglutinin and the neuraminidase enzyme. Several different subtypes and a number of dif-
ferent combinations of both occur in avian viruses. In humans, epidemic diseases in the last 
decades have been caused by two A virus subtypes, H1N1 and H3N2, and their composite 
virus (reassortant) H1N2. A previously healthy person usually recovers from infl uenza with-
out any particular treatment within two weeks, but with the elderly and those suffering from 
certain chronic diseases, an infl uenza viral infections may cause a serious secondary disease. 
Prevention of infl uenza is effected through vaccination. The disease may also be alleviated 
by using antiviral drugs, with certain preconditions.
4.1 Infl uenza as a disease 
4.1.1 Infection mechanisms, incubation period, infectious period
Infl uenza viruses spread from one person to another mainly through droplets. Infection 
through direct or indirect contact is also possible. There is also a possibility of airborne in-
fection. Infl uenza viruses multiply in the epithelial cells of the respiratory system and are re-
leased into respiratory secretions. Particularly when coughing or sneezing, large numbers of 
secretion droplets of various sizes are released from the respiratory system, spreading across 
the immediate surroundings of the infected person, in reality to a maximum distance of a 
metre. Even microscopic droplets may contain suffi cient numbers of viable virus to infect 
another person, if they gain access to membranes of the upper respiratory tract or the eyes, 
either directly (droplet infection) or via hands contaminated by respiratory tract secretions 
(direct contact infection). People may also be infected via hands from surrounding surfaces 
or materials, if respiratory tract secretions have contaminated them (indirect contact infec-
tion). Infl uenza viruses are easily destroyed by disinfectants, as well as by heating to above 
60 ºC (cf. section 10.4).
The incubation period from the point of infection to emergence of symptoms is usually 
one to four days, but with children may take up to six days. During the incubation period, 
the virus multiplies in the organism, as the defence mechanisms responsible for creation of 
symptoms have not yet had time to develop. The virus may be present in respiratory tract 
secretions before manifestation of the symptoms, but the secretions are at their peak during 
the fi rst and second symptom day. At that time, the chances of identifying the virus from se-
cretions by laboratory tests are also at their highest. Subsequently, the virus content of secre-
tions gradually declines. With adult infl uenza patients, the virus may usually be found in res-
piratory tract secretions within fi ve-six days from the onset of the illness, but children may 
secrete the virus for up to three weeks.
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4.1.2 Clinical description
With an adult infl uenza patient, a typical symptom is an acute fever, generally more than 
38oC, rising possibly even above 40oC. Along with the temperature or soon after, at least one 
of the following symptoms arise: sore throat, dry cough, nasal congestion. In addition, typi-
cal cases present with headache and muscular pains. Usually, the temperature starts to de-
cline on the third symptom day and returns to normal within fi ve or six days. At the same 
time, respiratory tract symptoms, such as cough and nasal congestion may increase in sever-
ity. Nasal secretions may increase and respiratory symptoms continue for one to two weeks 
after the temperature has gone. In mildest cases, infl uenza may present as a head cold or an 
infl amed throat. With children, the commonest symptoms of infl uenza are a high tempera-
ture, cough and nasal congestion, but the disease may also include symptoms of the diges-
tive tract, such as vomiting, diarrhoea and abdominal pains.
4.1.3 Complications
Although the majority of both children’s and adults’ infl uenza infections pass without treat-
ment, a considerable number of serious complications are associated with infl uenza. With 
adults, infl uenza A/H3N2 causes the most serious consequences, while with children, both 
infl uenza A subtypes, A/H1N1 and A/H3N2, and infl uenza B may cause an equally serious 
disease. 
There is no evidence of risk of deformity or other abnormalities in foetal development as-
sociated with ordinary infl uenza epidemics. However, several independent studies have de-
scribed a slightly increased risk of developmental abnormality affecting the central nervous 
system associated with the 1957 H2N2 pandemic. There was no evidence of an increased 
risk associated with the 1968 H3N2 pandemic. New studies on the issue are ongoing.
The most dangerous complication of infl uenza is pneumonia, which during annual epi-
demics or so-called seasonal infl uenza is almost always caused by bacteria. The most com-
mon cause is Streptococcus pneumoniae (pneumococcus), but it may also be an infection 
caused by some other bacterium, such as Haemophilus infl uenzae or Staphylococcus aureus. 
Pneumonia may develop soon after onset of infl uenza symptoms, or typically not until the 
convalescence stage. It may be life-threatening with the elderly and with patients who are in 
poor health and suffering from various chronic diseases. During previous pandemics, par-
ticularly the so-called Spanish fl u that began in 1918, pneumonia caused by the infl uenza 
virus has also occurred, often developing rapidly immediately after emergence of infl uen-
za symptoms and possibly leading to death within a few days. About a quarter of these af-
fected young and otherwise healthy people, and in addition about 10 percent were pregnant 
women. 
Infl ammation of the heart muscle and meningitis are more uncommon sequelae associat-
ed with infl uenza. They are also linked to considerable mortality rates. Less severe but trou-
blesome complications of infl uenza with children are commonly middle ear infections, and 
sinusitis with all age groups. 
A proportion of the mortality rate caused by infl uenza is due to deterioration of heart and 
vascular diseases, pulmonary disease and other chronic conditions.
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4.1.4 Infl uenza that passes from birds to humans
Known cases of human infection caused by the A/H5N1 avian infl uenza virus differ quite 
considerably from the clinical description of seasonal infl uenza. The incubation period is of-
ten longer, taking up to eight days, possibly even longer. Patients are usually running a high 
temperature and have symptoms indicative of lower respiratory tract infection very soon af-
ter the onset of the disease. Breathing diffi culties, rasping breathing sounds and high breath-
ing rate are typical observations. Almost all patients have clinically defi nite pneumonia, and 
microbiological test results to date indicate that the pneumonia is almost always viral. Func-
tioning of many other organs is also disrupted, with impaired renal function and cardiac en-
largement typical fi ndings. In some cases, the predominant symptom has been diarrhoea, 
and in a couple of cases, the patient has had meningitis without respiratory tract symptoms. 
The mortality rate of virologically confi rmed cases has been under 60 percent, and the pa-
tients have died on average nine–ten ten days after the onset of the disease. The majority of 
the patients have been children or young adults. If the A/H5N1 virus develops into a pan-
demically spreading form, the clinical picture may change to become less severe than is cur-
rently the case.
In 2003, an A/H7N7 infl uenza subtype caused a widespread poultry epidemic in the 
Netherlands. At the time of the epidemic, the same virus was found to have caused illness 
also in humans. One veterinary surgeon died from the avian infl uenza infection he had con-
tracted, but the symptoms affecting the other 90 or so patients were very mild, mostly con-
junctivitis or mild infections of the upper respiratory tract.
4.2 Protection from infection
The basic principles of protection against infl uenza infection are good hand hygiene and pro-
tection from respiratory tract secretions. Thorough and frequent hand washing prevents viral 
respiratory tract infections. (cf. 7.1.6 ”Hygiene and disinfection measures”) 
Spread of the disease is prevented by covering the mouth and nose with a disposable tis-
sue when coughing and sneezing and placing the used tissue immediately in the bin. The 
hands must be cleansed immediately after coughing or sneezing either by washing with soap 
and water or with alcohol-based disinfectant (cf. Appendix 7).
 4.3 Vaccines 
Vaccines have been employed in prevention of seasonal infl uenza for more than 50 years. 
Annual infl uenza inoculations can signifi cantly reduce serious infl uenza infections, hospi-
talisation and deaths. 
Because the composition of the vaccine varies each year, clinical investigations to ensure 
compliance with the immunogenicity, safety and effi cacy requirements of the vaccine must 
also be repeated annually. The vaccine containing the new strains is approved through the 
EU Mutual Recognition Procedure, in which Finland participates.
Today, the vaccines most commonly used to prevent infl uenza are inactivated vaccines. 
In addition to inactivated vaccines, infl uenza vaccines containing live but weakened virus 
have been developed in recent years. The difference is that the inactivated vaccine is injected 
into muscle, but the vaccine containing live virus is administered via a nasal spray. Live vac-
25
cine virus is capable of multiplying in the epithelial cells of the upper respiratory tract, and 
as the result of a very mild infection the inoculated person develops immunity. Live vaccine 
viruses have been modifi ed so that they are incapable of multiplying in the higher tempera-
ture of the lower respiratory tract.
In all European countries, infl uenza vaccinations are recommended for those in medical 
risk groups and the aged. In Finland, everyone over 65 has been included in the infl uenza 
vaccination recommendation under the general inoculation programme since 2002. In 2005, 
52 percent of the over-65s were inoculated against infl uenza in Finland. In 2003, the WHO 
Health Assembly urged countries to step up their national infl uenza vaccination campaigns, 
so that risk groups would be more comprehensively vaccinated.
About 300 million doses of infl uenza vaccine are currently produced annually world-
wide. In order to extensively reduce morbidity caused by an infl uenza pandemic, production 
capacity should be considerably increased in the next few years. Negotiations on joint vac-
cine production for the Nordic countries have taken place during 2006.
Production capacity can only be increased if the vaccine industry deems increased ca-
pacity to be feasible. Increasing inoculation coverage in the recommended groups and ex-
tending the vaccination programme to new medically justifi ed groups, such as children, 
would reduce infl uenza morbidity in all age groups and increase consumption, production 
and availability of vaccines.
4.4 Antiviral drugs 
4.4.1 Amantadine
The oldest of the infl uenza drugs, amantadine, has been used since the 1960s. Amantadine is 
an orally administered drug available only in tablet form. Thus, its use with children is dif-
fi cult, although the drug is offi cially approved also for treatment and prevention of infl uenza 
in children over the age of two.
When amantadine treatment is begun within two days of onset of symptoms, the medica-
tion reduces duration of infl uenza symptoms in adults by about twenty-four hours. Howev-
er, the medication is relatively frequently linked to side-effects affecting the central nervous 
system and the intestines, such as insomnia, headache, dizziness, lack of concentration and 
nausea. Amantadine is effective on the majority of infl uenza A viruses, but even some of the 
epidemic A virus strains are resistant to it. Conversely, amantadine has no effect whatsoever 
on B viruses. Nor has amantadine been found to be effective against topical H5 type avian 
infl uenza viruses, with the exception of a few isolated virus strains.
Perhaps the most signifi cant drawback of amantadine is that during treatment, the patient 
quickly hosts new viruses resistant to this drug, with normal transmission capacity. For this 
reason, amantadine is today rarely used in treatment of infl uenza, but in infl uenza prevention 
it is still a viable drug for example for elderly people in residential care, provided that trou-
blesome side-effects are minimised and that the circulating virus strains are sensitive to it.
Rimantadine is closely related to amantadine, and has been used in some countries along-
side it. It is not available in Finland.
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4.4.2 Zanamivir
Zanamivir was the fi rst infl uenza virus neuraminidase inhibitor which came into the market 
in 1999. Zanamivir binds to infl uenza virus neuraminidase, preventing release from its sur-
face of new viruses created in the host cell. Thus, zanamivir does not actually prevent infl u-
enza infection at cellular level, but its effective mechanism halts the progress of the infec-
tion in the organism.
Zanamivir is a powder, administered as inhalation directly into the respiratory tract in the 
same way as some asthma medications. In Finland, the approved indication for use of the 
drug is treatment of infl uenza in adults and children over 12. Although research shows zan-
amivir to be clearly effective also in prevention of infl uenza, this has not been approved as 
offi cial indication for use in this country.
When treatment with zanamivir is begun within forty-eight hours of the onset of infl u-
enza symptoms, the duration of the disease is reduced on average by 1-1.5 days. However, 
the medication is the more effective, the more severe the patient’s symptoms are when treat-
ment is started. Zanamivir has also been reported to have some preventative effect on lower 
respiratory tract infections associated with infl uenza and treatable by antibacterial drugs, al-
though only scant research knowledge exists on the effi cacy of the drug in this context. Con-
versely, in prophylaxis following exposure to infl uenza within the family circle, the effi cacy 
of zanamivir has been about 80 percent regardless of whether or not the fi rst case in the fam-
ily has been treated with the drug. Similarly, daily prophylaxis over four weeks administered 
during an infl uenza epidemic has been reported to reduce the incidence of infl uenza cases 
confi rmed by laboratory tests by 67 percent.  
Tolerance to zanamivir is very high. A rare reported side-effect is bronchospasm after in-
halation. Therefore, it is recommended that at least patients suffering from asthma or chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease should also have access to fast-acting medication that opens 
up the bronchial tubes during zanamivir treatment. 
Zanamivir is effective on both A and B type infl uenza viruses. Development of resistance 
during treatment has been extremely rare. Usability of zanamivir, particularly with the eld-
erly, is limited by the nebulator required to administer it, the use of which may be diffi cult 
for some patients, especially during the illness.
4.4.3 Oseltamivir
Oseltamivir is the other infl uenza neuraminidase inhibitor in the market. It was licensed for 
sale in 2002. Its mechanism of action is the same as that of zanamivir.
Oseltamivir is a drug taken by mouth, available both in capsule form and as an oral sus-
pension. Its approved indications for use are treatment and prevention of infl uenza in adults 
and children over 1 year old. Dosage must be reduced for patients with serious renal fail-
ure.
Effi cacy of oseltamivir in infl uenza treatment is akin to that of zanamivir; the total du-
ration of the disease is cut by about 1-1.5 days, when treatment is begun within forty-eight 
hours from onset of the symptoms. There are no published directly comparative effi cacy 
studies between different neuraminidase inhibitors. However, in the case of oseltamivir, ef-
fi cacy of the drug has been shown to be critically dependent on how quickly after the onset 
of symptoms the treatment is started. If it is possible to start oseltamivir treatment within 
six hours of onset of the symptoms, the disease duration is cut by more than half of what it 
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would be if the medication is begun 36-48 hours from onset of symptoms. Oseltamivir has 
been shown to prevent complications linked to infl uenza and requiring antibacterial medica-
tion by about 55 percent and the total antibacterial medications by about 27 percent. It has 
also been reported to reduce hospitalisations by about 60 percent. In infl uenza treatment of 
children, oseltamivir can reduce development of acute middle ear infection as a complica-
tion of infl uenza by more than 40 percent, when treatment is begun within forty-eight hours 
from onset of the symptoms. 
In long-term infl uenza prophylaxis lasting for six weeks, the effi cacy of a daily dose of 
oseltamivir has been 76 percent. In post-exposure prophylaxis within the family, the effi cacy 
of oseltamivir has also been 85-90 percent at individual level.
The most common side-effects of oseltamivir are nausea and vomiting, which occur in 
5-10 percent of patients, depending on their age. However, these adverse effects are gener-
ally so mild that they rarely lead to interruption of the drug treatment. Gastric side-effects 
may be reduced by taking the medicine with a meal, and in any event they usually cease as 
the treatment progresses. 
In principle, oseltamivir is effective against all A and B type infl uenza viruses. Develop-
ment of resistant virus strains during treatment has been rare, but recent studies would in-
dicate that development of virus strains resistant to oseltamivir during treatment, especially 
with children, may be considerably more common than has been thought. Similarly, very re-
cent reports suggest that some infl uenza A/H5N1 virus strains currently posing a pandemic 
threat have been found to have reduced susceptibility to oseltamivir.
4.5 Principles and surveillance mechanisms of infl uenza diagnostics
4.5.1 Basic principles of infl uenza diagnostics
On estimate, 5-20 percent of the population contract so-called seasonal infl uenza every year, 
and about one in two of those infected develop the disease with typical symptoms. Even dur-
ing a mild infl uenza epidemic, more than 125,000 inhabitants contract infl uenza in Finland. 
Only a small proportion seek medical help. Precise information on the incidence of infl uen-
za is only obtained from cases confi rmed by laboratory tests. Only a small fraction of infl u-
enza cases is subjected to laboratory testing. Laboratory confi rmation of infl uenza is either 
based on identifi cation of the virus or a part of it in patient specimens of respiratory tract se-
cretions, or by examining a sick person’s blood samples and fi nding that his immune system 
has reacted to infection by the infl uenza virus by producing antibodies. In Finland, univer-
sity virology and microbiology departments, microbiology laboratories of some hospitals, 
health centres and some private medical centres and laboratories provide viral diagnostic 
services. Customary patient diagnostics employ methods permitting identifi cation of a pos-
sible virus in a respiratory tract secretion specimen as A or B virus usually within twenty-
four hours at most.
The National Public Health Institute (NPHI) infl uenza laboratory carries out more pre-
cise subtype defi nitions on cases corresponding to exact clinical case defi nitions as part of 
national and international pandemic surveillance. 
Case defi nitions applied during a pandemic as basis for decisions on treatment and sur-
veillance are detailed in section 10.1.2.
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4.5.2 National infl uenza surveillance systems
Finland has surveyed incidence of respiratory infections and infl uenza for a long time in se-
lected population groups, such as conscripts. It is the intention of NPHI to initiate a surveil-
lance scheme in cooperation with health centres and other organisations around the country. 
The mechanism will cover the whole population and be based on recording of symptoms, 
which would also aid detection and surveillance of infl uenza epidemics. 
Most laboratories carrying out infl uenza diagnostics submit their positive fi ndings to the 
National Register of Infectious Diseases maintained by NPHI, resulting in approx. 1,000-
3,000 infl uenza diagnoses confi rmed by laboratories. 
The NPHI Infl uenza Laboratory also examines the specimens using the viral culture 
method. The laboratory isolates infl uenza virus from patient specimens, defi nes their type 
and subtype, analyzes their antigenic and genetic properties, and monitors mutation of the 
infl uenza viruses during the infl uenza season and between epidemics. The Infl uenza Labo-
ratory operates as the WHO National Infl uenza Centre and reports regularly on surveillance 
results to the WHO headquarters, the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (London) 
and under bilateral reporting agreements to about 20 other national infl uenza laboratories.
4.5.3 International infl uenza surveillance schemes
About 120 national infl uenza centres from more than 80 countries participate in WHO inter-
national infl uenza surveillance. Many national centres (including NPHI Infl uenza Laborato-
ry) submit their weekly fi ndings to the WHO FluNet database. Based on virological and epi-
demiological data accumulated from national laboratories, the WHO group of experts issues 
its recommendation on vaccine viruses twice a year. One of the most important tasks of the 
WHO infl uenza laboratory network is identifi cation of novel, uncommon infl uenza viruses, 
which in a worst case scenario may develop into causes of a pandemic.
Diagnosis of infl uenza in an individual patient purely on the basis of the clinical pic-
ture is impossible in reality, since many other viruses may cause a similar clinical descrip-
tion. Nevertheless, during an infl uenza epidemic, a patient running a temperature and with a 
cough, and with similar illness in the immediate environment, is highly likely to be suffer-
ing from infl uenza. Consequently, international infl uenza surveillance schemes often use the 
defi nition ‘infl uenza-like illness’, which is considered to give a better idea of incidence of 
infl uenza than would be achieved by recording all upper respiratory tract infections. Severe 
epidemic waves are reliably detected through the latter approach, too.
The European Union mechanism, the European Infl uenza Surveillance Scheme (EISS), 
collects virological and epidemiological data from member states and issues a report on the 
infl uenza status of the European zone between October and May. For the purpose of virolog-
ical investigations, patient details and specimens are collected in health centres and private 
medical centres belonging to the sentinel surveillance system. The specimens are examined 
and the clinical-epidemiological information from the surveillance units is collated in the 
member state’s EISS laboratory, which submits it to the EISS centre situated in the Neth-
erlands National Institute of Public Health and the Environment. The EISS statistics reveal 
both the weekly number of detected viruses and the number of health centre visits by pa-
tients suffering from infl uenza-like illness. Finland does not have the requisite surveillance 
system, but participates in the operation of EISS as an associate member. 
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4.5.4 Surveillance of infl uenza in animals
Infl uenza viral infections usually occurring without symptoms in wild birds may cause avi-
an infl uenza epidemics in poultry, with symptoms of varying degrees of severity. Strains of 
the subtypes H5 and H7 have caused the most serious diseases. The World Organisation for 
Animal Health (OIE, Organisation Mondiale de la Santé Animale) monitors infl uenza cases 
and epidemics in domestic animals, particularly fowl and pigs. Authorities of OIE member 
countries report cases and epidemics to OIE. In an effort to put an end to epidemics, poultry 
that is either diseased or exposed to infection is destroyed, strict isolation measures are taken 
and transport of animals restricted. (Further information on the OIE website www.oie.int)
In Finland, the infl uenza laboratory of the Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira) operat-
ing under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry monitors the infl uenza situation in poul-
try, imported fowl and pigs. The laboratory also participates in the infl uenza surveillance of 
poultry and migratory birds laid down by the EU. Further information on the Ministry of Ag-
riculture and Forestry (www.mmm.fi ) and Evira (www.evira.fi ) websites.
4.5.5 Other sources of information on infl uenza epidemics
In recent years, the fi rst information on epidemics affecting humans or animals in differ-
ent parts of the world has often been obtained via the online ProMed service maintained by 
the International Society for Infectious Diseases. Doctors, epidemiologists, microbiologists, 
health authorities and other people around the world enter details of clinically and epidemi-
ologically unusual or alarming cases and epidemics into this system, and the Society passes 
on the information via email and the Internet. Epidemiological observations are often report-
ed even before the cause of the disease has been established in the laboratory. Information 
on new detections and epidemics obtained through offi cial organisations, such as WHO and 
OIE and the Disease Control Centres of the United States (CDC) or Europe (ECDC) is of-
ten more accurate and reliable. However, at least in the early stages of epidemics it is often 
delayed, because these organisations generally only notify individual cases and epidemics 
confi rmed by reference laboratories or epidemiologically investigated.
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5 DEVELOPMENT PHASES OF A PANDEMIC
A risk of an infl uenza pandemic is only linked to infl uenza A viruses, which are classifi ed as 
different subtypes according to the properties of the proteins, haemagglutinin (H) and neu-
raminidase (N), on the virus surface. 16 different subtypes of haemagglutinin and nine of 
neuraminidase are known, and especially infl uenza viruses of wild waterfowl contain nu-
merous different HN combinations. Humans, pigs, horses and occasionally also other mam-
mals have only been found with a few A virus subtypes. 
A pandemic is created when a new subtype is transmitted to humans, and its spread is not 
curtailed by immunity based on previous infl uenza virus infections or inoculations. All pan-
demic viruses have originated from birds. In known cases, they have passed from birds to 
humans either gradually through adaptation (Spanish fl u 1918) or through so-called reassor-
tation, whereby the human virus has obtained genes originating from the avian virus (Asian 
fl u 1957, Hong Kong fl u 1968). Usually, avian infl uenza viruses transfer poorly to humans, 
and a long development process may be required before the virus is capable of effective mul-
tiplication and human-to-human transmission. Conversely, a virus created through reassor-
tation may have properties enabling it easily and quickly to develop into a human virus and 
to cause a pandemic.
The pandemics of last century were only detected when the virus had already had time 
to spread widely and caused large-scale epidemics in different countries. Recent research in-
dicates that the virus responsible for Spanish fl u had infected individual people and caused 
relatively small epidemics years before the beginning of the 1918 pandemic. Evidently, the 
virus has gradually obtained properties of a pandemic virus, until in 1918 it began to spread 
rapidly around the globe.
Today, poultry epidemics and even single, unusual human cases can be quickly detected, 
thanks to the international infl uenza surveillance schemes coordinated by WHO, OIE, and 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, FAO. Thus, development of a 
pandemic can be monitored phase by phase, and measures planned in an effort to prevent a 
pandemic or at least to slow down its development. 
In the WHO Global Infl uenza Preparedness Plan published in 2005, development of a 
pandemic is divided into six possible phases. These phases are briefl y described below and 
in Appendix 10. It is impossible to forecast the duration of the different phases; transition 
from one phase to the next may be very rapid or it may take several years.
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5.1 Interpandemic period 
Phase 1
No new infl uenza A virus subtypes have been detected in humans. An infl uenza virus subtype 
that has caused human infections may be present in animals, but the risk of human infection 
or disease is considered to be low.
Phase 2
No new infl uenza A virus subtypes have been detected in humans, but a circulating animal 
infl uenza virus subtype poses a substantial risk of human infection and disease.
5.2 Pandemic alert period
Phase 3
New infl uenza A virus subtype infections from animals to humans occur, but there is no hu-
man-to-human transmission, or at most rare instances of spread through close contact.
Phase 4
A new infl uenza A virus subtype has caused small disease clusters, indicating that human-to-
human transmission is limited. Infection chains are very localised, indicating that the virus 
is not yet well adapted to humans.
Phase 5
A new infl uenza A virus subtype has caused geographically limited large disease clusters. 
This suggests increasing adaptation of the virus to humans. The virus does not yet appear to 
be fully transmissible human-to-human (substantial pandemic risk).
Transition from phase 3 to phases 4 or 5 may take years, but it may also happen rapidly. 
In addition to case numbers and cluster sizes, phase classifi cation depends on the severity of 
the illness caused by the virus and estimates regarding its transmissibility that may be made 
based on the genetic or other properties of the virus. Efforts are made to prevent increase in 
pandemic threat by cutting off human infection chains, e.g. with the aid of isolation, trace-
back investigations and preventive medication. In theory, it is also possible that infections 
of a subtype new to humans can be halted in animals at phase 3, enabling return to phase 1 
or 2. 
Even if the events of phases 3-5 take place outside Finland and Europe, it is possible that 
individual infected persons enter Finland. If this happens as early as in phase 3, the subse-
quent phases may also occur in Finland.
WHO aims to develop international procedures, allowing phase 4 (and possibly phase 5) 
to be detected almost in real time, and effective preventive measures to be initiated to break 
infection chains and to halt the spread of the epidemic. The objective is to prevent formation 
of a comprehensive pandemic. The draft document published by WHO in 2006 defi nes the 
duties of national and international authorities in order to limit localised epidemics.
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5.3 Pandemic period
Phase 6
The virus is fully adapted to humans and spreads in the population, causing widespread epi-
demics crossing geographic boundaries. A worldwide pandemic is imminent. 
Development of a pandemic cannot be halted at this phase. All resources should be con-
centrated on alleviating the effects of the pandemic. At previous pandemics, the fi rst pan-
demic wave has been followed by a second and possibly even a third wave, months after the 
fi rst wave subsided. The second wave may be equally or more severe than the fi rst.
5.4 Postpandemic period
Return to interpandemic period.
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6 POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A PANDEMIC
6.1 Impacts on health and the healthcare system 
6.1.1 Scenario based on knowledge accumulated from previous pandemics
The World Health Organisation WHO states in its Global Infl uenza Preparedness Plan1 that 
it is impossible to predict the timing, intensity, or impacts on the healthcare system and other 
societal functions of the next pandemic. However, in order to draft a national pandemic pre-
paredness plan, assumptions must be made on the kind of impacts the next pandemic may 
have on healthcare and the rest of society. Thus, the following sections are only assumptions 
made in order to estimate required resources, not forecasts. Only when the pandemic virus 
has caused relatively extensive epidemics are factors determining its impacts revealed, con-
sisting of at least the following: particular properties of the pandemic virus genotype and 
structure, human-to-human transmissibility, pathogenicity and drug susceptibility, possible 
partial immunity in certain population groups and available vaccines, antiviral drugs and 
other measures that may be employed in an effort to reduce numbers of new infections.
By the end of September 2006, the A/H5N1 avian infl uenza epidemic, originated at the 
end of 2003 in South Korea, had caused the laboratory-confi rmed disease in 252 persons. 
Almost 60% of them had died. Even if the A/H5N1 was to develop into the next pandemic 
virus, case mortality is unlikely to remain at this level. 
Adaptation of an avian virus to humans may take a long time. That is why it is possible 
that before an actual pandemic wave, the pandemic virus may cause infection chains of var-
ying lengths in humans, some of which may also reach Finland. Attempts should be made to 
interrupt them through active isolation, treatment and preventative measures. This way, the 
start of a pandemic might be delayed, but it cannot be prevented. 
The fi rst pandemic wave, causing great morbidity, may be followed by one or more sub-
sequent waves after months or a year. Their morbidity in previous pandemics has generally 
– albeit not necessarily – been lower than during the initial wave.
6.1.2 Basic assumptions for drafting preparedness plans
Observations made during pandemics of the past century may be utilised when modelling 
potential impacts of the next pandemic. The fundamental problem is that the degrees of se-
verity of those three pandemics were very different, particularly in terms of case mortality. 
(Table 1) 
1  http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/infl uenza/WHO_CDS_CSR_GIP_2005_5.pdf
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Table 1. Figures from pandemics in the 1900s
Pandemic and
starting year
Estimated number
of dead worldwide
Morbidity
in USA
Case mortality
in USA
Spanish fl u 1918  50 million  25 %  1.9 %
Asian fl u 1957  1.5 million  30 %*  0.14 %
Hong Kong fl u 1968  0.7 million  25 %  0.07 %
*  During the Asian fl u pandemic, morbidity in the United Kingdom was 57 % and 188/100,000 inhabitants 
were hospitalised2.
#  The UK Infl uenza Pandemic Contingency Plan takes the basic model case morbidity as 0.37 % and for 
worst case scenario 2.5 %.
In the following sections, the assumption in calculations concerning Finland is that dur-
ing the fi rst pandemic wave, in the absence of effective vaccine or drug prophylaxis, 35 
percent of the population will contract infl uenza within two months. We will also briefl y 
outline the result of a second model, applying a lower degree of morbidity and adapted for 
Finland.
6.1.3 Need for primary healthcare services
Not all who contract pandemic infl uenza become seriously ill. An estimate in the United 
Kingdom is that only 10 percent of those infected visit a doctor’s surgery, where under the 
country’s preparedness plan the possible need for hospitalisation and treatment of compli-
cations of infl uenza is assessed. Depending on the properties of the pandemic virus, how-
ever, the infl uenza may cause complications and deaths in all age groups and even basically 
healthy people. When the aim is treatment with antiviral drugs as early as possible (<48 h 
from onset of symptoms) of as large a proportion as possible of those infected, in order to 
reduce hospitalisation, complications and deaths, the need for outpatient services is much 
greater than the UK estimate would indicate; in principle, they are needed by all those af-
fected. Clearly, a need of this magnitude cannot be fulfi lled within the framework of custom-
ary surgery facilities. 
The table below shows the estimated weekly outpatient contact requirement based on 
this worst case scenario. The estimate makes the assumption that the cases are symmetri-
cally distributed over a period of eight weeks, nevertheless including a relatively sharp two-
week peak period. The peak of a pandemic wave may also be much less pronounced, but in 
an individual location the epidemic peak may be even sharper than that shown in Table 2. 
It is likely that the epidemic wave will not occur simultaneously in all parts of Finland. The 
distribution of weekly incidences of illness presented in Table 2 may be useful in estimating 
the impacts of a pandemic on various functions of society.
2  Gani et al. http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no09/04-1344.htm
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Table 2. Outpatient services requirement during an eight-week pandemic
Measure Pandemic week
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Percentage of 
population 1 2 5 10 9 5 2 1
Number
In Finland 52,000 104,000 260,000 520,000 468,000 260,000 104,000 52,000
Number / 100,000 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 9,000 5,000 2,000 1,000
6.1.4 Need for hospitalisation and mortality
The following shows the impacts of a pandemic on the need for hospitalisation and mortal-
ity. The results are based on two different models using different base assumptions.
The USA Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has developed a Microsoft 
Excel based FluSurge program3, which can be applied to estimate usage of hospital services 
during a pandemic. The model makes the assumption that need for hospital care and mortal 
risk depend on the age of the infected person according to a certain formula. It is further as-
sumed that the duration of hospitalisation is on average seven days, approx. 15 percent of 
infl uenza patients admitted into hospital require intensive care, and about 7.5 percent need 
a respirator. Intensive and respirator care is estimated to last on average 10 days. It should 
be noted that these assumptions do not necessarily correspond to Finnish treatment practic-
es and that in any case they are only assumptions made for the purpose of calculating esti-
mates. Furthermore, the FluSurge program does not take account of antiviral drugs or vac-
cines possible employed, which may signifi cantly reduce requirements for hospitalisation 
and mortality rates. 
Tables 3 and 4 show the FluSurge program applied to Finland, using population numbers 
in various age groups as published by Statistics Finland in 20044 and making the assump-
tion that 35 percent of the population will be infected within eight weeks. Table 3 shows the 
‘average’, ‘mild’ and ‘severe’ scenarios created using the programme. This estimate makes 
the assumption that of those affected, 1.51% (0.63–1.96%) will require hospitalisation. The 
table shows the numbers of weekly hospitalisation periods and deaths. Table 4 shows esti-
mated numbers of patients admitted and already staying in hospital and intensive care and 
respirator requirements (the fi gures are per 100,000 population). The case mortality shown 
in the severe scenario in Table 3 (0.5% of all clinically affected patients) may also be an un-
derestimate. 
3 http://www.cdc.gov/fl u/fl usurge.htm
4 http://www.tilastokeskus.fi /tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto.html
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Table 3. Patients requiring hospitalisation and deaths during an infl uenza pandemic
(calculated using the FluSurge software; assumption that 35% of population affected within 8 weeks)
Scenario Population Periods of hospitalisation Deaths
Average Whole country 27,500 5,650
Cases per 100,000 population 530 109
Mild Whole country 11,480 3,450
Cases per 100,000 population 221 66
Severe Whole country 35,690 9,050
Cases per 100,000 population 686 174
Table 4. Weekly usage of hospital services during a pandemic lasting eight weeks, when morbidity is 35 percent (in-
cidence per 100,000 population, calculated using FluSurge software)
Scenario Event Week
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Average Infl uenza patients admitted into hospital 21 53 79 101 101 79 53 32
Mild Infl uenza patients admitted into hospital 13 22 33 42 42 33 22 13
Severe Infl uenza patients admitted into hospital 41 69 103 130 130 103 69 41
Average Infl uenza patients in hospital 21 53 79 101 106 97 75 50
Average Infl uenza patients in intensive care 5 10 16 20 22 22 17 12
Average Infl uenza patientsrequiring respirator 2 5 8 10 11 11 9 6
It should be noted that the estimates easily result in very different fi gures, depending on 
base assumptions and the formula applied. The estimates of different countries have been 
variable e.g. in terms of the proportion of those requiring hospitalisation in relation to all 
those affected, and the assumed case mortality rates. A French modelling study5 on possi-
ble impacts of an infl uenza pandemic has made base assumptions diverging from the above: 
the total morbidity of the pandemic is 25 percent of the population, but the proportion of 
those requiring hospitalisation greater than described above and case mortality 0.8 percent 
of those affected. Applied to Finland, this estimation model results in a good 50,000 periods 
of hospitalisation caused by the infl uenza pandemic and deaths of approx. 10,000 people, or 
greater fi gures than those given by the FluSurge model, despite a lower base assumption or 
total morbidity. 
 5  Doyle A., et al, unpublished data
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6.2 Economic and social consequences 
In addition to health risks affecting the population, the economic, social and political im-
pacts of an infl uenza pandemic are wide-ranging. During the SARS epidemic, Hong Kong 
estimated the fi nancial losses for South-East Asia at about 60 billion US dollars, and in To-
ronto, the losses were estimated at 2 billion Canadian dollars, in spite of the fact that the 
whole epidemic only involved around 8,000 cases, with about 250 in Toronto. The majority 
of the fi nancial losses affected sectors other than healthcare.
In addition to direct healthcare costs brought about by the disease and the reduced pro-
ductivity of those affected and those caring for them, a pandemic alert and an actual pan-
demic cause economic losses, particularly for tourism and commerce.
The avian A/H5N1 infl uenza epidemics that have occurred in an increasingly wider area 
in Asia have caused concern among those planning to travel to those countries. The small 
number of human cases and the absence of infections transmitted between humans have pre-
vented extensive losses in tourism in these destinations for the time being. Despite informa-
tion on risks and their prevention, enquiries from the public would indicate that even a small 
increase in the A/H5N1 virus human-to-human transmission rates would result in signifi cant 
decline in tourism in the affected regions. As a result of isolated ‘probable cases of SARS’ 
occurred in Finland at the time of the SARS epidemic, foreign organisers of conferences and 
travel began to cancel trips and meetings regardless of the fact that SARS was very quickly 
eliminated by further investigations. At the time of the SARS epidemic, demand for tourism 
services to South-East Asia fell quickly and substantially. The current view is that travel re-
strictions or screening and preventive methods targeted at travellers at border crossings are 
not important in limiting the progress or effects of a pandemic. Nevertheless, it is likely that 
due to perceived risk and possibly the precautionary principle dictated by political pressure, 
some countries will issue even unfounded restrictions, causing signifi cant and unnecessary 
damage to tourism.
Particular problems are posed by international operation under a pandemic alert of Finn-
ish companies in countries with poultry epidemics spreading infections, or the fi rst human 
epidemics. Company-specifi c travel restrictions or decisions to repatriate personnel may be 
adopted on the basis of personal or company-specifi c risk assessment, which would signifi -
cantly damage business operations. Furthermore, employers’ health and safety obligations 
must be taken into consideration, and these may be problematic in cases of international 
workforces. Decisions taken may have considerable economic consequences for affected 
companies and consequential effects on many business contacts.
Infl uenza is a zoonosis, or an infection affecting both animals and humans. In the present 
alert phase caused by the A/H5N1 avian infl uenza, the infection is primarily an animal infec-
tion, which occasionally infects humans in specifi c exposure situations. Poultry epidemics 
are restricted by quarantining and destroying animals, which in South-East Asian countries 
has led to fi nancial hardship of especially people keeping small numbers of poultry for do-
mestic use. Because infection is possible through handling sick animals or animal products, 
avian fl u epidemics have resulted in widespread trading restrictions of poultry from epidem-
ic countries. Although the objective of the restrictions is primarily prevention of the spread 
of a veterinary disease from one country to another, concern arises among the public over the 
risks of even harmless animal products. This leads to considerable fi nancial losses for both 
producers and trade. In Italy, where there were no avian A/H5N1 cases in 2005, consumption 
of poultry products collapsed in the autumn of 2005, and the losses incurred were already es-
timated at hundreds of millions of euros two months after news broadcasts on avian fl u epi-
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demics in other countries began. With increased pandemic threat as numbers of human-to-
human transmission of the virus increase, the disease is increasingly one limited to humans 
alone, and the importance of animals as source of infection decreases. In pandemic situa-
tions, the role of animals in terms of infection risk is insignifi cant in practice. At the time of 
the SARS epidemic, certain countries set import restrictions on other than animal products 
too, although there was no indication that the products may have transmitted infections.
A pandemic causing widespread illness among the population has societal impacts. 
Threat of infection may cause tensions between employees and employer, for example when 
service sector work is linked with a particular risk of exposure to infl uenza infection. Espe-
cially in healthcare, the risk of infection caused by work obligations and the work itself is 
associated with issues of work ethics that are crucial with regard to functioning of the health-
care system. Prioritisation of means of prevention or treatment in limited supply may cause 
socially divisive debate. Severe morbidity in the various work sectors of society may seri-
ously restrict services included in normal basic security. 
The Government Institute for Economic Research (VATT) has analysed impacts of an in-
fl uenza pandemic on the national economy. A pandemic would severely impact on the labour 
resources available to the national economy. A pandemic would have a similar impact to that 
of a deep recession. It must be assumed that the impacts would be the greatest in labour-in-
tensive service sectors. Some of the alternatives make the assumption that morbidity would 
be greater in the service sectors than in industry. Sickness absences and increased mortality 
would also have a long-term adverse effect on the national product. The results of the study 
are available on the National Emergency Supply Agency website www.huoltovarmuus.fi .
In Finnish conditions, care of the sick alone would incur direct additional costs to both 
the state and local authorities. The magnitude of the costs demands their reasonable division 
between the state and municipalities.
The transnational, global nature of a pandemic creates situations that require intensive 
international concerted action. Divergent views or procedures may develop for different rea-
sons between countries. The International Health Regulations, revised under the coordina-
tion of the World Health Organisation (WHO) and coming into force in 2007, lay down new 
procedures at sudden threatened infectious diseases. A particular aim is early, open commu-
nication of information, interaction between WHO and member countries when deciding on 
procedures and recommendations, and an effort to fi nd uniform measures that cause minimal 
damage to tourism and trade. Nevertheless, it is possible, indeed probable, that information 
on the threat situation will be obtained slowly from some countries. Countries may also im-
pose restrictions on tourism or trade that are neither recommended by WHO nor supported 
by other countries. This is likely to lead to tensions between countries. Particularly problem-
atic may be divergent ideas of neighbouring countries on necessary measures. The EU and 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) it set up in 2005 support 
EU member countries in creating uniform procedures in healthcare, although the actual de-
cisions on measures are taken in member countries. However, e.g. in the administrative sec-
tor of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, preventive measures are subject to uniform 
regulation in all member countries through EU-level regulations and decision-making.
Finland is one of the wealthy industrial countries able to obtain the vaccines, drugs and 
equipment necessary for preparedness. In global terms, even within the EU, there are consid-
erable differences in material preparedness of countries. Developing countries do not have 
the resources to prepare for a pandemic. At different phases of a pandemic alert, issues re-
lated to international solidarity will arise, for the effective resolution of which national and 
international procedures should be ready and in place.
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7 WAYS OF MINIMISING THE IMPACTS OF A PANDEMIC
7.1 Slowing down the spread of infection
There are a number of possible ways of prevention (appendix 3), not based on using vac-
cines or drugs, of a threatened infl uenza pandemic (WHO phases 3–5) or a pandemic (phase 
6). Their aim is (1) reduction of transnational spread of the virus through e.g. travel restric-
tions and screening of passengers, (2) prevention of infections within each country and be-
tween populations of different regions, through e.g. isolation and treatment of the sick, mon-
itoring and quarantine of those exposed to infection, measures increasing social distance, 
such as closing educational institutions, (3) reduction of infection risk of individual persons 
through e.g. hand hygiene, and (4) educating the population on the risk and individual pre-
ventive measures.
During pandemic alert phases 3-4, it is important to prevent infections from animals to 
humans by preventing infl uenza virus infections causing a threat of a pandemic in produc-
tion animals, particularly poultry. When poultry is infected with an infl uenza virus causing 
a pandemic threat, transmission to humans is prevented by means described in Appendix 4 
Reducing the risk of human infection during an avian infl uenza epidemic affecting poultry.
Recommended preventive measures not based on using vaccines or drugs, in Appendix 
3, lists preventive measures in a pandemic alert situation or a pandemic, albeit with little sci-
entifi c evidence on their effectiveness. Experiences gained during previous pandemics have 
led to an idea as to which preventive measures are likely to have had an effect on the courses 
of the pandemics, and which have probably been useless. 
Knowledge has accumulated from annual seasonal infl uenza epidemic situations and 
their prevention, which is useful in preparing guidelines for prevention of a pandemic. Dur-
ing the SARS epidemic in 2003, extensive preventive measures were implemented in some 
countries and in international air travel, and detailed accounts have been published on their 
feasibility and usefulness in preventing the spread of the disease in question. Due to differ-
ences related to transmission routes of infl uenza and SARS, caution is necessary when ap-
plying experiences gained from prevention of SARS to prevention of pandemic infl uenza.
During the pandemic alert phases and during the pandemic, investigations are carried out 
which help clarify knowledge on the effects of preventive measures. Guidelines are issued 
accordingly, and ineffective or unnecessary measures discontinued. WHO plays a central 
role in drawing up and updating recommendations. The European Centre for Disease Pre-
vention and Control (ECDC) is an important agent in dissemination of the knowledge base 
on preventive measures.
The WHO panel of experts has prepared the recommendations in Appendix 3 on meas-
ures to help prevent an infl uenza pandemic through means other than vaccines and pharma-
ceutical products. The recommendations issued by WHO are included in the appended table 
as they are, with the exception of very slight modifi cations due to Finnish conditions. 
The recommendations on use of different preventive measures vary in the distinct pan-
demic phases defi ned by the WHO. The reason is that the objectives of preventive action are 
signifi cantly different between phases 3-5 and phase 6. 
In phases 3-5, the number of cases is small. The objective of the action is to prevent a 
pandemic altogether or to signifi cantly delay the timing of its onset. Once the pandemic has 
begun (phase 6), the aim is to delay the timing of the pandemic peak, minimisation of ad-
verse effects to the health of the population, and securing of vital functions. During a pan-
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demic, case numbers are very high and the infection risk for the whole population is so great 
that certain preventive measures used in phases 3-5 are no longer feasible, due to limited re-
sources. Some methods used in phases 3-5 would no longer have any effect on the progress 
of the pandemic at phase 6.
In previous pandemics, the effects on the health of the population have fl uctuated a great 
deal. Obviously, as the pandemic alert progresses, the estimate of the severity of the immi-
nent pandemic affects particularly application of preventive measures that cause signifi cant 
disruption in functioning of society. If information available at pandemic alert phases 4–5 
indicates a threat similar to that of the Spanish fl u of 1918, in societal terms it is more justi-
fi able to employ extensive preventive measures that would cause disruption to society than 
if the forecast made at phases 4–5 indicates a pandemic similar to those of 1957 and 1968 
(Asian fl u, Hong Kong fl u; see section 6.1).
The WHO preparedness plan divides nonpharmaceutical interventions into subsections 
below, with headings referring to the detailed analysis in the WHO plan of each pandemic 
alert phase, in Appendix 3, Recommended preventive measures not based on using vaccines 
or drugs. Some of the areas of these preventive actions will be dealt with in more detail in 
other sections of the plan, with references below.
7.1.1 Public health information, communication 
Provision of information to the population and professional groups taking part in preventive 
action will be proactive during all pandemic alert phases and the pandemic itself. The aim of 
the information is to provide each target group with essential information on the epidemic 
and risk of infection, as well as prevention, without engendering unnecessary alarm among 
the population. It is particularly important to provide advance information on the next alert 
phases. The purpose is to support preparedness arrangements of various organisations and to 
educate the population as to how every citizen can affect the risk of infection. Provision of 
information will be dealt with in more detail in section 13.
7.1.2 Measures to reduce risk that cases transmit infection
The detailed measures are set out in the Pandemic Plan sections 10.3.1 Treatment chain in 
patient care and placement and 10.4 Protection against infection in healthcare 
7.1.3 Measures to reduce risk that contacts transmit infection
At pandemic alert phases 3-5, it is essential to break the infection chain by targeting the ac-
tions on symptom-free persons who have been in close contact with patients infected by the 
infl uenza virus causing a pandemic threat. The identifi cation and tracing of those exposed, 
post-exposure preventive use of antiviral drugs and use of quarantine are dealt with in more 
detail in section 10.2 Measures targeted at those exposed.
Tracing of contacts during the pandemic is no longer justifi ed; since infections take place 
commonly in all population groups, the action will not affect the course of the pandemic, and 
resources required for trace-back investigations are not available.
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7.1.4 Measures to increase social distance
Transmission of respiratory tract infections, such as infl uenza, can be reduced by staying at 
home at the onset of symptoms. The population will be provided with guidance on how risk 
of infection can be reduced at home, when a person becomes ill. A mildly affected person 
can often do remote work at home. Prior preparations for this option should be made.
During pandemic alert phases 4-5 and during the actual pandemic, it may be justifi ed to 
issue recommendations or orders e.g. on closing pre-schools and schools, cancelling pub-
lic events, sending national servicemen on leave, or closing public facilities (e.g. sports and 
cultural facilities). In such cases, expert recommendations are made according to an estimate 
based on information accumulated in the initial phases of pandemic alert on the character-
istics of the relevant virus, and the importance of infections taking place in schools or other 
communities in terms of the progress of the pandemic at the phase in question. 
There is no evidence of the effi cacy of the public using a mouth-nasal face mask in pre-
vention of infection during an infl uenza epidemic or seasonal infl uenza. WHO does not rec-
ommend use of face masks for the population, but accepts that the knowledge base regard-
ing the usefulness of this method is inconclusive. Properties and recommended uses of face 
masks are laid out in more detail in section 10.4 and Appendix 6. Guidelines on protection of 
persons exposed to birds or their secretions, required in case of a possible poultry infl uenza 
epidemic, are included in Appendix 4.
7.1.5 Measures to decrease interval between symptom onset and patient isolation
During all phases of pandemic alert and the actual pandemic, infections may be reduced by 
providing information in a way that helps those affected to recognise their illness at an ear-
ly stage as suspected infl uenza causing a pandemic threat (phases 3-5) or a probable case 
of pandemic infl uenza (phase 6). Early recognition of his own illness by the patient leads 
in phases 3-5 to the appropriate healthcare unit and effi ciently executed isolation, and dur-
ing phase 6 to behaviour reducing infections (home nursing, hygiene) and to an appropriate 
treatment facility. Healthcare arrangements are described in more detail in section 10.3. 
7.1.6 Disinfection measures
Comparative studies provide some evidence that thorough and frequent hand washing by 
the population prevents viral respiratory tract infections. Use of disinfectants in this context 
does not improve effectiveness. The recommendation differs from those given to health-
care personnel, because in healthcare hand hygiene recommendations also have other objec-
tives related to infection prevention. There is no research-based evidence of the part played 
by measures related to coughing hygiene in transmission of infl uenza. However, infection 
caused by droplets created by coughing and sneezing is an important infl uenza transmission 
mechanism. Consequently, it is justifi able to inform the population about a way of coughing 
that reduces the spread of droplets and their likely contact with hands or surfaces in the en-
vironment (Appendix 7).
Contamination of surfaces with respiratory tract secretions must be avoided. If soiling 
takes place, the surfaces must be thoroughly washed with proprietary detergents.
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During the pandemic alert phase or an actual pandemic, a recommendation may be is-
sued of avoiding greetings requiring hand-shaking or other personal contact, in order to min-
imise contact infections.
In public buildings, people should avoid as far as possible touching surfaces that may be 
contaminated by respiratory tract secretions.
Protection from infection in healthcare is addressed in section 10.4.
7.1.7 Measures for persons entering or exiting an infected area within the country
During the different phases of pandemic alert and full-blown pandemic, the population will 
be urged to avoid environments and especially exposure situations linked to the epidemic 
situation current in Finland. If there are areas in Finland that are free from infl uenza caus-
ing the alert or pandemic, a recommendation to put off non-essential travel is justifi ed dur-
ing phases 4-6. However, it is not expedient to actually prohibit travel within the country, if 
a situation causing a pandemic alert only arises in some areas of the country.
7.1.8 Measures at borders for persons entering or exiting the country
During a pandemic alert and an actual pandemic, WHO will issue situation-specifi c rec-
ommendations on measures related to international traffi c and trade, to expand on guide-
lines contained in the WHO Global Infl uenza Preparedness Plan (see bibliography). Within 
the EU, preventive measures will be implemented in the same way in the different member 
countries as far as possible, based on consultations between the Commission, member coun-
tries and ECDC.
Ineffectual inspection and restriction measures in terms of prevention may result in great 
international economic and social losses, while having no effect on the course of the pan-
demic alert or the pandemic itself. That is why it is crucial that measures are based on rec-
ommendations of the key international organisations mentioned above. WHO emphasises 
that the core measures in terms of pandemic prevention take place on national level within 
each country, with measures directed at international traffi c having little importance in pan-
demic prevention.
Most important is informing passengers of the current epidemic situation. They will be 
provided information at appropriate junctures, such as airports and border crossings, on the 
disease and infection risks, as well as action to take after possibly becoming ill after the trip. 
Depending on the nature of the alert situation, recommendations will be issued to put off 
non-essential international travel.
Screening of passengers entering Finland from pandemic alert areas in order to detect 
symptoms or identifi cation of those belonging to a risk group using a form fi lled in during 
travel are not useful measures. This has been shown by experiences of previous infl uenza 
pandemics and the SARS epidemic.
Screening of passengers from pandemic alert areas where infections have been diag-
nosed in humans through questioning or taking the temperature may be justifi ed during pan-
demic alert phases 4-5 and a full-blown pandemic. Travel of those who are sick from alert 
areas must be postponed.
A passenger may succumb to an infl uenza-like illness also during a fl ight. During pan-
demic alert phases 4-5 and an actual pandemic, passengers will be urged to report any infl u-
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enza-like symptoms to the cabin crew. The crew will isolate sick passengers as far as possi-
ble in a separate part of the aircraft. Health authorities of the destination country will relay 
to other countries the passenger information necessary for pandemic prevention and tracing 
of those exposed in the aircraft. 
7.2 Vaccines 
7.2.1 Infl uenza vaccines
From prototype vaccine to specifi c vaccine
The most effective means of prevention of the adverse impacts of an infl uenza pandemic 
would be a vaccine made to combat the virus that causes it. However, production of such a 
specifi c vaccine can only begin once WHO has declared that a pandemic is under way. Since 
the vaccine manufacturing process takes several months, it is unlikely that a specifi c vaccine 
will be available during the fi rst pandemic wave. However, past pandemics have occurred 
in several waves, and the specifi c vaccine would probably be available to prevent a second 
wave. The specifi c vaccine to be developed for the next pandemic is likely to contain inacti-
vated genetically modifi ed entire pandemic virus or parts isolated from them. 
The ability to manufacture and introduce a specifi c vaccine as quickly as possible is 
based on research carried out using a prototype vaccine. Approval of the manufacturing 
method of a prototype vaccine and fulfi lment of the criteria of clinical studies is a precondi-
tion of manufacturing a specifi c vaccine. 
The prototype vaccine is made using an infl uenza virus isolated from birds and known to 
have caused the disease in humans. The most commonly used virus in 2005–06 is A/H5N1. 
Depending on the manufacturer, the prototype vaccine is made in eggs or cell cultures. Char-
acteristics of prototype vaccines containing different quantities of antigens and adjuvants 
(substances that boost the effect of the vaccine, especially the immune response) are studied 
by vaccinating laboratory animals and humans. The formula of the test vaccine creating the 
best immune response is documented and the vaccine sales licence applications submitted 
to the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products, EMEA). With this proce-
dure, production of a specifi c vaccine can be started immediately after WHO has declared a 
pandemic, and once the pandemic virus of the subtype in question is isolated and genetically 
modifi ed to suit vaccine production. At this point, an application for a sales licence is also 
submitted to EMEA for the actual specifi c vaccine. As well as using prototype vaccine stud-
ies to speed up specifi c vaccine production and approval for use, the prototype vaccine itself 
may also be used to protect the population. 
At the onset of a pandemic, inoculations to protect the population should be started as 
soon as possible. However, obtaining the actual specifi c vaccine takes time. The fi rst doses 
will be available at the earliest three months after the pandemic is declared, and it will take 
at least six months before the vaccine is available in Finland. Therefore, purchasing a stock 
of the prototype vaccine for possible quick application has been deemed expedient in Fin-
land, although there can be no prior certainty of its effi cacy of protection. Finland has decid-
ed to obtain suffi cient prototype vaccine to inoculate the entire population. If the pandemic 
virus is only slightly different from the prototype vaccine virus, quick initiation of inocula-
tions may reduce severe illness and fatalities. To boost the protection, a second dose using 
the specifi c vaccine will be administered as soon as it is possible. Targeting of vaccinations 
and practical guidelines are addressed in section 10.6.
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Authorisation of model and specifi c vaccines
The sales licence application of the prototype vaccine is submitted to the European Agen-
cy for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) and the application is evaluated by 
the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (CPMP). After this, the EU Commission 
makes the actual decision. For the sales licence application of a specifi c vaccine based on the 
prototype vaccine, a variation application is submitted to EMEA, listing modifi cations to be 
made to the vaccine, such as change of virus stock. Following this procedure, it is possible 
to obtain a licence for a pandemic vaccine (specifi c vaccine) in about a week. A sales licence 
granted by the Commission is valid as such in all member states. 
In addition, the Finnish National Agency for Medicines must, if necessary, make a de-
cision on the requirements set on releasing vaccines to be used in pandemic prevention in 
Finland. 
Should a pandemic begin before the manufacturer’s prototype vaccine has had time to 
obtain an EU licence, the same manufacturer’s specifi c vaccine cannot obtain a licence ei-
ther through the fast-track procedure. In such a situation, the Communicable Diseases Act 
allows the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health to use vaccines in order to prevent an infec-
tious disease epidemic directly and seriously threatening public health. The National Agency 
for Medicines will provide expert assistance if required.
Special features of production
Once a pandemic has broken out, worldwide demand for the vaccine will be enormous, and 
the preparation must be available for extensive use as quickly as possible. Fulfi lling these 
expectations is a particular challenge for vaccine manufacturers. 
A total of 300 million doses of ordinary infl uenza vaccines are manufactured in the world 
every year, 190 million of them in Europe. However, only 90 million doses of the European 
production remain for use by the EU countries, the rest is exported. If all 450 million Euro-
peans are to be protected by vaccination at the onset of a pandemic, the number of vaccine 
doses required is considerably larger than normal. Taking the whole world into considera-
tion, the shortfall in production capacity is greater still.
Development of a pandemic is based on the fact that the population lacks the immunity 
against the virus causing the pandemic created by previous infections (antibodies or immu-
nological memory). For as small a quantity of antigen as possible to create a protective im-
mune response in such a population, ‘naïve’ in terms of a new virus, the immunogenic ef-
fect of the vaccine must be increased by adding a booster substance or adjuvant. In order to 
achieve good protection, two doses of vaccine are evidently required. 
Most vaccine manufacturers have made plans to increase vaccine production in the next 
few years. To date, infl uenza vaccines have been produced solely in eggs, but now cell cul-
ture has emerged alongside this method. This increases vaccine production capacity, but 
building and authorisation of production plants engaging in cell culture also takes time. 
Countries with no vaccine production of their own can try to secure availability of the 
specifi c vaccine by entering into a contract with the manufacturer on vaccine supplies, so 
that the specifi c vaccine is available as soon as possible at the start of the pandemic. Obtain-
ing the vaccine requires purchasing a ‘place in the queue’ for vaccine production, which in 
practice means payment of an annual reservation fee. Finland has signed a fi ve-year contract 
with a Dutch vaccine manufacturer, under which it undertakes to supply Finland with 5.5 
million doses of specifi c vaccine following a schedule which would make the vaccine avail-
able in Finland about six months after the onset of the pandemic. 
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7.2.2 Other vaccines
Because various bacterial infections may develop as complications of an infl uenza virus in-
fection, adverse effects of a pandemic may be mitigated by inoculating the population with 
vaccines targeted at such bacteria either before the pandemic or once it has already begun. 
Of vaccines currently available, only pneumococcus vaccines may be viable in this sense. 
Because the effectiveness of available pneumococcus vaccines against the most common 
serious complication of infl uenza, pneumonia, is either negligible (polysaccharide vaccine) 
or relatively slight (conjugate vaccine tested on children) according to most recent studies, 
general pneumococcus inoculations are unlikely to substantially reduce the adverse effects 
of a pandemic. Usefulness of pneumococcus vaccinations should be reassessed, if new pneu-
mococcus vaccines come into the market or signifi cant new research results are obtained on 
the effi cacy of the vaccines.
7.3 Antiviral drugs 
Antiviral drugs may be used in conjunction with other preventive measures in order to inter-
rupt or delay development leading to a pandemic during WHO pandemic alert phases 3-5. At 
the pandemic phase (phase 6), the objective in using antiviral drugs is to minimise complica-
tions, fatalities and loading on healthcare by treating patients presenting with symptoms.
Susceptibility of the virus causing the pandemic alert to antiviral drugs is the decisive 
factor as to which drugs are useful during the various pandemic alert phases and the pandem-
ic itself. The infl uenza virus creating the alert may be resistant or it may develop a resistance 
to one or more drugs. Recommendations on drug usage are based on latest information in 
other countries or in Finland on susceptibility of cultured viruses. Due to changes in the sus-
ceptibility status, recommendations on choice of drug, indications for use and dosage may 
change quickly during the different pandemic alert phases or the pandemic itself.
Infl uenza antiviral drugs belonging to both the adamantine group (amantadine, rimanta-
dine) and neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamir, zanamivir) have been shown in comparative 
studies to be effective in prevention of seasonal infl uenza caused by the infl uenza A virus. 
Early administration of both groups reduces the duration of infl uenza. Neuraminidase inhibi-
tors reduce development of infl uenza complications; there is no evidence of this with drugs 
from the adamantine group.
Use of infl uenza antiviral drugs in treatment of the patient, short-term post-exposure 
prophylaxis and long-term preventative drug therapy during the different pandemic alert 
phases and the full-blown pandemic are addressed in more detail in section 10.7 Indications 
for use of antiviral drugs and prioritisation. 
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8 ADMINISTRATION, AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND ORGANISA-
TIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR PREPAREDNESS IN HEALTHCARE 
8.1 International cooperation
World Health Organisation (WHO)
For decades, WHO has held a central role in surveillance of communicable diseases and co-
ordinating prevention of epidemics. A prime example of the active role of the organisation 
was its operation as coordinator and issuer of transnational guidelines in prevention of the 
SARS epidemic. Furthermore, WHO has drafted instructions to improve pandemic prepar-
edness, e.g. by coordinating infl uenza surveillance through a global laboratory network and 
by issuing guidelines to member countries for drafting pandemic plans. The 2005 World 
Health Assembly approved the revised International Health Regulations, effective from 15 
June 2007. It obliges member countries to notify cases of disease that may constitute inter-
national health risks (e.g. human cases of avian infl uenza) and to improve their ability to re-
spond immediately to situations that entail potential international danger. The revised Regu-
lations clarify the right of WHO to issue recommendations in the presence of international 
health risks. In relation to avian infl uenza, the WHO World Health Assembly decided in 
May 2006 to bring forward implementation of the revised International Health Regulations 
to 2006. The responsibility of the WHO Communicable Diseases Cluster is global and the 
EU Centre for Disease Prevention and Control covers the EU zone, providing assistance to 
WHO when required.
WHO publishes confi rmed case and epidemic notifi cations on its website, where they are 
accessible to everyone. WHO may also supply or obtain information bilaterally with mem-
ber countries, if necessary. If a human case of avian infl uenza was found in Finland, both 
WHO and the EU Community Network on Communicable Diseases would immediately be 
notifi ed. WHO keeps member countries informed, with the pandemic threat possibly ris-
ing, of the detailed surveillance and notifi cation procedures required at each alert phase. In 
a possible infl uenza pandemic situation, case details would be submitted both to the EU and 
WHO, both of which develop mutual integrated methods of gathering information. 
European Union (EU)
The European Union has developed a surveillance and prevention system of infectious dis-
eases since the 1990s. At the Commission, the work is centralised under DG SANCO, the 
Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs. Authority to act within healthcare 
systems lies with member countries; consequently, the EU does not have any actual powers 
with regard to preventive action against communicable diseases either. Nevertheless, mem-
ber states and the Commission can, if desired, decide on guidelines for preventive measures 
particularly along the outer borders of member countries and e.g. on policies regarding rec-
ommendations and instructions issued to citizens in epidemic situations. The member coun-
tries of the Union have a statutory obligation to participate in the operation of the communi-
cable diseases notifi cation and early warning system. 
The Finnish healthcare authorities, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the Na-
tional Public Health Institute, are a part of the EU-wide infectious diseases trace-back and 
surveillance network launched in 1998. Through the network, the Commission, member 
countries and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control obtain up-to-date 
information on epidemic outbreaks within the EU zone and, for the most important infec-
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tious diseases, also on individual cases. The system is functional and active, and informa-
tion exchange between member countries and the Commission within the network is almost 
daily. The network also disseminates information on preventive measures implemented by 
the countries. In addition, regulations oblige them to notify planned preventive action and 
to consult with other member countries and the Commission when possible. On the basis of 
information received and consultations completed, the member countries must coordinate 
their activities in cooperation with the Commission.
When necessary, the Early Warning Response System, EWRS, of the Community Net-
work on Communicable Diseases disseminates information by email around the clock.
In addition to Internet-based communication and contact, the EU Network on Communi-
cable Diseases may hold telephone conferences, as well as actual meetings of the Network 
working group on invitation by the Commission. Policies or recommendations regarding 
control measures may be agreed together, but they are not binding on the member countries 
under EU regulations. In an infl uenza pandemic alert situation (WHO phases 3-5) and in a 
full-blown infl uenza pandemic, exchange of information and the opportunity of obtaining 
up-to-date epidemiological information from other EU countries is benefi cial to an individu-
al member country, as is information on preventive policies and measures of other countries. 
In epidemic prevention, diverse systems or resources of different countries may occasion 
the possibility or a need for policies divergent from other countries. Information will help to 
avoid confusion and concern among citizens resulting from such differences. It is expedient 
to strive for uniform policies and recommendations when the policies have a clear scientifi c 
foundation, they can be implemented in all member countries, and their execution will im-
prove the chances of preventing the spread of the epidemic. 
In spring 2005, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, ECDC, was 
set up in Stockholm, initially operating solely in the area of infectious diseases. The Centre 
complements the work of national infectious disease control centres. It endeavours to im-
prove their collaboration and to develop surveillance systems of infectious diseases. One of 
the tasks of the Centre is to take charge of the EU communicable diseases surveillance and 
early warning response system. The Centre has already been active, e.g. drafting expert rec-
ommendations and setting up its own on-call system.
The working group coordinated by the Commission, the Health Security Committee, has 
also discussed and exchanged information on pandemic preparedness in member countries, 
and drafted non-binding documents on the subject as guidelines for preparedness.
The Friends of the Presidency was established in October 2005. It promotes exchange of 
information, monitors preparatory work necessary for preventing animal and human infec-
tions, furthers coordination of the EU’s international activities, and reports to Coreper (EU 
Permanent Representatives Committee).
The EU organised an infl uenza pandemic preparedness exercise in November 2005, pro-
viding experiences upon which to base improvements on the mechanisms of collaboration 
between the EU countries.
As for infl uenza pandemic preparedness during Finland’s Presidency of the EU, the agen-
da entry reads that information exchange on pandemic preparedness in the EU countries will 
continue in cooperation with the EU European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control.  
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8.2 Pandemic management, authority structure and organisations 
responsible for preparedness in Finnish healthcare
8.2.1 The Government and governance of a civil crisis
A prerequisite of good management of threats on the population, society and the state is an 
operational model of crisis management, with which all actors are familiar and practised. As 
vulnerability of society increases, it is vital that control of emergency situations that have 
arisen unexpectedly and suddenly can be taken without delay.
The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (CCFSP) has drawn up the prin-
ciples of the Government’s crisis management on 21 April 2006. They are also followed in 
management of an infl uenza pandemic.
According to the Government policy decision of 27 November 2003, Strategy for secur-
ing the functions vital to society, one of the four focal areas in the next few years in terms 
of improving performance is health protection, including sudden serious epidemics. The 
Government is drafting proposals for amendments to current legislation for Parliament. The 
Government issues decree-level regulations. 
Vital functions must be secured under normal conditions, exceptional circumstances and 
in emergency conditions. Under current legislation, an infl uenza pandemic does not consti-
tute a state of emergency, but it can probably be classifi ed as an exceptional circumstance. In 
exceptional circumstances, central government and authorities must take up special meas-
ures and concerted cooperation in order to avert the threat and to overcome it. Due to ex-
ceptional circumstances, additional resources may possibly need to be deployed, as well as 
special powers which are included in regulations for normal conditions. Exceptional circum-
stances may also occasion a need for clarifi cation of the regulations.
In the Government policy decision, strategic tasks refer to those tasks the execution of 
which is essential in order to secure vital functions of society in all situations. The point of 
departure is the current legislation and division of powers among the authorities. Vital func-
tions of society are governance of the state, external ability to function, military defence of 
the nation, internal security, functioning of the economy and society, security of livelihood 
of the population, its ability to function, and psychological ability to withstand crises. 
Emergency conditions are situations set out in the Emergency Powers Act, control of 
which is not possible with regulatory powers and resources of authorities. An infl uenza pan-
demic is not one of the emergency conditions under the current Emergency Powers Act. One 
of the means of developing operational preconditions of national governance is a situation-
al picture maintained at the Situation Centre of the Prime Minister’s Offi ce. The situational 
picture enables timely decision-making by national government in order to secure the vital 
functions of society. The following is an outline of the civil crisis management model, which 
is included in the revised Strategy for securing the functions vital to society.
Management of civil crises is based on the Constitution of Finland, the Government Act, 
Government Code of Practice, and other legislation concerning specialist authorities, such 
as the Communicable Diseases Act. The informal Government meeting discusses coordi-
nation of the functions of the administrative sectors and prepares issues for decision by the 
Government. Under current legislation, operative management is the responsibility of the 
statutory competent ministry. In the case of a pandemic, it is the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health.
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Government level management, operative management and coordination of drafting and 
hearing of matters in civil crisis situations is based on the duties of the Prime Minister under 
section 66 of the Constitution of Finland and other legislation. 
Levels of coordination in crisis management
Competent authority
Initiates actions 
and informs
GOVERNMENT MEETING OF THE HEADS OF 
PREPAREDNESS
Supports
MEETING OF THE MINISTRIES’ PERMANENT 
SECRETARIES
Supports
CCFSP
Prepares
Government plenary 
session
or informal Government 
meeting
CCFSP = Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy
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The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (CCFSP) has drawn up the 
national crisis management model, constituting the following principal stages and du-
ties: 
The responsible authority initiates the actions in accordance with its instructions 
and informs the preparedness organisation of its administrative sector of the inci-
dent.
Government level governance is supported by the Government control centre, 
based on collaboration of the ministries under the leadership of Prime Minister’s 
Offi ce. 
Under the legislation, the competent ministry leads the activities and cooperation of 
the ministries as necessary.
Prime Minister’s Offi ce ensures that the competent ministry has been appointed.
The Permanent Secretary of the ministry carries the main responsibility for prepar-
edness of its administrative sector and governance required by the security situa-
tion.
Actions taken by the different administrative sectors and, if necessary, by business-
es and civic organisations are coordinated at a meeting of the Ministries’ Permanent 
Secretaries under the leadership of the Permanent Secretary of Prime Minister’s 
Offi ce or Permanent Secretary of the competent ministry. 
In action taken commensurate to the situation, the Government Meeting of the 
Heads of Preparedness supports the Permanent Secretaries, led by the Permanent 
Secretary of Prime Minister’s Offi ce or the Head of Preparedness of the competent 
ministry.
On decision by the Prime Minister or proposal of the competent Minister, the 
matter is passed in a manner agreed with the Prime Minister for discussion by the 
informal Government meeting.
The body in charge of drafting and preparation of Government decisions may be a 
meeting of the President of the Republic and The Cabinet Committee on Foreign 
and Security Policy (CCFSP), called by the Prime Minister, or a ministerial com-
mittee. The committee is complemented by the competent minister in charge of the 
situation and any necessary experts.
Other Cabinet Committees deal with issues in accordance with their mandates.
Decisions required in order to control the situation are taken by the Government 
plenary session, the relevant ministry or other competent authority. 
The crisis management model takes into account the obligations placed on member 
or President countries by the EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangements.
The above national crisis management model does not affect the status and mandate 
of the Security and Defence Committee.
Preparedness and capacity for action of the highest Government authority and the 
necessary support organisation and systems are maintained through regular exer-
cises.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Meeting of the Ministries’ Permanent Secretaries (MMPS) and Government Meeting 
of the Heads of Preparedness (GMHP) 
Operation of the Government, CCFSP and the Prime Minister in governance of civil crises 
is supported as a cooperative organ under section 10 of the Government Code of Practice by 
the Meeting of the Ministries’ Permanent Secretaries, with the Permanent Secretary of Prime 
Minister’s Offi ce as chair. The Meeting may also be chaired by the Permanent Secretary in 
charge of the administrative sector of the competent authority responsible for operative man-
agement. The Ministries’ Heads of Preparedness are Permanent Secretaries of the Ministries 
or persons appointed by them for this specifi c task. The Government Meeting of the Heads 
of Preparedness supports the Meeting of the Ministries’ Permanent Secretaries. 
8.2.2 Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (MSAH)
The general planning, management and surveillance of protection against infectious diseas-
es is the remit of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, which is responsible for the pre-
paredness of social and healthcare services for an infl uenza pandemic. 
All departments and units of MSAH (Health Department, Preparedness Unit, Information 
and Communications Unit, Department for Occupational Safety and Health, International 
Affairs Unit, Department for Family and Social Affairs, Finance and Planning Department, 
and Administrative and Insurance Departments) are involved in pandemic preparedness and 
overcoming a pandemic situation, each in accordance with its own remit and sphere of re-
sponsibility. 
In its management operations, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health engages the sup-
port of the National Public Health Institute, which alongside MSAH maintains contacts with 
international organisations, such as EWRS (European Union Early Warning Response Sys-
tem) and WHO. The National Public Health Institute provides expert guidance to local au-
thorities and the public.
The responsibility for operative management of a pandemic situation lies with the health 
authorities. They are the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in coop-
eration with social and health departments of State Provincial Offi ces. Operative manage-
ment involves direction of functioning of the service system, securing of resources and their 
appropriate direction, obtaining powers and expert services as required by the situation, as 
well as adequate cooperation with the authorities. For the purposes of operative action, the 
Ministry maintains a national situational picture and situation management arrangements, 
a public crisis telephone system, as well as taking care of crisis information and commu-
nications and cooperation with EU and other international authorities. The expert services 
required for operative management are obtained by the Ministry from the National Public 
Health Institute and other expert bodies. A pandemic situation may require redistribution of 
resources within an administrative sector. 
To support its operative management activities, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
will set up a national control centre for the administrative sector, if the situation so de-
mands.
At regional and local levels of social and healthcare services, operative management 
takes place according to guidelines issued by the Ministry. 
Establishment of a control centre within the Ministry will not alter the responsibilities 
of the administrative sector, nor its power relations. The decisions are made in accordance 
with the Ministry procedure and other statutory powers. The control centre will participate 
in drafting, presentation and implementation of decisions. 
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In order to form a situational picture, the control centre is in real-time contact with the 
Social and Health Departments of State Provincial Offi ces and the National Public Health 
Institute, the National Register of Infectious Diseases and the European Union Early Warn-
ing Response System (EWRS) of infectious diseases. State Provincial Offi ces will supply 
the control centre, in accordance with Ministry directions to be issued separately, with a situ-
ational picture of social and healthcare services in their own areas. 
The national picture of the social and healthcare services situation is delivered to the situ-
ational picture system of Prime Minister’s Offi ce. On the basis of the situational picture, the 
Ministry control centre will direct State Provincial Offi ces’ regional control centres in ac-
cordance with the Ministry guidelines. 
The control centre manager or a person designated by him reports on the situation daily 
in a separately agreed manner to ministers, the leadership of the Ministry and the steering 
group.
The Ministry steering group appoints the staff of the control centre and defi nes its work-
ing principles. A phase 5 or 6 pandemic situation demands round-the-clock operation of the 
steering group. 
Pandemic Coordination Group (PCG) 
When necessary, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health may appoint a Pandemic Coordi-
nation Group. Its remit is to reinforce the operation of social and health services and to pre-
pare matters requiring urgent or multi-sector measures, and the preparation and coordination 
of which does not fall under the remit of the Government Meeting of the Heads of Pre-
paredness or the Meeting of the Ministries’ Permanent Secretaries. Such measures may be 
e.g. public communications, amendments required to regulations, restricting of mobility of 
the population (e.g. quarantine arrangements), prioritisation of medical preventive measures 
with limited availability, stockpiling, reserve stocks, controlled release of reserve stocks, 
and rationing of materials and equipment. Duties of the Coordination Group also include ob-
taining international expertise and experience to support national decision-making.
The Pandemic Coordination Group is chaired by a representative from the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health. Members are appointed e.g. from the following organisations: 
Prime Minister’s Offi ce, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, National Public Health In-
stitute, National Agency for Medicines, Finnish Institute for Occupational Health, National 
Advisory Board on Health Care Ethics, State Provincial Offi ces, Hospital Districts, health 
centres, Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, and representatives from the 
relevant ministries.
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Management of health services in a pandemic situation
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Ministry of Social Affairs and Health Advisory Boards
The Advisory Board on Communicable Diseases and the Advisory Board for Health and 
Welfare in Emergency Conditions support the work of the Ministry.
The Advisory Board on Communicable Diseases operates within the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health. Its tasks include provision of expert assistance to the Ministry in preven-
tion of exceptional national epidemics. 
The Advisory Board for Health and Welfare in Emergency Conditions promotes col-
laboration between national and international social and healthcare authorities in preparing 
for exceptional circumstances under normal conditions and for emergency conditions. The 
Advisory Board has set up four divisions, of which the NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemi-
cal) Division deals with radiation, biological and chemical threats. Pandemics are biologi-
cal threats.
8.2.4 Agencies under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
National Public Health Institute (NPHI)
As an expert body, the National Public Health Institute supports the work of the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health in drafting a national infl uenza pandemic preparedness plan. It par-
ticipates in discussion of issues at the ECDC. The NPHI infl uenza pandemic working group 
appointed by the NPHI Director General monitors the epidemiological situation of infl uen-
za, if necessary proposing amendments to the national pandemic preparedness plan, making 
proposals of measures based on the assessment of the situation to MSAH, supports pandem-
ic preparedness of regional and local level healthcare, and supports pandemic preparedness 
of other administrative sectors. 
The National Public Health Institute develops a national case surveillance system appro-
priate for the pandemic situation, providing information on the rate the epidemic is spread-
ing per health centre and hospital district that is up-to-date and corresponds to the needs of 
controlling the pandemic situation. In a pandemic situation, the National Public Health Insti-
tute is particularly responsible for provision of expert assistance to central government and 
social and healthcare services, as well as Internet services for social and healthcare actors 
and the population.
Finnish Institute for Occupational Health (FIOH)
The Institute for Occupational Health acts as expert body in assessing the risk of infl uen-
za infection at work and planning and implementation of preventive measures, particularly 
with regard to occupational healthcare. In cooperation with the occupational health author-
ity and the National Public Health Institute, the Institute for Occupational Health produces 
instructions for employees on protection from infection, protective equipment required at 
work and principles of their application, and assesses the kinds of protective equipment and 
clothing required in each type of work exposing employees to infection. The Institute of Oc-
cupational Health, in collaboration with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, prepares 
the duties and operational principles of occupational health and safety in case of a pandemic, 
in a manner compatible with other healthcare services. The Institute of Occupational Health 
website contains graphic instructions on use of protective equipment, as well as information 
on training on its use. The Institute of Occupational Health has prepared directions and train-
ing for occupational healthcare services and occupational groups requiring it. 
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National Agency for Medicines (NAM)
The National Agency for Medicines issues orders and directions to pharmaceutical sector 
operators on e.g. production methods, manufacture to contract, markings on drug packaging, 
and deliveries and assignments. The National Agency for Medicines maintains a register of 
side- effects of medicinal preparations. It is also responsible for implementing obligations 
under the Act and Decree on reserve stocks and supervision of the stocks. As the compe-
tent authority, the National Agency for Medicines is in charge of licensing of manufacture, 
import, retail distribution and sale of drugs used in infl uenza pandemic prevention (antivi-
ral drugs and vaccines, reagents required for in vitro diagnostics). In collaboration with the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the National Agency for Medicines issues guidelines 
on operational principles for pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesalers and pharmacies in 
a pandemic situation. The National Agency for Medicines, in collaboration with the Nation-
al Public Health Institute and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, will design a system 
of distributing the drugs to be deployed during a pandemic, and monitoring of consumption 
and side-effects of antiviral drugs.
The National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs (NAMA)
Under section 6 a of the Communicable Diseases Act (25.7.1986/583), The National Author-
ity for Medicolegal Affairs, under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, directs the op-
eration of State Provincial Offi ces, in order to standardise their operational principles, proce-
dures and solution practices in directing and supervision of combating infectious diseases. In 
addition, the National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs supervises protective work against 
infectious diseases especially in cases of: 1) important or wide-ranging matters of principle; 
2) issues concerning several provinces or the whole country; 3) issues linked to a matter of 
supervision concerning a healthcare professional to be handled by the National Authority 
for Medicolegal Affairs; and 4) issues which the State Provincial Offi ce is disqualifi ed from 
handling. 
NAMA maintains a central register of healthcare professionals (TERHIKKI). It may be 
used in deployment and implementation of special healthcare occupational obligations pos-
sibly demanded by a pandemic situation. 
National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health (STAKES)
STAKES helps develop information systems to quantify surveillance of the effects of a 
pandemic, as well as deployment of existing healthcare registers for this purpose. STAKES 
takes into consideration the needs of a pandemic situation in its development work of health-
care registers and an online patient records system. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
utilises STAKES know-how of local authority social services preparedness, support of psy-
chosocial services and expert guidance. FinOHTA, which researches and evaluates thera-
peutic practices, operates within STAKES.
8.2.5 State regional government
State Provincial Offi ce (SPO)
Under the Communicable Diseases Act, State Provincial Offi ces are obliged to plan, direct 
and supervise the effort of combating infectious diseases within the territory of the province 
(section 6, subsection 2). It may issue orders restricting the freedom of the individual and 
make decisions on the matter (sections 14, 15). The State Provincial Offi ce may order a com-
pulsory health examination (section 13). 
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In the case of a disease comparable to a communicable disease endangering the public, 
the State Provincial Offi ce may make the same decisions as in the case of a disease endan-
gering the public.
The State Provincial Offi ce ensures that Hospital Districts and health centres operating 
within its area draw up an infl uenza pandemic preparedness plan, as well as coordinating, 
supervising and directing implementation of the plans with the help of local and national ex-
perts and taking into account regional special characteristics. 
Under the leadership of the Governor, the State Provincial Offi ce steering group and a 
preparedness committee, set up in each province by the Governor and representing the dif-
ferent regional administrative sectors, are in charge of general regional management, coor-
dination, surveillance and on-call system of the situation. 
If necessary, regional control centres are set up within State Provincial Offi ces. In a pan-
demic situation, the responsibility for leadership lies with the Governor and the Social and 
Health Department. The provincial control centre must include representation of the region-
al special healthcare, or other steps must be taken to ensure functional collaboration.
Regional control centres carry out intensive situational assessment in support of deci-
sion-making by the Governor and the steering group, directing the operation of their re-
gional social and health services in cooperation with the Ministry, maintaining a regional 
situational picture and delivering it to the Ministry control centre. The Ministry ensures that 
regional control centres have access to and available suffi cient powers, expertise and re-
sources to implement the measures. For its leadership role, the State Provincial Offi ce issues 
directions on reporting to municipalities.
The Social and Health Department may set up an infectious diseases steering group (pan-
demic working group), chaired by the Provincial Medical Offi cer and including at least the 
offi cials representing veterinary medicine, health protection and social and healthcare serv-
ices within the department, as well as medical practitioners responsible for infectious dis-
eases in the Hospital Districts. Reports on the work of the group and the situational picture 
are submitted by the Social and Health Department to the State Provincial Offi ce Board and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
The mandate of the State Provincial Offi ce is highlighted in management and overcom-
ing of crises. In infl uenza pandemic prevention, the roles of social and healthcare services, 
veterinary disease prevention, emergency services, education authority and transport are 
central.
In a pandemic situation, the Social and Health Department of the State Provincial Offi ce 
directs the operation of social and health service systems in its area, as well as its adaptation 
to a changed service requirements situation and collaboration of primary healthcare, social 
services and special healthcare. Under current legislation, the State Provincial Offi ce does 
not have the right of binding direction of local authorities. 
Occupational Safety and Health Inspectorate (OSHI)
The Occupational Safety and Health Inspectorate ensures that employers comply with oc-
cupational health and safety legislation e.g. with reference to exposure to biological factors. 
The Occupational Safety and Health Inspectorate holds information on the workplaces in its 
area for each sector. When necessary, the Inspectorate targets surveillance and information 
on workplaces and occupations where it is possible to contract avian infl uenza due to condi-
tions in the workplace. If required, the Occupational Safety and Health Inspectorate coop-
erates with other authorities and expert organisations in e.g. avian infl uenza risk assessment 
and in issues related to choice and use of protective equipment at work. The Ministry to-
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gether with labour organisations draws up directions for Occupational Safety and Health In-
spectorates for taking account of avian infl uenza and an infl uenza pandemic in occupational 
protection surveillance. 
8.2.6 Local government
Municipality and health centre (HC)
Municipal self-government gives municipalities and Hospital Districts, owned by municipal-
ities, extensive opportunities of deciding on the organisation of its own operation. Directing 
of municipal healthcare and powers in organising healthcare services, including in a possible 
pandemic situation, are laid down by the Primary Health Care Act and the Act on Specialised 
Medical Care. In the case of infectious diseases, additional account must be taken of the stip-
ulations of the Communicable Diseases Act. The regulations of the Local Government Act 
must also be noted. As part of primary healthcare, the local authority must maintain health 
advisory services, organise immunisations under general vaccination programmes, organise 
medical care of the inhabitants of the municipality, take care of organising ambulance trans-
port, provide occupational healthcare services prescribed to be organised by employers, and 
organise emergency outpatient services regardless of the patient’s place of residence. In or-
der to carry out these functions, a municipality must have a health centre. 
Under the Communicable Diseases Act, local authorities must organise the work of in-
fectious diseases prevention in their areas. The Act further identifi es the powers and obliga-
tions of the municipal organ responsible for infectious diseases. 
In municipalities and joint local authorities, the responsibility for operative healthcare 
management lodges with the chief medical practitioner of the health centre, and the overall 
responsibility for the whole municipality with the municipal manager. The decision-making 
does not differ from normal decision-making. The municipality reports on the situation to 
the State Provincial Offi ce in accordance with directions issued by it.
The health centre draws up a plan in case of an infl uenza pandemic, including organisa-
tion of health centre functions in a pandemic situation, covering direction to treatment, di-
agnosis and treatment of the disease, as well as organising possible vaccinations. The plan 
also includes operation of occupational healthcare services organised by the health centre. It 
must take into account available private sector resources and collaboration with private sec-
tor occupational health services. The plan must be drawn up in cooperation with the State 
Provincial Offi ce and Hospital District regional pandemic working group. 
Under healthcare legislation, MSAH, NAMA and the State Provincial Offi ce are respon-
sible for directing, planning and supervision. The municipalities are responsible for organi-
sation of services. In situations where the Emergency Powers Act does not apply, the Min-
istry of Social Affairs and Health and State Provincial Offi ces have no powers to order the 
way municipalities and Hospital Districts organise their services. Nevertheless, the mandate 
of monitoring the lawfulness of organisation of services supports Government control.
The local authority and service structure reform will have an impact on planning pan-
demic preparedness by way of increasing regional cooperation of municipalities. 
 
Hospital District (HD)
Under the Communicable Diseases Act, direction of the work of combating infectious dis-
eases within its territory is the duty of the Hospital District, which also acts as regional ex-
pert adviser on combating infectious diseases and monitors execution of such work in its 
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area. The Hospital District assists the municipal organ responsible for combating infectious 
diseases in diagnosing infectious diseases, identifi cation of epidemics of such diseases, and 
in trace-back infections. The Hospital District directs prevention, surveillance and investiga-
tion of hospital infections in its area.
In addition to the duties indicated in the Communicable Diseases Act, as obligations un-
der the same Act the Hospital District must: - ensure that special medical services required 
for treatment of infectious diseases are available within the Hospital District area; organise 
the necessary education and training for combating infectious diseases within the Hospital 
District; participate in development of measures to combat infectious diseases within the 
Hospital District; provide, on demand, summary details of notifi ed infectious diseases regis-
tered in the health centre catchment area, taking account of the restrictions on disclosure of 
information under section 10 subsection 3 of the Communicable Diseases Decree; undertake 
regional dissemination of information on infectious diseases to healthcare professionals. 
The remit of the State Provincial Offi ces is to coordinate the plans of Hospital Districts 
and to ensure that the latter collaborate with their area primary healthcare and social services 
in drawing up an infl uenza pandemic preparedness plan. The plan must also take into consid-
eration private sector and occupational healthcare resources available in the area. The Hos-
pital District acts as the regional expert adviser on infl uenza pandemic preparedness.
Appendix 5 sets out the areas of responsibility and decision-making of different organi-
sations and administrative levels at the various phases of pandemic alert and full-blown pan-
demic. 
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9 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PREVENTION OF PANDEMICS
As an infl uenza virus infection affects an individual, it always affects also the surrounding 
community. Preventive measures, treatments or lack of them directed at an individual may 
affect the health of other community members. In accordance with the principle of equality, 
everyone permanently living in Finland must have an equal right to protection by vaccina-
tions and treatment of the disease, once it has erupted. If, however, due to practical reasons 
the best prevention or treatment is not suffi ciently available for everybody, we need to con-
sider priority setting principles that withstand ethical scrutiny. In measures directed at alle-
viation of impacts of the pandemic, confl ict between basic individual rights and benefi ts to 
the community may also arise. Therefore it is important to evaluate the ethical aspects of 
planned measures in advance.
9.1 Values and principles affecting decision-making
During a pandemic, decision-makers and those responsible for healthcare may be forced to 
make diffi cult decisions affecting the health and freedom of action of their citizens. These 
decisions must be grounded on jointly defi ned values. The Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health proposes the following values as bases of decision-making. Balanced reconciliation 
of these values is important, albeit not easy. 
Individual liberty
It may be necessary to restrict individual liberty at the threat of or during a serious epidemic. 
Possible restrictions must not be exaggerated in relation to the impending danger, and they 
must be equally applied to all whose liberties it is deemed necessary to restrict in order to 
protect the community. 
Equity (egalitarian approach)
Equal right of everyone to preventive healthcare and treatment is an integral part of the Finn-
ish and Nordic value system. Nevertheless, even under normal conditions various treatments 
and target groups must be placed in order of urgency and priority. In a pandemic situation the 
need for prioritisation is emphasised. It is also possible that quick decisions are required, if a 
means of protection (e.g. vaccine) is not available in suffi cient quantity for everyone.
Utility maximisation (utilitarian approach)
Utility maximisation aims at the maximum possible good for as many as possible. 
Effi ciency
Effi cient and appropriate use of resources is extremely important in a situation where re-
sources are limited.
Transparency
Values and principles as the basis of decision-making, and its implementation, must be eas-
ily accessible to all concerned.
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Reasonability of the decisions
The decisions must be clearly reasoned and based on best available information on the threat, 
as well as on previously accepted values and principles.
Reciprocity
The principle of reciprocity presupposes that society will support and protect especially 
those who bear a considerably greater than average burden in order to safeguard the com-
mon good.
9.2 Fundamental ethical issues
9.2.1 Duty of healthcare personnel to provide treatment
Treatment of infl uenza patients may cause a risk of infection for the healthcare person-
nel giving treatment. The Act on Health Care Professionals and general ethical regulations 
(codes of ethics) oblige to administer immediate assistance to the seriously ill in all situa-
tions. The Occupational Safety and Health Act obliges the employer to take all necessary 
precautions in order to minimise any health risks arising at work. 
For decades, there has been no need to reconcile the duty of healthcare personnel to pro-
vide care and their right to protect their own health in situations where the duty to provide 
care would have placed their own health at serious risk. However, the matter has been dis-
cussed e.g. in connection with the global SARS epidemic of 2003, when three cases fulfi ll-
ing the WHO criteria of likely cases of SARS were identifi ed. If the number of those in-
fected during the pandemic is very large, application of maximal protective measures sure 
to prevent infection will not be possible at every patient contact. Nevertheless, treatment of 
patients cannot be abandoned. Even if mortality of infected people of working age might be 
very small, confl icting ideas about transmissibility of the infection, severity of the disease 
and adequate preventive measures may arise. 
Those responsible for healthcare must ensure safe working conditions for staff by train-
ing and by ensuring that units have adequate supplies of structures and equipment needed 
in protection. Ethical guidelines for healthcare personnel should defi ne in more detail how 
great a personal risk may be expected of healthcare professionals. They should also defi ne 
the practical meaning of their duty of not harming patients and colleagues by spreading the 
disease, as well as when they may be obliged to use all available precautionary measures.
9.2.2 Just distribution of limited resources
In distribution of healthcare personnel work, treatment units, vaccines and antiviral medica-
tion, the aim should be equality on one hand, and the maximum possible health benefi t on 
the other hand. Taking both into consideration, it must further be decided what kind of health 
benefi ts are sought.
A frequently mentioned aim is prevention of adverse health effects (infection, hospitali-
sation, deaths). However, adverse health effects are not of equal value, and different meas-
ures may have different capacities in preventing various health effects. Every infl uenza pan-
demic in the 1900s has been characterised by increase of deaths extending to younger age 
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groups. The intensity of this phenomenon has varied a lot, and can thus be ascertained on-
ly once the pandemic or the preceding alert phase of local epidemics has been ongoing for 
some time.
Saving of expected years of life is based on prevention of deaths, and is a more unambig-
uous goal than the above. This approach considers protection of children from mortal danger 
more valuable than that of old people, which some may see as setting the young and old in 
an unequal position. On the other hand, ignoring remaining life span would also lead to con-
sidering an aged person’s year of life more valuable than that of a child.
By talking about quality-adjusted life years, we mean that the estimated remaining life 
span of the individual or group of persons in question is assessed for value. This model of 
thinking emphasises prevention of the death of a previously healthy child in relation to e.g. 
an elderly person perhaps already affected by a serious chronic illness, and with the number 
of remaining years of life in any case clearly lower. However, evaluation of quality of life is 
not unambiguous, and application of this model may also be felt to be unjust.
In aiming to save productive quality-adjusted life years, one quality criterion, social add-
ed value, is taken into consideration in evaluating likely remaining years of life. In addition 
to supposed work input (‘taxpaying capacity’), many immaterial products (e.g. art) affect 
functioning of society and wellbeing of the population. Their impact is diffi cult to quantify 
and predict. 
As well as maximising equality and health benefi ts, the principle of reciprocity must be 
taken into consideration when distributing limited resources. While the staff is expected to 
have an especially large input in taking care of infected patients, and even subject them-
selves to dangerous infection, they must be given priority in distributing all means of pro-
tection. 
After the objective of alleviating the impacts of a pandemic has been chosen, the means 
most likely to reach the objective must be assessed. If resources are limited, a decision must 
be made on the order of targeting the preventive measures on different population groups.
Finland has signed supply contracts for two different types of vaccine for the whole pop-
ulation. Should delivery of the vaccines be partially delayed, the decision must be made as 
to who should receive the fi rst batches, and who should wait for the remaining deliveries. 
Finland has obtained 1.3 million courses of the antiviral drug oseltamivir, suffi cient for treat-
ment of a quarter of the population. In principle, it can also be used as post-exposure short-
term prophylaxis or long-term preventive drug treatment, in addition to treatment of the in-
fected. If the population morbidity percentage of a future pandemic rises above 25 percent, 
there are no longer suffi cient drug supplies for all, and their use must be prioritised. Similar-
ly, if it were decided to use the drug as long-term preventive treatment of considerable popu-
lation groups, a proportionally smaller share would be left for treatment of the infected.
The National Advisory Board on Health Care Ethics (NABHCE) has discussed at its 
meetings the principles of using vaccines and antiviral drugs. According to the opinion of 
the Advisory Board, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health proposes that the primary aim 
of measures to prevent a pandemic should be prevention of adverse health effects and saving 
of years of life. Their emphasis on targeting of inoculations, use of antiviral drugs and oth-
er preventive measures is explained in detail elsewhere (sections 7.1, 10.6.1 and 10.7) The 
crucial point is that effective efforts are made to halt infection chains created in pandemic 
alert phases 3-5 through measures to isolate and protect those exposed, and through targeted 
prophylaxis (see section 10.2). Once the pandemic is under way, the emphasis is on caring 
for the infected and protecting exposed healthcare personnel. (section 10 Obligations and 
operation of the healthcare system). In healthcare and elsewhere in society, efforts to prevent 
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the spread of infection are made through means other than those based on the use of vaccines 
and antiviral drugs (section 7.1 Slowing down the spread of infection and section 10.4 Pro-
tection against infection in healthcare).
Long-term prophylaxis of “groups vital for functionality of society”, or giving them pri-
ority in administering vaccinations is not justifi ed. Identifi cation of the groups is diffi cult in 
many areas, and is likely to cause feelings of injustice in the population. Continuity of func-
tions must be ensured by other means. In the case of vaccinations, personnel caring for in-
fected patients are an exception.
The extreme burdening of healthcare brought about by the pandemic will unavoidably 
reduce availability of healthcare services for treatment of other than infl uenza patients. Re-
gional and primary healthcare preparedness planning must take into consideration in relation 
to each problem and disease group, how serious the impacts will be on rescheduling non-
emergency preventive services and those for chronic diseases. The planning should identify 
alternative methods of treatment, through which the diffi culties caused by reduction of these 
services might be minimised.
9.2.3 Justifi cation of emergency measures
Restriction of individual liberty in order to prevent an epidemic
Measures impinging on individual liberty and protection of property are rare exceptions in 
healthcare legislation, and their application is regulated in great detail. The Communicable 
Diseases Act and Communicable Diseases Decree defi ne the responsibilities and duties of 
various parties in surveillance and prevention of infectious diseases, as well as the situations 
in which an individual’s inviolability, freedom of movement or property may be compro-
mised in order to prevent infection. The municipal agency (usually the health committee) re-
sponsible for prevention of communicable diseases may order an infected person or one sus-
pected of being infected to absent himself from work, an educational institution or daycare. 
It has the option of ordering a person to be isolated in a hospital, if the risk of the disease 
spreading is apparent, and if there is no other way of preventing the spread of the disease. At 
the place of isolation, a person suffering from an infectious disease involving danger to the 
general public may be administered treatment necessary for prevention of the spread of the 
disease, even regardless of his wishes. An amendment to the Communicable Diseases Act 
concerning quarantine has been passed by Parliament.
Under the Communicable Diseases Act, a general programme of vaccination is voluntary 
to the individual. However, the Government may separately decide on mandatory inocula-
tions to prevent the spread of such an infectious disease as may have considerable adverse 
effects on the health of the population or a part of it. It is unlikely that mandatory inocula-
tions would be necessary in a pandemic situation. 
Accelerated adoption of new vaccines and drugs
Vaccines used in a pandemic may have to be widely used before the safety studies normally 
required of infl uenza vaccines have been completed. Accelerated adoption of a new antiviral 
drug or drug variant is also a possibility during a pandemic. Infl uenza vaccines and antiviral 
drugs are usually well tolerated. Pandemic vaccines are unlikely to be signifi cantly different 
from similar seasonal infl uenza vaccines, or possible new antiviral drugs from those already 
in established use. Therefore, application of these preventive methods to reduce health risks 
caused by a pandemic can be deemed to be ethically acceptable.
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10 OBLIGATIONS AND OPERATION OF THE HEALTHCARE 
SYSTEM 
10.1 Detection of cases and epidemics 
10.1.1 Objectives and method of surveillance
Surveillance is one of the cornerstones of pandemic preparedness. The main objectives of 
surveillance are (1) detection as early as possible of the arrival in Finland of a virus causing 
a pandemic threat or a pandemic virus, and (2) description of incidence, severity and spread 
of a disease caused by an infl uenza virus or causing a threat. 
During the pandemic alert phase and the pandemic, surveillance includes (1) epidemio-
logical surveillance of incidences; (2) virological laboratory surveillance; (3) surveillance 
of antiviral drug and vaccine usage; (4) surveillance of adverse side-effects of the above and 
(5) surveillance of veterinary diseases. Surveillance of 3, 4 and 5 will be addressed in other 
sections of the Pandemic Plan. Prerequisites of surveillance are well-functioning informa-
tion gathering and processing systems, collaboration between laboratories and with parties 
involved in epidemiological information gathering.
During pandemic alert phases 3-5, surveillance must be sensitive in order to detect sus-
pected cases, the laboratory testing (see section 10.1.3) of which will confi rm or eliminate 
an infl uenza virus infection causing a pandemic threat. 
At pandemic phase 6, the aim of surveillance is to detect the start of regional epidemics, 
to describe the course and end of the epidemic in each area, and to direct detection of cases, 
use of different preventive methods (section 7) and assessment of their effi cacy. 
Particular objectives of surveillance include detection of changes in transmission mecha-
nisms of an infl uenza virus causing a pandemic threat or a pandemic, in the clinical descrip-
tion (complications, deaths), in distribution of the cases across age or medical risk groups, 
possible protecting factors, and to quantify the burdening on healthcare services caused by 
infl uenza. Properties of infl uenza virus strains identifi ed through surveillance are compared 
to the structure of available vaccines, and sensitivity of the virus strains to antiviral drugs 
established.
Due to the divergent objectives at the different phases of pandemic alert and full-blown 
pandemic described above and to the extensiveness of the operation, surveillance methods 
applied are also different at different phases. National and international infl uenza surveil-
lance during WHO phases 1–2 is described in sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3.
10.1.2 Clinical assessment and confi rmation of cases
Case assessments are used to direct e.g. use of diagnostics of a virus causing a pandemic 
threat in incidences of disease, to denote the degree of certainty of the diagnosis at various 
stages of an investigation into a case, to standardise information gathering on incidences, 
and to enable quality clinical-epidemiological research during the different phases of pan-
demic alert and full-blown pandemic. Use of laboratory diagnostics is described in section 
10.1.3.
The surveillance case defi nition may include a section concerning symptoms and clini-
cal fi ndings, one on exposure and one on laboratory confi rmation. At pandemic alert phases 
3-5, crucial sections are the one on exposure containing a frequently geographically delimit-
ing defi nition (e.g. “countries where A/H5N1 infl uenza is found in birds”), a description of 
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the exposure situation causing the actual infection risk (e.g. “direct personal contact”, “less 
than 1 metre from confi rmed case of infl uenza”), and an assessment of timing of the expo-
sure (e.g. “at most 7 days before fi rst symptoms”). The defi nitions change when epidemio-
logical information or that concerning properties of the virus changes. When the infl uenza 
virus subtype causing a risk of a pandemic changes, the directions are updated. Precise up-
to-date defi nitions may be found on the NPHI website13. 
At pandemic alert phases 3-5, laboratory confi rmation is always required. During the 
pandemic proper, the number of cases does not permit systematic laboratory confi rmation. 
However, in order to monitor possible changes in the properties of the pandemic virus, spec-
imens are collected from a sample of suspected cases under a separate plan. At the peak of a 
pandemic wave, a very large proportion of all feverish respiratory tract infections are caused 
by infl uenza, which is why a simple case defi nition based on symptoms is suffi cient both as 
surveillance tool and as basis for treatment decisions.
As the pandemic alert progresses, WHO and ECDC issue recommendations on interna-
tional standardisation of surveillance case defi nitions.
In terms of patient care, the grounds for starting antiviral drug treatment differ from the 
surveillance case defi nition during pandemic alert phases 3-5. During the current alert phase 
3 caused by the infl uenza A/H5N1 virus, initiation of treatment is based on the present direc-
tion for early identifi cation of an A/H5N1 infection in humans and risk assessment carried 
out on this basis. The direction is constantly updated on the basis of epidemiological infor-
mation and that accumulated on special characteristics of the disease and diagnostics during 
alert phases 3-5. Up-to-date directions may be found on the NPHI website6.
At pandemic phase 6, the surveillance case defi nition is based on the simple combina-
tion of symptoms typical of infl uenza. The aim is that the surveillance case defi nition and the 
grounds for starting antiviral drug treatment should be as compatible as possible. The case 
defi nition consists of infl uenza-like symptoms, which in ordinary seasonal infl uenza include 
especially a high temperature (>38ºC), respiratory tract symptoms and muscle aches. Based 
on information accumulated at a late alert phase (phase 5) on the clinical description caused 
by the pandemic infl uenza virus, a fi nal, detailed case defi nition will be drawn up, to act both 
as surveillance tool and grounds for starting antiviral drug treatment. 
10.1.3 Using viral diagnostics
Only laboratory tests can provide confi rmation of a case of infl uenza, particularly an infec-
tion by an infl uenza virus causing a pandemic alert or an actual pandemic. In addition, labo-
ratory activities are used to monitor the possibly changing properties of the virus. During the 
different phases of a pandemic alert and full-blown pandemic, the objectives and methods 
of laboratory activity vary. 
During pandemic alert phases 3-5, halting or at least slowing down the development of 
a pandemic is the key objective. Then it is important that every single new case or cluster 
caused by the infl uenza virus is quickly identifi ed, so that potential infection chains may be 
broken. Specimens must also be examined for other possible pathogens, in order to avoid 
unnecessary costly isolation and other further measures. 
6 www.ktl.fi  -Terveyden ammattilaisille  
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At phase 6 the case numbers are so large that diagnostics of individual cases are neither 
feasible nor justifi ed. At that phase, too, investigations by virus laboratories are needed for 
testing of separately defi ned samples, for example for surveillance of development of a po-
tential drug resistance. 
Analytical methods
To identify a virus from respiratory tract secretion samples, laboratories use viral culture, 
antigen tests or polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods. Viral culture may be used to iso-
late the virus strain for further analysis. These are carried out to identify the virus type (e.g. 
infl uenza A) and subtype (e.g. H5N1). Through genetic analysis of isolated viruses, muta-
tion of the virus is monitored and the resistance of the virus to medications may be deter-
mined. The downside of viral culture is the slowness of the method. It may take several days 
– sometimes even weeks – for the virus to multiply to such a degree that it can be character-
ised. Antigen tests produce results considerably faster, even in 20 minutes. These tests iden-
tify structural components of the virus, but they do not distinguish infl uenza A virus sub-
types from one another. Therefore, express tests employed in seasonal infl uenza diagnostics 
should not be used as the sole method when suspecting a pandemic virus, since both positive 
and negative results might be misleading. PCR is also a great deal quicker than viral culture. 
New specifi c reagents can be quickly developed for it as the virus to be identifi ed mutates. 
The other side of the coin is that there are a number of different PCR versions available, the 
sensitivity and specifi city of which at the present phase of pandemic development may be 
uncertain. National and international coordination is essential for viral fi ndings results ob-
tained by PCR methods to be reliable and comparable. 
Antibody tests carried out on blood samples can be used later to show whether the patient 
has contracted a certain virus, whether vaccination has brought about an immune response, 
and whether the patient has immunity against a certain virus. Testing by traditional antibody 
identifi cation methods, the haemagglutination inhibition test (HI) and neutralisation test re-
quire using live virus and thus a BSL3 laboratory. EIA methods do nor need live virus and 
they would be possible also in customary virus laboratories. In early 2006, there is no EIA 
method available that could specifi cally quantify H5N1 antibodies.
Specimens
Precision and reliability of laboratory diagnostics is largely dependent on patient specimens 
taken correctly and at the right moment. To identify a virus, the specimen is taken as early 
as possible in the course of the disease, usually using a cotton wool or dacron wand from the 
pharynx and nostrils, or with a suction device from the epipharynx. Detailed specimen-tak-
ing instructions are on the NPHI website. For antibody testing, paired serum specimens are 
collected. The fi rst specimen is taken at the acute stage of the disease and the second 10-14 
days later. If necessary, a third specimen may be taken about four weeks from the onset of 
the illness.
Before taking specimens it must be ensured, especially at pandemic alert phases 3-5, 
that the laboratory has the appropriate resources for examining the specimens. The speci-
mens are packed in a refrigerated container and delivered to the laboratory by emergency 
transport as quickly as possible. If transport is delayed, the specimen is kept in a refrigera-
tor. More detailed instructions may be found on the NPHI website (www.ktl.fi  -Terveyden 
ammattilaisille).
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Using virological laboratory tests at different phases of pandemic development
WHO pandemic alert phases 3-5
Viral diagnostics are required if the suspected infl uenza patient may have contracted the 
virus causing pandemic threat from a diseased animal (phases 3-5) or human outside Fin-
land (phases 4-5). Current instructions on confi rming suspicions of an avian-based infection 
caused by the A/H5N1 virus are on the NPHI website. If one of the phase 5 local human in-
fection clusters occurs in Finland, phase 6 procedures will be adopted.
Intensive and extensive microbiological diagnostics should be used on every patient sus-
pected of contracting a disease caused by a pandemic threat virus. At least during phase 3, 
taking specimens should be preceded by consultation with a medical practitioner specialis-
ing in infectious diseases as indicated in separate guidelines (more detailed instructions on 
NPHI website). A positive result leads to measures that are taxing for the relevant healthcare 
unit, and possibly restrict the freedom of movement of the patient and his close contacts. 
Similarly, a negative result generally halts the measures initiated just in case. This sets spe-
cial demands on the reliability of the results. An incorrect result either way hinders the meas-
ures required in order to break an infection chain possibly under way. At the same time, it 
is important to endeavour to identify some other possible pathogen in the patient. Although 
double infections are a possibility, discovery of some other pathogen is an extremely impor-
tant piece of information in planning further steps. 
Identifi cation of the virus is the primary principle of diagnosis, but particularly if taking 
specimens is delayed for some reason or another, antibody defi nitions are also important. 
Because viral culture is important at this stage, examination of the specimens should be 
concentrated in laboratories where the culture can be implemented under biosafety level 3 
(BSL-3) conditions. In early 2006, of laboratories engaged in extensive viral diagnostics, 
only HUSLAB had such facilities. Detailed specimen-taking and dispatching instructions 
are on the NPHI website (www.ktl.fi  -Terveyden ammattilaisille)6.
The instructions may change with increased knowledge and progression of pandemic de-
velopment phases. Therefore, the latest directions should always be checked on the NPHI 
website. 
The number of patient specimens to be examined may increase in fi ts and starts dur-
ing pandemic alert phases. Therefore, preparations should be made in time for carrying out 
screening for both the virus causing a pandemic alert and alternative pathogens also in nor-
mal virus laboratories under biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) conditions (e.g. PCR). The National 
Public Health Institute (NPHI) monitors development of the alert situation, and when neces-
sary, issues instructions and recommendations on the use of new diagnostic methods on its 
website and through other channels. 
NPHI monitors mutation and drug sensitivity of possible isolated infl uenza virus strains 
causing a pandemic threat, keeping as up-to-date as possible. This knowledge is utilised in 
an effort to optimise measures to prevent creation of potential infection chains.
WHO phase 6 (pandemic) 
During phase 6 (and possible already at phase 5, if human-to-human transmissions are oc-
curring as an epidemic in Finland), the objective is no longer identifi cation of the cause of 
an individual patient’s illness, except at the early stage, when the spread of the disease across 
different regions in Finland is best monitored on the basis of laboratory-confi rmed cases. 
Even on the outbreak of a local epidemic, the high case numbers render comprehensive di-
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agnostics impossible, and after the cause of the epidemic is confi rmed, also unnecessary. 
However, possible mutation of the virus in terms of its antigenic properties and drug sen-
sitivity should be monitored also during the pandemic. Samples are collected in accordance 
with a separately established plan and delivered to the National Public Health Institute infl u-
enza laboratory for further analysis. 
10.1.4 Surveillance information gathering
Surveillance information gathering is based on the surveillance system under normal condi-
tions (section 4.5) and on the system adopted in stages, taking into consideration the infor-
mation requirements of the pandemic alert phase or the pandemic.
WHO phases 3-5 
Under normal conditions, all microbiology laboratories notify laboratory-confi rmed cases 
of infl uenza to the National Register of Infectious Diseases. As the pandemic alert phase 
progresses, information gathering can be quickly extended to cover required additional in-
formation on the virus causing the threat. When there is a suspicion of an infl uenza viral in-
fection causing a pandemic threat, the fi nal result of the laboratory test is always confi rmed 
by the NPHI national reference laboratory which submits details of the confi rmation to the 
Register of Infectious Diseases, where the information is collated with that notifi ed by other 
sources. 
The unit treating the patient (including private services) submits a notifi cation by tel-
ephone of each suspected and confi rmed case of pandemic alert virus infection, as early as 
possible, to the medical practitioner responsible for infectious diseases within the Hospi-
tal District and to the National Public Health Institute (more detailed instructions on NPHI 
website6). The National Public Health Institute participates in case-by-case assessment, es-
tablishing at the suspicion stage the probability of the diagnosis and the extent of preventive 
measures.
On every suspected and confi rmed case of pandemic threat viral infection, the National 
Public Health Institute systematically collects information on the disease, exposure and the 
outcome. The information is primarily collected by the medical practitioner responsible for 
infectious diseases within the Hospital District or a person appointed by him or her. While 
the case numbers are very low, the information is collected by telephone and a dedicated 
form issued by NPHI, transmitted by fax. The functions of the National Register of Infec-
tious Diseases may be technically improved in that as the case numbers increase, the treat-
ing doctor or the medical practitioner responsible for infectious diseases within the Hospi-
tal District can submit electronically the necessary systematic surveillance information (e.g. 
exposure details, symptoms, referral to hospital, antiviral medication, inoculation history). 
This way, the information would be immediately available to everyone involved in preven-
tive work through the remote user system of the Register of Infectious Diseases.
If regional epidemics or clusters occur in Finland at pandemic alert phases 4-5, early ep-
idemic detection methods will also include surveillance of reasons for outpatient visits for 
infectious diseases, currently under development. Surveillance of reasons for outpatient vis-
its for infectious diseases aims to develop a procedure in cooperation with health centres, 
emergency clinics and parties responsible for the technical structure of patient record sys-
tems, which would allow for automated collection of information of simple content from lo-
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cal patient record systems for a national data system, to aid detection of infectious disease 
epidemics. The doctor or nurse responsible for the treatment event does not need to take 
any other measures in addition to entering normal records into the system. In order to func-
tion extensively, the system demands more comprehensive use of reason-for-visit codes in 
primary healthcare. The information collected by the system would permit its transmission 
through online technology for use by local, regional and national healthcare authorities. The 
intention is to extend the system to become a central sentinel surveillance system covering 
a signifi cant part of public primary healthcare and emergency rooms. In its extensive cover-
age mode, the system provides an accurate picture of public healthcare burdening brought 
about by infl uenza. 
WHO phase 6
MSAH declares a pandemic (phase 6) as under way in Finland (section 8.2), signalling tran-
sition to the procedure described below.
Due to the large number of patients, the infl uenza diagnosis for the majority is no longer 
based on laboratory testing, but a simple diagnosis based on symptoms (section 10.1.2).
The functions of the National Register of Infectious Diseases (www.ktl.fi /ttr) are devel-
oped in such a way that doctors and, if necessary, persons authorised by them (nurses, com-
munity nurses) can submit online notifi cations of infl uenza cases to the Register at the time 
of the treatment event. By adding the possibility of online recording of infl uenza to patient 
visit information systems, through partial automation of information content creation, noti-
fi cation can be made to consume very little extra time. Should it be deemed appropriate, it 
is possible to include additional fi elds on e.g. administration of antiviral drugs and referral 
to hospital. Thus, the patient record system produces the notifi cation of infectious disease, 
the information content is supplemented, if necessary, in a way demanded by pandemic sur-
veillance, and the information system sends a notifi cation to the National Register of Infec-
tious Diseases.
For healthcare units that do not have the necessary online notifi cation structures in their 
information systems, an Internet-based notifi cation procedure will be developed, whereby 
the information is recorded direct in the database of the National Register of Infectious Dis-
eases.
Through the above procedures, up-to-date information on treatment events would be 
quickly available to everyone involved in preventive work through the remote user sys-
tem of the National Register of Infectious Diseases. Using this solution, they would also be 
quickly available for the public online statistical service provided by the National Register 
of Infectious Diseases (www.ktl.fi /ttr).
The automated surveillance of reasons for outpatient visits for infectious diseases, de-
scribed above in the context of measures during pandemic alert phases 3-5, helps early de-
tection of the eruption of a regional epidemic. On this basis, regional and national commu-
nications and training may be improved.
Some of the above-mentioned modifi cations to information systems can be effected 
quickly as the pandemic alert phase progresses. The extent of available resources deter-
mines the schedule of progress of the actual development projects. While the above-men-
tioned integrated, automated systems are under development, information gathering may be 
for a short time implemented through a form delivered by fax. The information would be 
most expediently recorded regionally, and the system would be most rapidly created cen-
trally. This kind of a separate notifi cation procedure is more time-consuming for medical 
personnel than integrated procedures, which would be a signifi cant problem while health-
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care services are under great pressure. Furthermore, the information would not be as readily 
available for use by parties involved in prevention as when already existing surveillance in-
formation systems are modifi ed to suit the purpose, with utilisation procedures that are ver-
satile and well-established. 
Based on the severity of the pandemic, the grounds are established for drug treatment of 
those affected (in detail in section 10.7). If the aim is to treat everyone contracting infl uenza 
at an early stage (<48 h from onset of fi rst symptoms) with an antiviral drug, it is possible to 
integrate in surveillance the information of whether antiviral treatment was started, as well 
as other simple details required for directing preventive work. If surveillance of antiviral 
drug use is linked to case surveillance in information systems, the information produced by 
the system could direct deliveries of antiviral drugs.
By entering in the National Register of Infectious Diseases the information on each case 
on possible death, obtained through normal methods using the ID code from the population 
registration system, the system may, with a small delay, provide information on case mor-
tality rates. 
In seasonal infl uenza surveillance, absence surveillance of daycare centres, pre-schools, 
educational institutions, workplaces and the armed forces is often used. Design and organi-
sation of such extensive surveillance nationally and with uniform procedures would require 
more resources than are currently available. Nevertheless, in regional terms, absence sur-
veillance could be used to complement that based on use of healthcare services to clarify the 
picture of the impacts of a pandemic. Systematic absence surveillance is especially impor-
tant in organisations that are pivotal in securing vital functions. 
Development of the information systems, as outlined above, demands well-coordinated 
collaboration among parties responsible for healthcare information systems and surveillance 
systems. As numbers of suspected or confi rmed cases grow during pandemic alert phases 
or particularly the full-blown pandemic, technological systems require much greater line, 
memory and processing capacities set aside for this purpose than are currently available, in 
order to function reliably and to provide effective support for control operations.
In terms of implementation of the plans for both pandemic alert phases 3-5 and the ac-
tual pandemic (phase 6), it is crucial that the systems they are based on are in routine use. 
The various actors involved in surveillance are given obligatory directions, and decisions are 
made regarding development measures. The intensive methods of gathering and utilising in-
formation of the pandemic alert phase demand separate development resources, if they are 
to be available in the near future.
10.2 Measures targeted at those exposed 
A person exposed to a suspected or confi rmed case of infl uenza is at risk of contracting in-
fl uenza. With some people affected, the infl uenza infection may remain symptom-free, with 
some it may cause mild illness which the infected patient does not recognise as infl uenza, 
and with some of those infected, infl uenza with a typical clinical description will develop. 
In all the infection situations described above, the person may pass on the infl uenza vi-
rus in his respiratory tract secretions. With those affected with symptoms, the virus may be 
found in respiratory tract secretions before the fi rst symptoms appear (see sections 4.1.1 and 
10.4).
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The aim of measures targeted at those exposed is to reduce the risk of the person infected 
through exposure passing it on to others before his symptoms appear, or before the illness is 
diagnosed as infl uenza.
No effort will be made to identify those exposed during the pandemic (phase 6), and no 
particular measures will be targeted at them. The procedures described below apply to pan-
demic alert phases 3-5.
10.2.1 Defi nitions of exposure and an exposed person
Transmission mechanisms and transmissibility of infl uenza are described in section 4.1.
People exposed to a case of infl uenza (case defi nition in section 10.1.2) are (1) those liv-
ing in the same household; (2) persons who have been in direct contact with the patient or 
exposed at a maximum distance of one metre to the patient’s respiratory tract secretions, 
spread in droplets by coughing, sneezing, nose-blowing and talking; (3) medical staff ex-
posed in the manner described above while caring for the patient in hospital without appro-
priate protection (see section 10.4 Protection against infection in healthcare). N.B.! People 
who have used appropriate protection have not become exposed.
10.2.2 Tracing
The objective of tracing is to fi nd those exposed before they can spread the disease further. 
The exposed are advised to recognise the symptoms of possible infl uenza as soon as they 
occur and to avoid behaviour that might spread the infection before the symptoms appear. 
Through trace-back, a case of infl uenza that has become symptomatic may be recognised 
early, before the person has realised that he has infl uenza, and isolation measures immediate-
ly implemented to prevent further infection, and treatment begun as early as possible. Mon-
itoring of those exposed can also help collect information on the effi cacy of implemented 
precautionary measures. 
Tracing is initiated when a suspicion of exposure to a virus causing a pandemic risk aris-
es. Because the incubation period (see section 4.1.1) of infl uenza is short, trace-back is com-
menced as quickly and effi ciently as possible. While the source of the exposure is still lack-
ing laboratory confi rmation, the party locally or regionally responsible for epidemiological 
investigation should contact the National Public Health Institute as soon as possible, for risk 
assessment and determination of the extent of the measures to be taken.  
Trace-back is a task for the experts, requiring training on infectious diseases and special 
features of tracing. The patient, close family or people living in the same household, col-
leagues, staff of the healthcare units that have treated the patient, passenger and seat lists of 
public transport etc. are used as sources of information. Often, numerous sources of infor-
mation result in a list of exposed contacts, with details for each person on the nature of the 
immediate exposure.
Detailed information on each exposure situation is collected, which may either increase 
or reduce the risk of infection in the situation in question. It is particularly important to in-
clude information on possible protection from infection in the exposure situation, or of prior 
vaccination against the relevant microbe. 
Tracing demands wide-ranging collaboration between healthcare units. If the exposure 
has taken place on international transport (e.g. airplane, ship), tracing requires passing on the 
71
information to one or more national health authority, as well as to international organisations 
(WHO, ECDC) that may be coordinating the investigation.
10.2.3 Advising and monitoring the exposed
The exposed person is advised to follow diligent hand hygiene and to avoid close contact 
with other people during the remaining potential incubation period of the disease (see sec-
tion 7.1 Slowing down the spread of infection). The symptoms that might accompany the on-
set of infl uenza and the measures to be taken when the fi rst symptoms appear are carefully 
explained to the exposed person. The goal is to have available a local or regional telephone 
helpline which the exposed person can call when the fi rst symptoms appear, to be given de-
tailed instructions on action to be taken thereafter.
A pandemic alert phase may require active monitoring of the exposed without setting 
up quarantine. The unit carrying out active monitoring is in daily contact with the exposed, 
enquiring whether he is running a high temperature, cough or shortness of breath, muscle 
pains, headache, fatigue, sore throat, a runny nose, nausea, vomiting or diarrhoea. The onset 
of symptoms is followed by direction to a regionally appointed healthcare unit for diagnos-
tics and treatment.
10.2.4 Quarantine
Quarantine means restricting the movements of a person who has been exposed to infection 
but is free of symptoms, to prevent him from passing on the microbe to others as the infec-
tion develops. Quarantine is started at the earliest point when the person may be contagious, 
and it ends when the longest known incubation period, during which the symptoms should 
appear, has passed since the last exposure. The maximum incubation period of normal sea-
sonal infl uenza is six days, but the incubation period of a new pandemic virus may be dif-
ferent. The incubation period is determined at the pandemic alert phase according to best 
available knowledge.
Quarantine is always a part of a prevention programme, where other methods likely to 
be effective in controlling the infection in question are also employed in an effort to prevent 
an epidemic. Most commonly, quarantine is implemented at home by voluntary agreement. 
Under exceptional circumstances, quarantine in an institution may also be an option. Only 
in emergency situations is it justifi ed to impose quarantine against the will of the person be-
ing quarantined (for points of law, see section 14 Legislation). 
If possible, a healthcare unit should be in contact with the quarantined person at least 
once a day. The quarantined person is advised how he can at home avoid passing on the in-
fection to people living in the same household or to e.g. persons who provide the patient with 
food. Social services must have a system in place to support those quarantined at home, as 
far as is necessary. Staff must take appropriate measures to protect themselves from infec-
tion. 
During a long-haul fl ight, a justifi ed suspicion may arise that a passenger has contracted 
a disease caused by an infl uenza virus posing a pandemic threat. In such a case, an assess-
ment of the situation conducted by health authorities may defi ne all or some of the passen-
gers on the aircraft as exposed. If there is an airport in the area taking long-haul fl ights, a 
regional plan is required, allowing for quarantining of the passengers of a single aircraft, if 
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necessary. Under international recommendations, quarantine measures for passengers are 
not otherwise considered. The extent of the measures depends on the pandemic alert phase.
10.2.5 Post-exposure short-term antiviral drug therapy 
If the infl uenza virus posing a pandemic threat is sensitive to antiviral drugs, all those ex-
posed are administered short-term prophylaxis. This is not implemented if the time elapsed 
since the last exposure is longer than the known incubation period of the infl uenza virus in-
fection. 
Short-term prophylaxis for adults post-exposure to the A/H5N1 infl uenza virus currently 
posing a pandemic threat is oseltamivir 75 mg once a day for seven days. Dosage for chil-
dren is determined according to weight. The grounds more specifi cally linked to choice of 
drug and execution of drug treatment are explained in more detail in section 4.4.
10.2.6 Information-gathering
The different stages of action concerning the exposed demand management of information 
on them. One case may be linked to dozens or hundreds of exposed people.
A data system must be created for management of information on those exposed and 
quarantined, allowing for recording of such information and its utilisation in implementation 
and monitoring of the activity at local, regional and national levels.
10.3 Examination and treatment of patients 
10.3.1 Treatment chain in patient care and placement
Aims and main principles
During an infl uenza pandemic alert (WHO phases 3-5), the aim is prevention or consider-
able delaying of a pandemic. During phases 3-5, the infl uenza virus increasingly adapts to 
humans and its transmissibility increases. The patient numbers in Finland are few or at most 
a few dozen. The burdening of healthcare is still such that it allows implementation of the 
measures within the framework of the normal system. Adequacy of isolation facilities, sup-
plies of drugs and equipment does not prevent protective measures for nursing and other 
staff on usual medical grounds.
Patients are directed and transported as directly as possible to the fi nal place of treatment 
in order to avoid infections. In hospital, treatment of all patients fulfi lling the case defi ni-
tion is carried out using the standard precautionary measures, contact, droplet and airborne 
isolation (see section 10.4, appendices 6 and 8). During phases 3-5, tracing and quarantine 
measures of those exposed are implemented in order to break the infection chain (see sec-
tion 10.2). 
At the pandemic phase (WHO phase 6), the aim is to delay timing of the maximum 
morbidity of the pandemic through preventive methods (vaccinations, non-pharmaceutical 
methods, see sections 7.1 and 7.2) and reduction of serious cases of illness and deaths caused 
by infl uenza through effective treatment that is started early. The great burdening of patient 
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care is likely to demand emergency arrangements with regard to organisation and facili-
ties, in order to fulfi l the need for care. Due to the heavy burdening and nature of the facili-
ties available, it may not necessarily be possible to implement the same level of isolation 
and protection comprehensively as during WHO phases 3-5. In that case, the emphasis is on 
close observation of good hand hygiene and protection from droplets (see section 10.4).
Reception, triage and transport of patients should be executed in such a way as to avoid 
infections at the different levels of the treatment chain, as far as possible, also at the pan-
demic phase. The patients should be sent as directly as possible to the fi nal treatment facility. 
As great a proportion of infl uenza patients as possible should be cared for at home. Setting 
up of dedicated infl uenza clinics is likely to be necessary in primary healthcare. In hospitals, 
patients are cohorted (grouped). The number of patients requiring intensive monitoring and 
respirator treatment is great.
During phase 6 the number of exposures is high. At this stage, tracing and quarantining 
of the exposed no longer help to delay the progress of the pandemic, so they are not includ-
ed in the activity.
Seeking of treatment by patients and arrangements in the treatment chain 
Infl uenza pandemic alert (WHO phases 3-5)
Patient 
If a patient has symptoms indicating infl uenza posing a pandemic threat, he should initially 
contact healthcare services by telephone. According to instructions received, he should go 
directly to the designated place of examination and treatment, avoiding extraneous contacts 
and observing good hand and coughing hygiene. This goal demands informing the popula-
tion on the grounds and procedures of seeking treatment. 
Outpatient care
In the fi rst instance, the healthcare staff determine by telephone the exact details regarding 
symptoms, travel and exposure, and assess whether they fulfi l the clinical criteria of infl u-
enza causing a pandemic threat (see section 10.1.2, updated instructions are on the NPHI 
website www.ktl.fi  – Terveyden ammattilaisille ). If the criteria are fulfi lled, the doctor next 
consults the infectious diseases specialist of his own Hospital District, and if he is not avail-
able, the infectious diseases specialist of his own special sphere of responsibility. Following 
his instructions, the patient is then sent as directly as possible to the fi nal place of treatment, 
avoiding extraneous contacts. 
Reception and transportation of patients is executed in such a way as to avoid infections. 
During the procedure, diligent observation of good hand hygiene and protection from drop-
lets is essential (see section 10.4). 
Every confi rmed case of suspected infl uenza subtype causing a pandemic threat must 
be notifi ed as soon as possible to the National Public Health Institute Department of Infec-
tious Disease Epidemiology. Tracing and quarantining of those exposed is implemented us-
ing procedures described in section 10.2. Use of antiviral drugs for post-exposure short-term 
prophylaxis is also addressed in section 10.2. 
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Hospital 
Reception and transportation of patients is executed in such a way as to avoid infections. Pa-
tients must always be taken as directly as possible to the fi nal place of treatment, and trans-
fers between hospitals should be avoided, if possible. Patient care is carried out using the 
standard precautionary measures, contact, droplet and airborne isolation (see section 10.4, 
appendices 6 and 8). 
Airborne isolation facilities are not available in all hospitals that will potentially become 
treatment units. As far as possible, the isolation facility is selected in the following order: 
Isolation room equipped with sealed lobby, with en-suite WC and washing facilities, 
separate ventilation, negative pressure and air replacement 6-12 times per minute 
(airborne isolation room).
isolation room with sealed lobby
single room with en-suite WC and washing facilities
cohorting in room/rooms with separate ventilation but shared WC and washing 
facilities 
If separate ventilation is not an option, the arrangements are planned in cooperation with 
the hospital technical unit. 
Pandemic phase (WHO phase 6)
Patient 
During the pandemic phase, the population is educated on personal behaviour that can pre-
vent infections, and of possible exceptional procedures in seeking treatment. Citizens are is-
sued with clear, uniform national instructions on symptoms that are suffi cient grounds for 
telephoning or going to the correct treatment centre in the healthcare system. Patients are 
directed through local methods of communication; telephone helplines, online services and 
other public information channels, as directly as possible to the fi nal place of treatment, de-
pending on the severity of the clinical picture.
Outpatient care 
Burdening of primary healthcare is signifi cantly determined by whether the stockpiled an-
tiviral drug is effective against the infl uenza pandemic virus. If the drug is effective against 
the virus, the initial aim is that everybody suffering from infl uenza-like illness registers 
within 48 hours at a healthcare unit which carries out a clinical assessment and decides on 
starting antiviral drug therapy (see section 7.3 and 10.3.2). The aim is to prevent complica-
tions and deaths by early antiviral drug treatment. This adds considerably to burdening of 
outpatient care. 
In a pandemic situation, uniform national directions on use of antiviral drugs will be is-
sued. Resistance to antiviral drugs developing during a pandemic may lead to signifi cant 
procedural changes regarding use of drugs that must be implemented quickly. Forced ration-
ing of drugs is also a possibility. When an antiviral drug with regulated indications for use 
and limited availability is used extensively, the need for monitoring its correct use is con-
siderable.
If the stockpiled antiviral drugs are not effective against the pandemic virus, they are not 
used during the pandemic. If it is not justifi able to use antiviral drugs or if stocks run out 
1.
2.
3.
4.
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while the pandemic is still ongoing, as large a proportion of patients as possible are nursed 
at home in order to avoid additional infections. In such a case, the basic principles of seeking 
treatment from healthcare services and referrals are the same as in normal situations. 
Regardless of whether or not the aim is early antiviral drug therapy for everyone con-
tracting infl uenza, the patient numbers are likely to be so large that reception and treatment 
arrangements must be made that diverge from normal situations. Due to large patient num-
bers and the above-mentioned special features of infl uenza treatment, it is probably neces-
sary to organise special infl uenza clinics. In order to avoid infections, they are positioned 
separately from premises used by other patients. Movement of patients should be organised 
in such a way that no additional infections occur. In order to avoid additional infections, if 
would be benefi cial if distribution of the antiviral drug involves as little movement of the pa-
tient as possible from one place to another.
The need for home visits will increase and probably exceed capacity. Support should be 
organised for care of patients nursed at home. Pressure on social service activities linked to 
contracting the illness will be great.
Each primary healthcare unit should map the non-urgent functions that can be suspended 
in a pandemic situation. The premises and personnel released by interruption of non-urgent 
functions are utilised. Due to large patient numbers, infl uenza clinics may have to be run by 
community nurses and nursing staff or healthcare professionals other than doctors. After in-
duction and according to pre-issued guidelines, they triage the patients to be directed to a 
doctor’s surgery or a hospital emergency room, decide whether an antiviral drug should be 
prescribed, and issue it to the patient. The work takes place under the direction and respon-
sibility of a doctor. 
The infl uenza clinic should be on-call in nature, preferably 24 hours a day, where the as-
sessment is made quickly and the patient’s waiting time should be as short as possible. If the 
burdening is great, only e.g. children under a year old and pregnant women, possibly requir-
ing hospitalisation, are directed to the doctor’s surgery and hospital emergency rooms. Citi-
zens are informed locally of emergency arrangements.
At all levels of healthcare, the emphasis is on close observation of good hand hygiene 
and protection from droplets (see section 10.4).
Hospital
Placement of patients
Reception, triage and transportation of patients should be executed in such a way as to avoid 
infections. The patients must always be sent as directly as possible to the fi nal place of treat-
ment in order to avoid infections.
Factors infl uencing patient placement include the type of isolation used, patient numbers, 
and the level of care the patient needs, i.e. whether he can be nursed on the ward or whether 
he needs observation, intensive care or respirator treatment. Depending on available facili-
ties, even 2-5 simultaneous suspected infl uenza cases may create a situation where not eve-
ryone can be treated in appropriate airborne isolation. Airborne isolation rooms in intensive 
care departments are likely to run out at a very early stage. If the number of patients requir-
ing isolation is 5-30, special arrangements are probably necessary. If there are more than 30 
patients, the situation is an emergency and deployment of an emergency hospital plan may 
be required.
Hospitalisation of children requires special arrangements, as the carer must be present in 
hospital due to limited staff resources. 
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At the pandemic phase (WHO phase 6) patient numbers are so large that airborne isola-
tion is not possible for everybody. Hospitals will observe diligently at least the standard pre-
cautionary measures, contact and droplet isolation. Essential aerosol-producing procedures 
on patients should be carried out in airborne isolation rooms or at least in single rooms (see 
section 10.4, appendix 8).
Placement within wards 
Non-urgent elective activity will probably have to be reduced or discontinued, in order to 
free facilities and staff. 
If there are insuffi cient numbers of isolation rooms, infl uenza patients should be concen-
trated preferably in a separate building. If this is not possible, patients are concentrated in a 
ward with ventilation that is separate from that of other areas. If separate ventilation is not an 
option, the arrangements are planned in cooperation with the hospital technical unit. 
Placement in intensive observation and intensive care wards 
There are not enough airborne isolation rooms in intensive care wards during a pandemic. 
The patients may be cohorted within an intensive care or intensive observation ward, or in a 
single intensive care or intensive observation ward. Operating theatres and recovery wards 
freed from elective activity may be used for patients requiring intensive care. It is likely that 
these facilities are also insuffi cient. 
Properties of an ideal temporary hospital
Caring for large patient numbers may require deployment of temporary hospitals. Premises 
suitable for this purpose should be identifi ed for preparedness plans. The best alternative for 
a temporary hospital would be premises in hospital use, with existing required functional 
equipment, and from which patients could easily be moved elsewhere. The temporary hos-
pital should be situated away from other operational units, but yet close to support services, 
such as x-ray and laboratory services. A prepared plan should exist on deployment of tempo-
rary hospitals and removal of patients and functions normally using the facilities. 
The deceased
Exceptionally high mortality should be taken into consideration by ensuring adequate appro-
priate facilities for storing the deceased.
10.3.2 Using antiviral drugs
During the pandemic alert period (WHO phases 3-5), precautionary measures and starting of 
antiviral drug treatment are based on clinical suspicion fulfi lling diagnostic criteria (see sec-
tion 10.1.2). The diagnosis is confi rmed by laboratory tests (see section 10.1.3). Conclusion 
of the treatment depends on laboratory test results and their reliability.
During the pandemic period (WHO phase 6), the majority of all feverish respiratory tract 
infections are caused by infl uenza, and due to large patient numbers, confi rmation of diag-
noses with laboratory tests is not possible for all patients. The diagnosis of infl uenza is based 
on a clinical defi nition (see section 10.1). 
Use of antiviral drugs must comply with national guidelines. The preliminary goal is that 
both during the pandemic alert period (WHO phases 3-5) and the pandemic (WHO phase 6), 
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all who have contracted infl uenza should be given specifi c drug therapy at least within 48 
hours from onset of symptoms, providing that the drug is effective against the pandemic vi-
rus and that suffi cient quantities of it are available (see section 7.3 and section 10.7). During 
the pandemic (WHO phase 6), special arrangements in healthcare may be necessary in order 
to ensure that all those affected receive treatment as quickly as possible, and that additional 
infections are avoided in connection with distribution of the drug (see appendix 2 Local pre-
paredness plans for an infl uenza pandemic – primary healthcare).
Antiviral drugs for infl uenza are described in section 4.4.
The National Agency for Medicines is responsible for monitoring drug side-effects. The 
monitoring procedures and register currently in use are suitable for collecting side-effect in-
formation during a pandemic.
10.3.3 Antibacterial drugs required for treatment of complications 
Antibacterial drug therapy is indicated in suspected cases of pneumonia as a complication 
of the infl uenza infection. Other complications of infl uenza may be acute sinusitis and with 
children, middle ear infections. Complications of infl uenza are described in section 4.1. 
In drug therapy, it is most important that the chosen antibacterial agent covers the likely 
pathogens. The main pathogenic bacterium is Streptococcus pneumoniae (pneumococcus), 
but Haemophilus infl uenzae and Staphylococcus aureus are also possible, which is why es-
tablished practice differs somewhat from customary recommended antibiotics for treatment 
of pneumonia.
During pandemic alert phases 3-5, adequate supplies of antimicrobial drugs are not a 
problem and do not limit the choice of antimicrobial agent.
In pandemic phase 6, when the number of patients is exceptionally large, availability of 
antibacterial drugs is probably limited and reduces the choice.
Antibacterial drugs used in hospital
Obligatory stocking of drugs in hospitals and health centres is determined by the basic drug 
range of each unit, and the obligatory stocks should equal six months’ consumption (see sec-
tion 11.2). Therefore, the antibacterial drugs to be used in a pandemic situation should be 
included in the basic drug range of the unit. A standardised antibiotic recommendation also 
facilitates the work of healthcare personnel. 
The primary recommended treatment for bacterial pneumonia complicating infl uenza re-
quiring hospitalisation is intravenous administration of cefuroxime. Cefuroxime is effective 
against the likely pathogenic bacteria, and it is held in obligatory stocks of healthcare units, 
as it is frequently used under normal conditions. As necessary, broader-spectrum antibacte-
rial agents may also be used, but their obligatory stocks are considerably smaller.
Antimicrobial drugs used in outpatient care
Of pharmaceutical preparations included in pharmaceutical manufacturers’ and importers’ 
obligatory stocks, in practice the only antibacterial drugs currently capable of being uti-
lised in a pandemic situation in outpatient treatment of pneumonia and other respiratory 
tract infections are amoxicillin, amoxicillin and clavulanic acid and doxycycline (see sec-
tion 11.2). 
At the time of implementation of the pandemic plan, the principles and regulation of ob-
ligatory stockpiling will be assessed in more detail, including the need for obligatory stocks 
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to ensure suffi cient supplies of drugs required to treat bacterial infections in a pandemic sit-
uation. 
10.4 Protection against infection in healthcare 
During an infl uenza epidemic, protection of healthcare personnel from infection is crucial. 
It is the most important means of prevention and slowing down of the spread of infections 
before a vaccine becomes available. The properties of the pandemic virus are not known in 
advance. This protection plan makes the assumption that the pandemic virus is transmitted, 
spread and destroyed in the same way as seasonal infl uenza viruses.
10.4.1 Transmission mechanisms
A person who has contracted seasonal infl uenza secretes the virus into his respiratory tract 
and may transmit the disease to another person through coughing or sneezing (droplet trans-
mission). The large droplets (>5 μm Ø) produced when coughing or sneezing do not fl oat in 
the air, but fall down, and do not travel further than a metre from the coughing or sneezing 
person. Transmission may also take place via hands contaminated by respiratory tract secre-
tions (direct contact transmission). In addition, it is possible to become infected from sur-
faces or materials in the environment, if they have become contaminated by respiratory tract 
secretions (indirect contact transmission). For a person to become infected, respiratory tract 
secretions must come into contact with membranes of the upper respiratory tract or the eyes, 
for example through touching them.
In experimental studies, the infl uenza virus has been shown to remain viable on smooth 
metal and plastic surfaces for 24-48 hours at most, and on clothing and tissues 8-12 hours 
maximum. From the surfaces, the infl uenza virus has been transmissible to hands for 24 
hours after contamination by the virus, and for 15 minutes from a tissue. However, on the 
hands the virus numbers decline to one hundredth–one thousandth in a few minutes. It should 
be noted that transmission via the environment or materials requires great numbers of virus, 
such as are present in respiratory tract secretions in the early stages of the disease. The in-
fl uenza virus becomes inactivated in 30 seconds with alcohol-based hand rinses. Customary 
disinfectants used for secretion contaminations also inactivate it.
The incubation period of seasonal infl uenza from infection to onset of symptoms is 1-4 
days, on average 2-3 days. Adults are already contagious a day before the symptoms begin 
and 3-7 days thereafter, on average for fi ve days. Young children may be contagious several 
days before the onset of symptoms, and the contagiousness may continue longer than with 
adults (7-21 days). Patients with reduced resistance may secrete the virus into their respira-
tory tract for several weeks or even months. A patient with symptoms secretes greater quan-
tities of virus into his respiratory tract and is therefore more infectious than a symptom-free 
patient. This is the case especially during the fi rst few days.
Droplet transmission and both direct and indirect contact transmission are the principal 
transmission mechanisms of seasonal infl uenza. Airborne transmission is possible, particu-
larly if procedures are carried out in hospital on an infl uenza patient, whereby fi ne droplet 
aerosol (1–5 μm Ø) is formed from respiratory tract secretions. This fi ne aerosol can fl oat in 
the air for long periods and travel a distance of more than a metre. Such procedures are e.g. 
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intubation, endotracheal aspiration, tracheostomy care, respiratory physiotherapy, bronchos-
copy, nebuliser treatment and autopsy of the lungs.
10.4.2 Precautionary measures
The customary precautions, i.e. good hand hygiene and protection from secretions are the 
basic principles of infection prevention.
Customary precautionary measures and good hand hygiene
Customary precautionary measures mean the recommended good nursing practice in health-
care client/patient treatment and care. Their purpose is to prevent transmission of microbes 
from employees to patients, from patients to employees, and from patients via employees 
to other patients. This practice is recommended regardless of whether or not the patient is 
infected. The customary precautionary measures are based on hand hygiene and apply to 
blood, all bodily fl uids and secretions, patient’s broken skin and membranes (Appendix 8 
Classes of precautionary measures).
In healthcare institutions, good hand hygiene means disinfecting massage of the hands 
using an alcohol rinse. The hands must always be disinfected before and after every patient 
contact, as well as after removal of protective gloves and on leaving isolation rooms. The 
hands are washed with soap and water before disinfecting only when they are visibly soiled 
or possibly contaminated with secretions. Use of protective gloves does not replace disin-
fecting the hands. Gloves are used for a single patient or procedure and they must not be al-
lowed to contaminate surfaces in the environment.
Protection from droplets
Protection from patients’ respiratory tract secretion droplets is by a surgical mouth-nose 
mask and visor or protective glasses (Appendix 6 Using respirator and surgical mouth-nose 
masks in healthcare). In addition, patients are instructed to cover their nose and mouth with 
a tissue when coughing and blowing their nose, or a coughing patient is given a surgical 
mouth-nose mask (Appendix 7 General hygiene instructions for prevention of respiratory 
tract infections).
Protection from airborne infection
Protection from airborne infection (fi ne aerosol) takes place with a respirator mask (Appen-
dix 6 Using respirator and surgical mouth-nose masks in healthcare). Preferably, an FFP3 
mask or a powered air-purifying respirator (PAPR) equipped with a P3 fi lter should be used, 
with an FFP2 mask as second choice. At the same time, protection from droplets requires 
separate eye protectors (mask type protectors, goggles with side pieces or a visor, not nec-
essary with a PAPR). With reference to PAPRs, it should be noted that staff should have re-
ceived prior training in working with a PAPR (e.g. risk of needle accident), that their cleans-
ing/disinfection is carried out safely, and that appropriate storage facilities are designated 
for them. Technical properties of the patient accommodation (separate ventilation, direction 
and fi ltering of air fl ows) are used to reduce fi ne aerosol content of the air and to prevent its 
transmission to other parts of the hospital.
Handling of waste and equipment, meals, cleaning and laundry handling should follow 
normal practice (Appendix 8 Classes of precautionary measures). In cleaning, particular at-
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tention should be paid to diligent cleaning of surfaces likely to be touched. Disinfectants are 
used on surfaces in accordance with usual hospital practice. Employees cleaning patient ac-
commodation and facilities and taking specimens should take the same protective measures 
as nursing staff. 
It is important to identify employees who have contracted infl uenza quickly, in order to 
restrict the spread of the pandemic. Affected employees and visitors should be kept away 
from healthcare premises as far as possible.
Training is provided for the entire staff on transmission mechanisms of infl uenza and 
the basic principles of protection. Employees working in patient quarters are given separate 
training in implementation of precautionary measures and use of personal protection. Pa-
tients and visitors are also instructed on transmission mechanisms of infl uenza and the basic 
principles of protection. (Appendix 7 General hygiene instructions for prevention of respira-
tory tract infections).
10.4.3 Precautionary measures at different pandemic phases
Pandemic alert period or WHO phases 3-5
During the infl uenza pandemic alert phase, the aim is to prevent the pandemic or at least to 
considerably delay it. At this stage, there will be individual patients suffering from infl uenza 
in Finland, or a few dozen at most. Problems are not envisaged with regard to appropriate 
isolation facilities, staff trained in use of respirator masks or suffi cient supplies of protective 
equipment.
All patient examinations and care are carried out under the standard precautionary meas-
ures, or good hand hygiene and protection from patients’ respiratory tract secretions (Appen-
dix 7 General hygiene instructions for prevention of respiratory tract infections). To mini-
mise additional infections, patients requiring hospitalisation are directed or transported as 
directly as possible to the actual place of treatment, in accordance with instructions issued by 
the medical practitioner in charge of infectious diseases in the Hospital District. 
At the actual place of treatment, customary precautionary measures are observed, as well 
as instructions on contact, droplet and airborne isolation (Appendices 8 Classes of precau-
tionary measures, 6 Using respirator and surgical mouth-nose masks in healthcare).
Pandemic period or WHO phase 6
During the pandemic phase, the aim of protective measures is to delay the timing of the peak 
morbidity caused by infl uenza and to minimise the number of serious infl uenza cases and 
deaths. At this stage, the number of patients suffering from infl uenza and requiring hospital-
isation is high. There are not enough appropriate isolation facilities, and there may be short-
ages of protective equipment or staff trained in use of respirator masks.
All patient examinations and care are carried out using standard precautionary measures, 
or good hand hygiene and protection from patients’ respiratory tract secretions (Appendix 7 
General hygiene instructions for prevention of respiratory tract infections). To minimise ad-
ditional infections, patients requiring hospitalisation are directed or transported as directly 
as possible to the actual place of treatment, following regional instructions. 
Unavoidably, hospitals are forced to cohort patients. Cohorting means division of pa-
tients into groups and caring for the groups separately from others. The patients are divided 
according to symptom-based case defi nition into infl uenza and non-infl uenza patients. Those 
exposed are placed with infl uenza patients, if there is no dedicated group for them, and new 
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patients with non-infl uenza cases, if they do not present with infl uenza symptoms. The co-
horts should have separate nursing staff, if possible. If this is not possible, in daily work the 
non-infl uenza patients should be attended to fi rst and then the infl uenza patients. However, 
the patient’s need for urgent and emergency treatment must be taken into consideration.
In hospital, customary precautionary measures are observed in the infl uenza patients’ 
cohort area, as well as instructions on contact, droplet and airborne isolation (Appendices 8 
Classes of precautionary measures and 6 Using respirator and surgical mouth-nose masks 
in healthcare). If this is not possible, in addition to customary precautions, at least contact 
and droplet isolation instructions should be observed in contact nursing (Table 6 Minimum 
requirements of staff protective measures during the pandemic period (WHO phase 6)). Pro-
cedures forming aerosols with infl uenza patients should be avoided. If this is not possible, in 
addition to protective gloves and coat, staff should wear a respirator mask (FFP3 or in work 
taking some time, a powered air-purifying respirator equipped with a P3 fi lter, see 10.4.2), 
and a visor or protective goggles (not necessary with a powered respirator) during these pro-
cedures. They should be carried out in air isolation facilities. If this is not possible, a separate 
room with the door closed should be used, with only the necessary number of staff present. 
Table 6. Minimum requirements of staff protective measures during the pandemic period (WHO phase 6)7
In cohort area but not 
close contact7 Close contact (<1 m)
Precedures producing 
aerosol8
Hand hygiene + + +
Protective gloves -9 +10 +
Protective apron -9 + -
Protective coat - -/+11 +
Surgical mouth-nose mask + + -
Respirator mask FFP3 - - +
Visor or goggles - -/+12 +
7 customary precautions are always taken
8 intubation, endotracheal aspiration, tracheostomy care, respiratory physiotherapy, bronchoscopy, nebuli-
ser treatment and autopsy of the lungs.
9 cleaning staff should always wear protective apron and gloves in addition to surgical mouth-nose mask
10 if there is a shortage of protective gloves, they should be worn when handling secretions, broken skin and 
mucous membranes (customary precautions)
11 protective coat should be worn in place of protective apron, if extensive soiling of uniform or direct skin 
contact with blood or other secretion anticipated, e.g. intubation or treating young children
12 goggles or visor should be worn if risk of blood or secretion spray (customary precautions)
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10.5 Occupational health and safety and placement of staff in
healthcare
During a pandemic, healthcare employees may contract infl uenza outside their work-
place or they may become exposed while carrying out their duties. It is important to identify 
employees who have contracted infl uenza quickly, to prevent transmission of the disease to 
patients and other employees.
Employees who are sick must be kept away from patient care. Exceptions may have to 
be made, e.g. in case of employees with mild symptoms or who are recovering, if there are 
signifi cant staff shortages. Employees who have mild symptoms or are recovering, and feel 
that they are fi t for work, may nurse infl uenza patients, but they should avoid contact with 
other patients and healthy employees.
Employees should inform the party responsible for employee placement that they have 
had infl uenza and recovered, as it may affect their future duties. Correspondingly, the par-
ty responsible for employee placements ensures that sickness and absence information is 
passed on to occupational health and safety departments.
The general principle is that healthcare employees who nurse infl uenza patients do not 
nurse other patients or enter other premises with patient access. Exceptions may have to be 
made, particularly in the case of small occupational groups, or if there are signifi cant staff 
shortages. 
Nor is this necessarily feasible in outpatient healthcare. During the pandemic, hospital 
employees may be transferred to care for infl uenza patients if they have previously nursed 
other patients, but not vice versa. Conversely, employees who have had infl uenza should 
primarily be placed to nurse infl uenza patients, since they are not at risk of contracting in-
fl uenza, nor do they spread it. Similarly, these employees may be placed in units where in-
fl uenza would have serious consequences, such as organ transplant units, neonatal intensive 
care units and outpatient haemodialysis units. 
Healthcare employees, who are at great risk of contracting complications of infl uenza, 
should not participate in direct patient care. They should be considered for other duties, or 
in any case they should not nurse infl uenza patients. They include e.g. pregnant women and 
employees with reduced immunity.
Temporary employees are subject to the same operational principles as permanent staff.
If the situation demands using staff that has not received healthcare training, it must be 
noted that the employer is always liable for them and should ensure that untrained people are 
capable of the tasks they have been assigned. The employer must familiarise the employees 
with the risks and dangers of the job.
Occupational health services of healthcare employees may be outsourced. In that case, 
the agreement must include the above duties in a pandemic situation.
Duties of occupational health services
To maintain a system of monitoring infl uenza cases of employees and absences 
from work
To organise antiviral drug treatment for employees 
To implement employee vaccinations
To work in close cooperation e.g. with parties responsible for prevention of infec-
tion, recruitment and employee placement
•
•
•
•
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10.6 Vaccinations 
10.6.1 Targeting of vaccinations
Finland has set the target of obtaining pandemic vaccines equally for all residents. Despite 
the decisions made and vaccine procurement contracts, preparations must also be made for 
the eventuality that not enough vaccine is simultaneously available for everybody. It is there-
fore expedient at least to defi ne the principles under which people are placed in order of pri-
ority for vaccinations. 
Recommendation on vaccination against normal seasonal infl uenza
Infl uenza vaccinations of population groups for which the disease constitutes a substantial 
health risk are administered annually before the start of the epidemic season free of charge, 
as part of the general inoculation programme. The vaccination groups include all those over 
65 and those suffering from certain chronic illnesses. For these population groups, even or-
dinary annually recurring infl uenza may be fatal. Conversely, it is only rarely dangerous for 
basically healthy young or middle-aged persons. For example, according to American and 
Finnish mortality statistics, studies show that the risk of over-65s dying as the consequence 
of customary infl uenza is 50-200 times that of under-65s. During an annual epidemic, 5–20 
percent of the population contracts customary infl uenza, and 1–2 per thousand over-65s die 
as the consequence of annual infl uenza.
What is different during a pandemic?
The effects of the disease caused by a pandemic virus are expected to be considerably more 
severe than those of annual infl uenza. The number of those affected during the fi rst pandem-
ic wave (duration in community 6–8 weeks) is estimated at 25–35 percent. The number of 
deaths during the fi rst wave is estimated at 2–4 times that of customary seasonal infl uenza, if 
it is a case of a moderate pandemic, and up to 40 times if the pandemic is particularly severe. 
The estimates are based on information collected from the three pandemics of the 1900s. Of 
them, the 1957–58 and 1968–69 pandemics may be deemed to have been moderate and the 
1918–19 pandemic particularly severe.
As well as an absolute rise in morbidity and mortality rates, all the pandemics of the 
1900s have been characterised by the relative transfer of deaths to younger age groups. 
During the two milder pandemics, mortality was still clearly higher among over-65s than 
with younger age groups. In the United States, the risk of over-65s dying of infl uenza dur-
ing the 1957–58 epidemic was 18-fold and during 1968–69 13-fold compared to younger 
age groups. The 1918–19 pandemic was totally different from the milder pandemics, both 
in terms of mortality rates and age distribution. The mortality rate was 40–50 times that of 
normal infl uenza epidemics, and according to an American study, the risk of death for under-
65s was more than threefold compared to that of older age groups. At greatest risk of dying 
were children under fi ve and people aged 20–40.
Thus, the severity of pandemics and the danger to different age groups can vary a great 
deal. Therefore, it is not possible to draw up a universally applicable vaccination plan in ad-
vance. The priority order of vaccinations can be fi nally determined only just prior to the start 
of the vaccination programme. Nevertheless, it is expedient to draw up preliminary plans 
both in case of a moderate pandemic, such as those of 1957–58/1968–69 and a severe one, 
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such as the 1918–19 pandemic. It is most important to defi ne the objective of the vaccina-
tion, i.e. the grounds upon which they should be targeted.
Priority for personnel caring for infected patients
In most cases, there are no justifi cations for giving certain defi ned key groups priority in vac-
cinations. Defi ning key groups and organising such special vaccinations would expend inor-
dinate resources in relation to benefi ts gained. 
However, the workload and personal risk to staff caring for infected patients, compared 
to all other groups, is in a class of its own, and therefore immunisation of this group fi rst may 
be deemed to be justifi ed. The grounds are described in more detail in section 9.
Aim of saving years of life while respecting principle of equality
Vaccination is a simple protective measure and applicable to all. At the threat of a severe epi-
demic, targeting of vaccinations must be based on a benchmark that is as widely acceptable 
as possible and compliant with a sense of common justice. 
The aim is to use vaccinations to save as many years of life as possible. To ensure that 
equal treatment of citizens is not jeopardised when defi ning target groups, the calculated life 
expectancy should take into account only the age group, and not e.g. such factors affecting 
life expectancy as social group or chronic illness. 
Defi nition of saving years of life
If the aim of vaccinations during an infl uenza pandemic is specifi cally saving years of life, 
information or justifi able assumptions of life expectancy based on age (average years of life 
remaining) is required, as well as infl uenza mortality based on age and the effect of the vac-
cine on infl uenza mortality. After this, targeting of vaccinations is based on simple deduc-
tion: in an older age group, infl uenza mortality must be greater than in a younger age group, 
in order that the expectancy of saved years of life per vaccinated person would be equal. 
For example, because life expectancy of 60-year-olds is about one third of that of 10-year-
olds, infl uenza mortality of 60-year-olds should be three times that of 10-year-olds, in order 
that vaccination of 60- and 10-year-olds would save on average the same number of years 
of life.
The attached diagram shows the relative age-related infl uenza mortality required for vac-
cination to achieve the same expectancy of saved life years as with vaccination of a 10-, 40- 
or 70-year-old. The estimates are based on the assumption that the effect of the vaccine is the 
same for all age groups (level of effectiveness is not relevant in this assessment). Assuming 
the effect of the vaccine as the same for all ages probably slightly favours older age groups, 
as the current thinking is that the effect of vaccination is lower with the aged.
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If further assumptions on infl uenza morbidity and case mortality are made, the number 
of years of life saved by targeting vaccinations can be estimated. The table below shows one 
calculation of numbers of infl uenza cases (of illness) and deaths caused by the pandemic in 
a situation where the population is not vaccinated at all, and an estimate of the number of 
years of life saved through vaccination per one vaccinated person. The population is split 
into three age groups (0–19, 20–64, >64). In addition, each age group is split, in terms of in-
fl uenza mortality, into those under basic risk and those under increased risk (based on those 
recommended for infl uenza vaccinations and receiving special concessions from KELA, the 
latter numbering approx. 3.3%, 8.4%, 48.0% within these age groups). The other assump-
tions affecting the results are given in the table. The assumed morbidity and mortality rates 
used in the table fall into the middle ground between the two milder pandemics of the 1900s 
and the 1918–19 pandemic.
Diagram 1. The unbroken line is the level of age-related relative infl uenza mortality (compared to infl uenza mortality 
of 10-year-olds) that leads to the same expectancy of saved years of life as vaccination of a 10-year-old. 
The corresponding observations have been made for comparative ages of 40 years (triangles) and 70 
years (circles).
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Table 7. Numbers of people contracting and dying of pandemic infl uenza without vaccinations and the expect-
ancy of years of life saved by vaccination per one vaccinated person. The fi gures are based on the fol-
lowing assumptions: morbidity 25 percent of population; proportion of those affected in each of three age 
groups 42/21/16 percent; case mortality in the three age groups 0.5/0.75/1.5 percent (base risk group) and 
1.0/1.5/2.0 percent (heightened risk group); effectiveness of vaccine 70 percent; life expectancies in the 
three age groups are 72, 48 and 15 years. (Reference re: morbidity and case mortality: Doyle et al., unpub-
lished to date.)
0–19 yrs
base risk
0–19 yrs
heightened
risk
20–64 yrs
base
risk
20–64 yrs
heightened 
risk
>64 yrs
base risk
>64 yrs
heightened 
risk
Total
At risk* 1,207 41 2,920 268 423 391 5,250
Number affected, if no 
vaccination* 508 17 601 55 68 63 1,312
Number of dead, if no 
vaccination* 2.54 0.17 4.51 0.83 1.02 1.26 10.33
Saved years of life 
/1000 vaccinated per-
sons
110 210 50 110 30 20
* The fi gures signify thousands of persons, e.g. 5,250 = 5,250,000 persons
According to the plan shown in the table, the vaccinations would be targeted on the pop-
ulation in order of age, starting from children. Within each age group, the greatest health 
benefi t would be achieved by giving priority to vaccinating those at heightened risk. Other 
kinds of assumptions on morbidity and/or case mortality may lead to a different result. How-
ever, it should be noted that the order of priority in different age groups is essentially depen-
dent only on the (relative) infl uenza mortality rates of the age groups (cf. previous fi gure). 
In reality, mortality fi gures only become known after the onset of the pandemic. It is likely 
that information will be already available before a widespread strike of the pandemic among 
the Finnish population. 
Different order of vaccinations in different pandemics – two examples
Moderate pandemic (as in 1957–58 or 1968–69)
In a moderate pandemic, mortality transfers to some degree to younger age groups, but the 
risk of death of the over-65s (and possibly also those in clinical risk groups) is still 10-20 
times that of younger people. During such a pandemic, the vaccination recommendation of 
customary seasonal infl uenza could probably be applied, after the personnel caring for in-
fected patients has been vaccinated. The order of vaccination would then be:
Personnel caring for infected patients (50,000–150,000 people)
Over-65s and those in seasonal infl uenza risk groups due to chronic condition (in 
2005 approx. 1.1 million persons)
0.513 – 64-year-olds not in risk groups (approx. 4.1 million persons). Possible pri-
oritisations within this group will be made early during the pandemic or during the 
immediately preceding alert phase, on the basis of collected mortality information. 
13 Research shows that infl uenza vaccination results in a protective level of antibodies only from the age of 
6 months. 
1.
2.
3.
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However, in such a case serious consideration should be given to starting vaccina-
tions from younger age groups, since they are at most risk of becoming infected and 
thus also spread the disease most. Latest research results indicate that vaccination of 
schoolchildren against infl uenza can indirectly signifi cantly reduce infl uenza mor-
bidity of other population groups too. 
Modifi cation of the seasonal infl uenza vaccination recommendation would be likely to 
refl ect also on this order of vaccinations.
Severe pandemic (as in 1918–19)
If the pandemic is severe and results in a great deal of death also among the young, the gen-
eral attitude to vaccinations is sure to be different from when the pandemic is moderate. 
Such a situation results in extreme burdening of healthcare. Thus, the vaccination plan must 
be simple, in order that resources are not wasted on establishing whether someone is entitled 
to vaccination or not. During a severe pandemic, it is probably almost impossible to distin-
guish those at special risk within age groups, and therefore the single recommended criterion 
for vaccination is age. In a severe pandemic, the order of vaccination would be:
Personnel caring for infected patients (50,000–150,000 people)
Everyone else from the age of six months, from youngest to oldest.
10.6.2 Establishing practical guidelines for vaccinations 
Once the pandemic is declared, inoculations using the prototype vaccine must begin as 
quickly and comprehensively as possible, if there are stocks of suitable prototype vaccine at 
the start of the pandemic. In Finland, the decisions on using the prototype vaccine, the vac-
cination recommendation and order to be applied are made by the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health on instigation by the National Public Health Institute.
The vaccines must be distributed quickly throughout Finland. Local authorities must 
have detailed plans in place for the practical arrangements of the vaccinations and dissem-
ination of information on them, so that the entire population can be vaccinated in a few 
weeks. 
In municipalities, vaccinations may be carried out e.g. in health centres, hospitals, oc-
cupational healthcare, advisory health clinics, residential homes for the elderly, sheltered 
housing and community nursing, as well as possibly in schools. All premises planned for 
vaccinations must be carefully inspected in advance and detailed operational instructions 
prepared for each vaccination point. Suffi cient space must be reserved for those waiting to 
be vaccinated, as well as for the vaccination event and follow-up monitoring. Each munici-
pality needs several vaccination venues, so precise direction of residents to the correct vac-
cination point at the right time is important.
The National Public Health Institute is in charge of procuring of vaccines and their distri-
bution via wholesalers to hospital pharmacies and dispensaries. They distribute the vaccines 
to local authorities. The vaccines are delivered in as large batches as possible, so receiving 
parties must set aside suffi cient cold storage (+4–8 oC) for the duration of the vaccination 
campaign. It is particularly important that the division of labour between municipal opera-
tors is carefully planned in advance and their duties clarifi ed in good time before the vacci-
1.
2.
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nations begin. Vaccine quantities per municipality are estimated on the basis of population 
records, and the delivery destinations agreed in advance with the National Public Health In-
stitute. 
In order to implement mass vaccinations, local authorities must be prepared to recruit 
and train additional staff. 
Availability and adequate stocks of equipment required for vaccination must be ensured, 
and their stockpiling must be planned in cooperation with the Hospital District. 
The vaccine is most likely to be packaged in 50-dose bottles. One dose of vaccine is 
drawn into a disposable hypodermic syringe and injected using a dry needle into the muscle 
of the outer arm or thigh. Before the start of the vaccination campaign, NPHI will issue more 
detailed instructions on dosages of the vaccine, method of administration, choice of injection 
site, vaccination equipment and injection technique. 
Common contra-indications are noted in the vaccination. NPHI notifi es possible specifi c 
contra-indications before the start of the vaccination campaign. 
The general condition of the vaccinated person must be monitored for 15-30 minutes 
post-vaccination. Preparations must be in place for treatment of anaphylaxis, as always af-
ter vaccinations.
Rokottajan käsikirja (www.ktl.fi >julkaisut>rokottajan käsikirja) lists the side-effects that 
should be at least notifi ed to the National Public Health Institute. 
Recording of vaccinations
Every recipient of a vaccination is issued with a document showing the date and venue of re-
ceiving his prototype or specifi c vaccine. In mass vaccination situations during pandemics, 
recording of vaccinations in accordance with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health De-
cree 421/2004 either on a vaccination surveillance form or the equivalent fi eld in the health 
centre electronic data system is not necessarily possible. Nevertheless, records must be kept 
of the numbers of vaccinations given (e.g. fi ve-bar-gate tally). The National Public Health 
Institute may issue more detailed instructions before initiation of vaccinations. The National 
Public Health Institute collects the information from municipalities on numbers of vaccina-
tions administered after the campaign is complete.
10.7 Indications for use of antiviral drugs and prioritisation 
10.7.1 Pandemic alert phase
During WHO pandemic alert phases 3-5, antiviral infl uenza drugs are used for (1) treatment 
of patients to alleviate the severity of the illness and (2) short-term post-exposure prophy-
laxis. There is evidence of the effi cacy of neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir, zanamivir) 
in both of the above indications for use. Adamantine group drugs (amantadine, rimantadine) 
are effective in preventive use, if the virus is sensitive to them. The virus strains of the in-
fl uenza A/H5N1 avian infl uenza epidemic, which originated in Asia in 2003 and raised the 
pandemic alert, have mostly been resistant to adamantine group antiviral drugs, but at least 
in one area A/H5N1 virus strains sensitive to adamantines have been identifi ed.
Treatment of patients with infl uenza antiviral drugs is implemented in the manner out-
lined in sections 4.4 and 10.3.2. Choice of antiviral drug depends on the sensitivity of the 
virus to different drugs and new knowledge on the effi cacy of drug treatment obtained from 
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analyses of patient treatment at the different alert phases. When interpreting the results, it 
should be noted that neuraminidase inhibitors are not expected to affect the outcome of treat-
ment, if it is begun more than 48 hours from the onset of symptoms. 
Exposure as justifi cation of post-exposure short-term prophylaxis during pandemic alert 
phases 3-5 is defi ned in section 10.2. It should be noted that short-term preventive medica-
tion does not fully prevent the virus from reproducing and occurring in respiratory tract se-
cretions, which must be considered when deciding on other precautionary measures. 
It is likely that the events marking the WHO pandemic alert phases 3–5 will be located 
in countries outside Finland. With a single case entering the country, the number of those ex-
posed may rise to dozens, even hundreds of people. The drug quantities held in the obliga-
tory stocks of the normal drug distribution system and in reserve stocks (section 11.2 ”Pro-
curement, reserve stocks and logistics”) are likely to be suffi cient for the purposes mentioned 
above, up to alert phase 5. Nevertheless, in order to secure adequate supplies of infl uenza 
drugs, prescriptions and deliveries of drugs must be carefully monitored, as with increased 
threat of a pandemic, delays in additional purchases are likely to be long.
If the events marking pandemic alert phases 4-5 are located in Finland, moving to pro-
cedures described as those of the actual pandemic phase (phase 6) will be considered, as the 
situation dictates, also with reference to use of infl uenza antiviral drugs.
10.7.2 During the pandemic
At the onset of the actual pandemic, the bases of using infl uenza antiviral drugs change. The 
objective is to reduce complications and deaths of infl uenza patients by treating as great a 
proportion of them as possible with antiviral drugs within 48 hours of the onset of symp-
toms. At this stage, it is no longer worth tracing those exposed, as the number of infections 
is already very large.
The measures aimed at effective treatment of patients are described in section 10.3. Due 
to pandemic alert phase 3, Finland obtained in 2005 a quantity of the drug oseltamivir suf-
fi cient to treat all the cases, if a quarter of the population is affected. 
Only from the start of pandemic alert phases 4-5 will information accumulate regard-
ing which age- or other population groups the pandemic alert infl uenza virus is affecting 
the most and causing signifi cant numbers of serious infections, leading to hospitalisation or 
death. This information will have a decisive impact on the precise aims and fi nal recommen-
dations on antiviral treatment during the pandemic. If the accumulating information strong-
ly indicates an Asian (1957) or Hong Kong (1968) pandemic type development, where the 
clinical descriptions of children and people of working age did not substantially differ from 
customary seasonal infl uenza, there is no need to take emergency measures in order to reach 
all those who are suffering from infl uenza symptoms, in order to administer the drug. In that 
case, drug therapy arrangements are targeted at high risk groups based on age or chronic ill-
ness. If information accumulating during a pandemic alert phase indicates large numbers of 
serious cases of infection in all age groups, the aim must be treatment of all those contracting 
infl uenza in the whole population. The case may also be that possible differences in morbid-
ity of different population groups change during the pandemic, and thus fi nal information on 
the matter is obtained only at the last moment.
A particular problem arises if the events of pandemic alert phases 4-5 are located in Fin-
land, and they consume much of the drug stockpiles before the actual pandemic. Morbidity 
during the pandemic itself may be higher than the quarter of the population used as the basis 
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of stockpiling. Because a simple diagnosis based on symptoms is used during the pandemic 
as basis for treatment, some of the stockpiled drugs will inevitably be used on treatment of 
infections other than infl uenza. If the pandemic manifests, in common with certain previous 
pandemics, at brief intervals in more than one wave, it is likely that the infl uenza antiviral 
drugs are not suffi cient to treat all those infected after the fi rst wave. The partial resistance to 
antiviral drugs of the pandemic infl uenza virus may demand higher dosage and longer dura-
tion of treatment than anticipated, which would increase drug consumption and lead to pre-
mature depletion of drug stocks. 
For reasons mentioned above, the target groups for antiviral drug treatment among those 
infected may need to be prioritised. Correct prioritisation of target groups for drug therapy 
from the viewpoints of the individual and society takes place according to the principles and 
decision-making chain described in section 9 Ethical considerations in prevention of pan-
demics. Drug stocks are released in accordance with regulations to be issued separately. 
10.7.3 Viewpoints on use of antiviral drugs as long-term preventive medication
During a pandemic, the population becomes infected in homes, pre-schools, schools, work-
place communities, incidental contact exposures in public premises and on public transport. 
Some of the exposures leading to infection take place from infected people with few or no 
symptoms, but who are carrying the virus in their respiratory tract secretions.
Occupational groups working in customer service are exposed to more people with symp-
tomatic or symptom-free infectious infl uenza in their work than the rest of the population. 
The risk of infection can be reduced through means described in section 7.1 Slowing down 
the spread of infection. Improved hygiene and structural methods reducing droplet or con-
tact transmission can be used to reduce the risk of infection in customer service, although it 
cannot be totally prevented. 
Healthcare staff caring for infected patients are particularly frequently exposed to infl u-
enza infection in their work. In their case, prevention of infection during the pandemic is 
based on precautionary measures and use of a possible vaccine. Protection from infection is 
described in section 10.4 and use of vaccines in section 10.6.1. In addition to taking precau-
tionary action and using vaccines, it is essential that healthcare personnel recognises, by ac-
tive monitoring of their own symptoms, infl uenza-like symptoms immediately at their onset, 
so that antiviral drug treatment can be started early in order to alleviate the symptoms.
Long-term preventive use of antivirals will probably not be possible in a pandemic situ-
ation, due to their limited availability. For example, oseltamivir treatment for 100,000 peo-
ple over the estimated 10-week duration of a pandemic wave would use up approx. 700,000 
courses of treatment, or more than half of the drugs held in reserve stocks. The pandemic 
wave is likely to manifest in different regions of the country with phase delays of at least a 
few weeks. The associated lack of precision in defi ning the timing of the start and fi nish of 
possible long-term preventive medication would prolong its duration and increase total con-
sumption. 
Prophylaxis does not prevent initiation of the immune response brought about by normal 
seasonal infl uenza. The same may possibly be shown during a pandemic alert or in the ear-
ly stages of an actual pandemic. If this is the case, those at greatest risk in healthcare could 
possibly be prescribed preventive medication for a limited period, thus avoiding short-term 
courses of prophylaxis following repeated exposures (phase 4-5) or unnecessary long-term 
preventive medication (phase 6). However, the precondition is that immunity can be ascer-
tained by laboratory tests, which is likely to be diffi cult. 
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On the basis of modelling studies, it has been suggested that while human-to-human 
transmission of the virus is still weak in pandemic alert phases 4-5, small local infection 
clusters and chains could be broken by preventive administration of antiviral drugs to every-
one working close to infl uenza cases found within a small, geographically defi ned area. The 
method may be useful particularly when the population has partial protection from previ-
ously given vaccinations, and the target group of preventive action is clearly defi nable e.g. 
in rural conditions. There are no clear international recommendations on this to date. 
Due to the limitations on their application, relatively little interest has been shown in the 
adamantine group of antiviral drugs (amantadine, rimantadine) in relation to improving pre-
paredness for an infl uenza pandemic. If the virus posing a pandemic threat is sensitive to ad-
amantine group drugs, long-term preventive medication using them may be an option with 
specifi c target groups. They may be e.g. patient groups that do not obtain protection from 
vaccines due to long-term and profound immune defi ciency, and with whom the risk of in-
fl uenza complications is pronounced. Considerations linked to use of adamantines should be 
further investigated at the time of implementation of the pandemic plan.
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11 PROCUREMENT, RESERVE STOCKS AND LOGISTICS 
11.1 Vaccines 
11.1.1 Procurement
In the supplementary budget of 2005, the Parliament approved funds for obtaining prototype 
vaccine. The supply contract with a Dutch vaccine manufacturer was signed in March 2006. 
The vaccine will be produced during 2006, but the fi nal formula will only be decided after 
clinical trials. The intention is that 5.2 million doses of the prototype vaccine will be brought 
to Finland for stockpiling in 2008. 
The National Public Health Institute has also signed a fi ve-year reservation agreement on 
specifi c vaccine with the same Dutch infl uenza vaccine manufacturer. Under the agreement, 
it undertakes to supply Finland with 5.5 million doses of the vaccine. The specifi c vaccine 
will be delivered to Finland in one or more batches about six months after a pandemic has 
been declared. Production of the vaccine can only begin after WHO has declared that a pan-
demic is under way. Negotiations have taken place between the Nordic countries on a shared 
vaccine manufacturing facility.
11.1.2 Stockpiling and logistics
The rapid distribution of prototype and specifi c vaccines to be procured for Finland poses a 
great challenge to everyone involved, such as wholesalers, dispensaries and hospital phar-
macies, in a pandemic situation. More than fi ve million doses of prototype vaccine must be 
delivered to vaccination venues within as short a time as possible after declaration of a pan-
demic. If the cause of the pandemic is found to be a mutation of the current avian infl uenza 
virus (A/H5N1 subtype), a vaccination campaign covering the whole population using the 
A/H5N1 prototype vaccine will be implemented as soon as possible. The prototype vaccines 
delivered to Finland by the manufacturer will be stored e.g. at wholesalers and other cold 
storage (+2 - +8 o C) facilities suitable for drugs. Pharmaceutical wholesalers are in charge 
of correct storage of the vaccines and for their delivery to municipalities according to in-
structions issued by NPHI. Local authorities make the arrangements for storage and release 
of the vaccines delivered to them. The vaccine will be packaged in 30-50-dose injection bot-
tles. Detailed instructions on packaging, dispatching and transfer to vaccination venues of 
the vaccine deliveries must be drawn up and agreed with all parties involved. Section 10.6.2 
also includes information on transportation of vaccines.
However, the fi nal decision on the manufacture, distribution and use of specifi c vaccine 
can only be made once the pandemic virus strain is identifi ed. Specifi c vaccines do not re-
quire long-term storage, but are distributed almost immediately after arrival in the country 
to vaccination points, using the same logistics chain as in distribution of the prototype vac-
cine.
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11.2 Drugs 
11.2.1 Emergency supplies and obligatory stocks
Emergency supplies
The emergency supplies maintained by the National Emergency Supply Agency refer to 
state-owned drugs, pharmaceutical and raw materials procured to ensure security of supply 
in an effort to secure availability of so-called crisis-specifi c drugs during a long-term crisis, 
mainly using the principle of compensatory production. The stockpile is based on the Act on 
Safeguarding Security of Supply (1390/1992). There is no public information available on 
the drugs held in the Government stockpiles and their quantities, with the exception of the 
Tamifl u preparation obtained in 2005. 
The Government generally decides on the use of emergency supplies. Under the Govern-
ment Decree No. 279, 20.4.2006, however, drugs, medical materials and protective equip-
ment may be released for use when the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health alone has de-
cided that it is necessary. This allows starting of drug therapy within 48 hours in an infl uenza 
pandemic situation.
 
Obligatory stocks
Obligatory drug stocks refer to those owned and stored by pharmaceuticals importers and 
manufacturers and healthcare institutions and health centres, the quantity of which is based 
on legislation on obligatory stocks. The Act on Obligatory Reserve Supplies of Medicinal 
Products (402/84) defi nes the drug groups covered by obligatory stocking, as well as ancil-
lary materials used in manufacture of pharmaceuticals and packaging materials covered by 
the obligation. The Decree on obligatory reserves (608/84) defi nes the pharmacological and 
ancillary materials within these groups covered by the obligation. With its annual decision 
(most recent 28.10.2005 NAM Reg. No. 1685/34/2005), the National Agency for Medicines 
confi rms by brand name those pharmaceutical preparations that contain pharmacological 
substances confi rmed by the Decree and in which such substances are crucial in terms of 
their medicinal signifi cance, and with which the ancillary materials and packaging materials 
used in production are covered by the obligation. The decision is published on the National 
Agency for Medicines website (www.nam.fi ).
Obligatory stocks of pharmaceutical companies and importers
Stockpiling obligations of pharmaceutical manufacturers and importers in Finland concern 
licensed commercial medicinal preparations. Depending on the drug group, the quantity of 
obligatory stocks is that corresponding to fi ve or ten months’ consumption/sales. 
Imported medicinal preparations are held in obligatory stocks as end product packages. 
Finnish pharmaceutical producers are permitted to stock the quantity of drugs correspond-
ing to their obligations as semi-fi nished products or medicinal substances, raw materials and 
packaging materials. Nevertheless, some domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers stock a 
part of their obligation as fi nished drug packs. 
Pharmaceutical companies must inform the National Agency for Medicines at the end of 
each year of the quantities held in their obligatory stocks for the following year. A company 
is not permitted to understock its obligation without a permit issued by the Agency. Under 
the Act on Obligatory Reserves, a permit to understock may be granted due to a disruption 
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in availability, or if a preparation held in the stockpile is at risk of exceeding its sell-by date 
while in stock. If the sales licence of a preparation is withdrawn, running down of obligatory 
stocks may be started 10 months before expiry of the licence. 
Obligatory stocks in healthcare institutions
Obligatory stocks in healthcare institutions only concern municipal hospitals and health 
centres. Private hospitals are under no obligation. The stocking obligation of hospitals and 
health centres is tied to the basic drug range of each unit. The criteria for selection of a ba-
sic drug range have not been defi ned, but the range is specifi c to the institution and based on 
the needs and drug consumption of each institution. Hospital obligatory stocks of medici-
nal preparations in their basic drug ranges should equal six months’ consumption. Hospitals 
keep stocks equivalent to two weeks’ consumption of base and nutritional solutions. Hos-
pitals may understock their obligations without a permit, if releasing the stocks is essential 
for the operation of the institution, e.g. due to disruption in availability of the drug, but they 
must replenish their stocks without delay to the level of the set obligation.
 11.2.2 Current situation of obligatory stocks and need for change
The total value of obligatory stocks is in excess of 100 million euros, of which the value 
of municipal healthcare institutions’ obligatory stocks is approx. 20 million euros. Because 
the stocking obligation is determined on the basis of normal drug consumption, obligatory 
stocking does not provide long-term security of supply of drugs with little or no use in nor-
mal situations, but with signifi cant increase is usage in emergency situations. 
The legislation on obligatory stocking dates back to 1984, with most recent amendments 
regarding drug groups covered by obligatory stocking in 1997. Reform of the legislation 
is currently under way, one of the reasons being that the medicinal preparations and their 
quantities covered by the stocking obligation no longer in all respects correspond to modern 
drug treatment practices. Under existing legislation, obligatory stocks of antimicrobial drugs 
for sale in Finland include medicinal preparations containing amoxicillin, benzylpenicil-
lin, doxycycline, erythromycin, phenoxymethylpenicillin, isoniazid, chloramphenicol, met-
ronidazole, miconazole, riphampicine, cyprophloxacine, tobramycin and trimetoprime. Of 
medicinal preparations used today in treatment of bacterial infections, e.g. cephalosporins, 
anti-staphylococcal penicillins, new macrolides, new fl uorochinolons and wide-spectrum 
beta-lactam antimicrobial agents, are missing from importers’ and pharmaceutical manufac-
turers’ obligatory stocks. 
11.2.3 Purchases for emergency stockpiles
The Finnish Government has made preparations for an infl uenza pandemic by supplement-
ing the emergency drug stocks with antiviral agents of the neuraminidase inhibitor group, 
Tamifl u (oseltamivir) and Relenza (zanamivir). 1.3 million treatment courses of the former 
have been ordered and 100,000 courses of the latter. In addition, Finland has placed an order 
for a million tablets of Atarin (amantadine). 
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11.2.4 Antiviral drug logistics in a pandemic situation
Since the effi cacy of antiviral agents held in emergency stockpiles is conditional on its ad-
ministration within 48 hours of the onset of symptoms, availability and smooth distribution 
of the drugs will be critical for the successful outcome of drug treatment. Appendix 9 deals 
with antiviral drug logistics in a pandemic situation and associated procedural suggestions.
11.2.5 Antibacterial drugs used to treat complications
Every hospital and health centre must estimate the number of patients it is likely to have to 
deal with during an infl uenza pandemic. The estimate is based on the population base, sce-
narios outlined in section 6.1 Impacts on health and the healthcare system, and regional and 
local preparedness plans. Hospitals and health centres must make an inventory of their ex-
isting obligatory stocks. A further estimate should be made on the proportion of hospitalised 
patients who are likely to require the drug treatment in oral suspension format (about 30% of 
under-16s and some of the elderly) and assess the adequacy of stocks in this respect, too. An-
tibacterial agents used to treat complications of infl uenza are dealt with in section 10.3.3. 
If it is assumed that all patients admitted to hospital are suspected of having pneumonia 
and their antibacterial drug treatment is started, most healthcare units would probably need 
more cefuroxime for their stocks, and possibly also orally administered antibacterial drugs. 
It must also be noted that even if the antibacterial drugs would last over the pandemic, re-
plenishment of stocks after the pandemic might take longer than usual. Agreement on addi-
tional supplies should be reached in regional plans. Collaboration between other hospitals 
and health centres in the area would also be benefi cial in circulating the stocks in order to 
prevent drugs passing their sell-by date.
Legislation does not include obligatory stocks in companies, hospitals or health centres 
of dosing devices necessary for intravenous administration of drugs. Therefore, there is a 
possibility that dosing equipment runs out during the pandemic. 
The quantities required by obligatory stocking by drug manufacturers and importers are 
only equivalent to fi ve or ten months’ consumption/sales, depending on the drug group, and 
the medicinal preparations covered by the current legislation on obligatory stocks no longer 
fully correspond to modern drug therapeutic practices. Therefore, in practice, the only anti-
bacterial drugs currently capable of being utilised in a pandemic situation in outpatient treat-
ment of pneumonia and other respiratory tract infections (see section 10.3.3) are amoxicillin 
(powder for oral suspension and tablets), amoxicillin and clavulanic acid (powder for oral 
suspension and tablets), and doxycycline (tablets). The quantity of these drugs held in ob-
ligatory stocks is insuffi cient to treat all the patients diagnosed with an illness as a complica-
tion of infl uenza, requiring treatment with antibacterial agents. 
In the reform of legislation on obligatory stocks, consideration should be given to in-
cluding under obligatory stocking drugs required for treatment of infl uenza complications 
caused by bacteria, such as cephalosporins, anti-staphylococcal penicillins, new macrolides, 
new fl uorochinolons and wide-spectrum beta-lactam antimicrobial agents. With reference to 
obligatory stocking, procedures for securing obligatory stocks and their controlled release in 
a pandemic situation must be created. Furthermore, consideration should be given to inclu-
sion in the Government reserve stockpiles of antibacterial drugs for treatment of the most 
common complications of infl uenza, both for hospitalised and outpatients (e.g. cefuroxime, 
fi rst generation cephalosporin and amoxicillin and clavulanic acid), and to stocking of dos-
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ing devices, either in the Government reserves or locally, for dosage of antibacterial drugs 
for hospitalised patients. Adequate supplies of infusion fl uids must be assessed and measures 
considered for their inclusion in obligatory stocks.
For antibacterial drugs, the logistics follow normal practices. 
11.2.6 Monitoring of adverse side-effects
The National Agency for Medicines is responsible for monitoring drug side-effects. The pro-
cedures and register currently in use are suitable for collecting information on adverse side-
effects during a pandemic.
11.3 Equipment and materials 
Every healthcare unit should produce an estimate, based on the above calculations, of the 
number of patients requiring hospitalisation, intensive care and respirator treatment it is like-
ly to have to deal with during an infl uenza pandemic. These fi gures should be compared to 
available resources, quantities of e.g. respirators and other breathing equipment and oxygen 
stocks, and an estimate included in local preparedness plans for their optimal use and pos-
sible additional supplies needed. Using a pulse oximeter is recommended to screen patients 
who are likely to require intensive observation or care. 
In addition to equipment and material needed in patient care, available stocks of mate-
rials required for protection of nursing staff must be assessed, such as protective clothing, 
gloves, face masks, mouth, nose and eye protectors, disinfectants, and their reserve stocks. 
In addition to healthcare burdening forecasts, these estimates are based on the basic guide-
lines on staff protection during a pandemic (section 10.4 Protection against infection in 
healthcare) Based on the estimates, adequacy of the materials in a pandemic situation should 
be assessed, and whether reserve stocks might be increased. 
As well as assessment and purchase of materials and equipment, plans should be made 
on how the healthcare unit will store them. In preparedness planning, consideration should 
also be given to whether the healthcare unit holds reserve stocks of actual working clothing, 
and whether it stores protective clothing removed from normal use. 
The National Public Health Institute Hospital Infection Programme (HIP) was commis-
sioned by the Pandemic Preparedness Working Group to map the materials and equipment 
used to protect staff in Finnish emergency hospitals and largest health centres, and their re-
serve stocks, through a questionnaire compiled in cooperation with the National Emergency 
Supply Agency and sent to Hospital Districts at the end of the year 2005. Based on the sur-
vey results, Hospital Districts will be directed at the implementation stage of the pandemic 
plan in drawing up their own pandemic preparedness plans, and the necessity for national 
emergency stockpiling will be assessed. Materials and equipment purchases and stockpiling 
must take into account the target that regional organisation will vaccinate the whole popula-
tion twice. 
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12 PREPAREDNESS FOR A PANDEMIC IN DIFFERENT SECTORS OF 
SOCIETY
12.1 Health services
12.1.1 Public healthcare
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is responsible for preparedness of healthcare serv-
ices for the threat of an infl uenza pandemic. The Ministry is supported by the National Pub-
lic Health Institute and the Advisory Board on Communicable Disease. The organisations 
responsible for preparedness are described in detail in section 8 and appendix 5. 
The State Provincial Offi ce ensures that Hospital Districts, health centres and munici-
palities in its area draw up an infl uenza pandemic preparedness plan, as well as coordinat-
ing, supervising and directing implementation of the plans with the help of local and national 
experts and taking into account special regional characteristics. The duties belonging to the 
State Provincial Offi ce mandate are highlighted in crisis management and coping. In infl u-
enza pandemic prevention, the roles of social and healthcare services, veterinary disease pre-
vention, emergency services, education authorities and transport take centre stage.
The Hospital District prepares an infl uenza pandemic preparedness plan for specialist 
nursing care, directs and supports preparedness of health centres and public and private oc-
cupational healthcare in its area, and acts as regional expert adviser on infl uenza pandemic 
preparedness. 
The health centre draws up an infl uenza pandemic plan, covering direction to treatment, 
diagnosis and treatment of the disease, and organising possible vaccinations. The plan al-
so includes operation of occupational healthcare services organised by the health centre. It 
must take into account available private sector resources and collaboration with private sec-
tor occupational health services. It is coordinated with other administrative organs of the lo-
cal authority.
Due to the great variation in size of Hospital Districts and health centres in their areas, 
regional operational models may be very different. Closely coordinated collaboration of the 
Hospital District, State Provincial Offi ce and health centres is required. To this end, it may 
be advisable to set up a regularly functioning regional infl uenza pandemic preparedness co-
ordination group.
In preparing for an infl uenza pandemic, local healthcare preparedness plans must consid-
er both preparedness for very large patient numbers and prevention of infection, resulting in 
special characteristics in existing preparedness plans and great challenges to the healthcare 
system in practical operations. Preparedness planning checklists in Appendices 1 Regional 
and local preparedness plans for an infl uenza pandemic – hospitals and 2 Local prepared-
ness plans for an infl uenza pandemic – primary healthcare) are intended as aids in drawing 
up local preparedness plans.
12.1.2 Occupational health services
The occupational health service system provides services for employers who at their own 
cost must organise occupational health services for their employees. The extent of occupa-
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tional health services organised and implemented must be commensurate to the needs de-
termined by the work, working arrangements, personnel, workplace conditions and their 
changes. It may be implemented through either public or private healthcare.
Section 12 of the Occupational Health Care Act (1383/2001) stipulates the content of oc-
cupational healthcare. Obligations of occupational healthcare include e.g. workplace assess-
ments, medical examinations and disclosure of information, advisory services and guidance. 
In workplace assessment, the role of occupational healthcare is particularly assessment of 
health impacts of harmful and dangerous elements. Occupational healthcare supports pro-
tection against infections, prevents infections and supports protection and promotion of safe-
ty, health and capacity for work. 
Occupational healthcare helps employees and employers to internalise knowledge, skills 
and procedures that are important in prevention and control of infections. In addition to pre-
vention, occupational healthcare provides information on treatment and treatment facilities. 
In occupations with a particular risk of illness based on exposure, medical examinations 
are organised in accordance with the Government Decree on medical examinations in work 
that presents a special risk of illness (1485/2001). The objective of medical examinations 
is to ascertain the effect on the employee of factors linked to health, safety and capacity for 
work, and to initiate preventive and corrective measures as early as possible. The medical 
examination assesses the employee’s state of health and work and functional ability. 
The need for medical examinations and possible vaccinations is based on risk assess-
ment of the work duties carried out in the workplace. In occupations where a risk of expo-
sure has been identifi ed, initial and periodic inspections must be carried out. At the medical 
examinations, employees needing special protective measures must be identifi ed, the need 
for vaccination assessed, vaccination executed or the individual directed to an appropriate 
place for vaccination. 
Occupational health -oriented healthcare combines medical and occupational health ex-
pertise. With nursing care, organisation of which is voluntary for the employer, information, 
advice and guidance are also provided. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and State Provincial Offi ces supervise the op-
eration and medical content of units providing occupational healthcare services and occupa-
tional healthcare professionals.
Each local authority must decide on the part played by occupational healthcare in prepar-
edness planning and division of duties.
12.1.3 Private healthcare
In recent years, private healthcare has come to represent an increasingly large part of health-
care in Finland. Private healthcare is not under the same statutory obligation to prepare for 
emergency situations as public healthcare. However, State Provincial Offi ces may set as 
condition of their licensing that the premises, equipment and skills and knowledge of per-
sonnel of a private healthcare provider must be of a high standard, and that it is capable of 
preparedness for possible epidemics of infectious diseases. 
The number of doctors in mainly private practice is 1,600, representing 10 percent of all 
working doctors. 770 of them work in the occupational health sector. The number of doctors 
with private practice as secondary occupation is 4,331, representing 27 percent of doctors. 
In a pandemic situation, doctors’ workload is assumed to increase in their main post and the 
opportunity of running a private practice to decline, resulting in a possible increase in the 
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amount of work for mainly private doctors. In 2004, about 1.2 million surgery consultations 
took place in private occupational healthcare. The working age population has become ac-
customed to using occupational healthcare services.
The intention in 2006 is to complete the registers of private healthcare service provid-
ers and practitioners. The registers are held by State Provincial Offi ces, and through them, 
they are in contact with the private sector. The aim is to have an email network operational 
in 2007 at the latest, in order to facilitate contacts. Currently, they take place from State Pro-
vincial Offi ces partly by email and partly by post. Information may also be disseminated to 
private healthcare through the newly established Lääkäripalveluyritysten yhdistys [Associa-
tion of private medical services]. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has sent a letter to State Provincial Offi ces, re-
questing them to take into account inclusion of private sector representation in regional pre-
paredness planning. 
At municipal level and in Hospital Districts, it would also be expedient to include in 
planning local representatives of the private sector, and to agree on division of duties and 
possible new outsourced services, required for primary healthcare in a pandemic situation. 
When issuing invitations to tender and signing contracts on outsourced services, municipali-
ties must make sure that they guarantee security of service also in epidemic situations. 
At its discretion, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities may draw up 
a national model for an invitation to tender and a contract. 
The aim of preparedness is to be able to function as well as possible in a pandemic situa-
tion, even if the Emergency Powers Act is not yet in force. When the Emergency Powers Act 
is in force, the Government may, in order to secure healthcare of the population, order the 
body responsible for a hospital or health centre to extend or modify the operation of its in-
stitution, to relocate the operation wholly or partially outside its operational area or location, 
or to organise activities also outside its operational area, to place patients in the institution 
regardless of legislation on the matter, or to surrender its institution or a part thereof for use 
by the public authority. The same applies, as appropriate, also to a pharmaceutical manufac-
turer and wholesaler, holder of a pharmacy licence, and a community or private practitioner 
providing goods or services used in healthcare. 
The draft for the revised Emergency Powers Act defi nes as emergency conditions a very 
widely spread infectious disease equivalent to an especially serious disaster. 
2.1.4  Blood service
The Finnish Red Cross Blood Service is in charge of blood donations, provision and stor-
age of blood preparations, and ensuring adequate supplies of different blood preparations in 
Finland. It should be noted that blood can only be collected from healthy persons. In order 
to secure the functioning of the blood service in a pandemic situation, it must obtain up-to-
date information on the course of the epidemic, precise epidemic areas and suspected cases. 
Blood is primarily collected from areas with no diagnosed or suspected cases in the vicin-
ity. Thus, blood service personnel may need to be granted exceptional rights e.g. based on 
protective measures, if movement within the country is otherwise restricted. Movement of 
blood service samples within the country must also be secured in emergency conditions, be-
cause testing of donated blood is centralised at the Helsinki Blood Centre. Provision of in-
formation on changes in hospital blood requirements during a pandemic is important, so that 
more blood is not collected than is necessary.
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12.2 Social services
12.2.1 Social work
In a pandemic situation, a lot of expectations, reorganisation and work fall on social serv-
ices. 
Staff requirements increase considerably, if standard procedures are not modifi ed. Reas-
sessment of prioritisation of tasks and vulnerability of decentralised services, such as home 
care, is inevitable. 
Social services preparedness plans must be coordinated with the area health centres and 
hospitals under the same planning process, in order to assess how the task may be discharged 
through cooperation. The preparedness instructions drawn up for social services contain no 
mention of an infectious disease epidemic as a threat situation; therefore, preparedness for 
such an eventuality must be planned as a new issue, applying the directions supplied.
Social services must draw up plans on how to execute children’s daycare, child protec-
tion, home services and care of the elderly, care of the disabled, income supplement issues 
and other general social work in emergency conditions. Furthermore, social services are 
needed to organise temporary accommodation, provisions, clothing and transport for people 
who cannot live at home for a variety of reasons during a pandemic, or who may be quaran-
tined during pandemic alert phases 4 or 5. Thus, the clientele may grow considerably com-
pared to normal conditions. In addition, a signifi cant proportion of social services staff may 
become ill themselves, or be forced to care for their sick child, for example. During a pan-
demic situation, organisation of psychosocial support and other temporary care represent 
qualitatively new challenges of social work. 
Home nursing, home services and supported living
Home nursing patients are often also clients of social services. In most local authorities, so-
cial services care for home services clients, and in some, home nursing and care (of the eld-
erly) have been combined as a home service. Workers assist the elderly, the disabled and 
sick in various daily routines. The same person may require visits from several social serv-
ice workers. In the event of an infl uenza epidemic, illness would threaten both home service 
clients and personnel. The pandemic would also threaten families of home service clients, 
of which some are responsible for the assistance, nursing and care of home service clients. 
When they are sick, people living with support may need more help than usually, or they 
may no longer be able to cope at home. There is a possibility that some of the clients left at 
home with insuffi cient help would need temporary mass accommodation, such as institu-
tional-type care. In that case, the situation must be assessed in terms of risk of infection.
Social services institutions
Social services institutions house elderly and disabled people. In an epidemic situation, it is 
likely that more long-term patients who must be moved out of hospitals and health centres 
need to be moved into them. Illness of those at home would also create pressure. If the epi-
demic spreads in the above institutions, care of the elderly, disabled and dementia patients 
would become very demanding. The problem to be considered would be how to organise 
their nursing care, when the beds of health centres and hospitals are full of infl uenza patients 
with complications. It should be borne in mind that the need for medical care must be as-
sessed individually, even in emergency conditions.
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Outsourced services
In their plans, municipalities may agree on outsourcing services from the private sector, 
which is increasingly active in Finland. Private social care, in common with healthcare, has 
no obligation of preparedness, but it should be negotiated while drawing up social services 
preparedness plans. The agreement should take into account continuity of the operation in a 
pandemic situation.
Daycare centres
Some of the children in daycare would become ill, as would some of the daycare centre staff. 
It is possible that daycare centres would be closed, due to spreading of the pandemic or staff 
sickness. In that case, daycare children need to be cared for at home or in family daycare, 
provided that places can be found. Then, both parents of young children would not be able 
to work, causing labour shortages in many sectors, in addition to sickness absences. The so-
cial services preparedness plan should consider the possibilities of e.g. utilising voluntary 
organisations in such situations. The situation is especially diffi cult when a single parent be-
comes ill and is hospitalised, or is otherwise unable to care for his or her child/children. As-
sistance from social services is then required, and the plans must make provisions for e.g. us-
ing foster families or sending the child to a relative. Daycare authorities should be instructed 
to gather contingency plans in advance for each child on daycare in a possible pandemic 
situation. Mass media should be used to urge families to plan suitable solutions in advance 
and when there is a threat of a pandemic. The obligation of local authorities to organise chil-
dren’s daycare is unchanged in a pandemic situation.
The national STAKES early child development and daycare online service Varttua (ht-
tp://varttua.stakes.fi ) has direct links to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health infl uen-
za information bulletins, and via further links also to those of other ministries. Stakes al-
so maintains a network of municipal daycare contact persons, through whom the person in 
charge of daycare in each local authority may be quickly reached. 
Organisation of local authority services 
Each local authority must take into consideration the servicing and provisioning of pos-
sible quarantine accommodation, temporary hospitals and social care institutions that may 
have to be set up.
Reserve personnel
The social and healthcare agencies are largely service-based, and thus very labour-intensive. 
Therefore, designing a reserve personnel system is challenging, and constant coordination is 
necessary in order to cope with the situation. For this reason, the reserve system of manage-
ment must include previously trained offi cials who have a good grasp of the structure, plan-
ning and supervision. 
Representatives of the Finnish Red Cross, Voluntary Rescue Service and workers from 
various churches (e.g. deacons) may be involved in the preparedness planning of social serv-
ices, in addition to representatives from healthcare. They are needed for everyday work in 
addition to being able to participate in providing psychosocial assistance. We must consider 
whether e.g. students could become reserve staff after express training.
Local authorities must investigate together with the education services, whether the re-
sources of closed schools and daycare centres could be utilised during the epidemic, both in 
material and personnel terms. What could healthy teachers and employees of schools and 
daycare centres do? How could the municipal kitchens provide meals for those who need 
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them? Are there suffi cient supplies of disposable utensils, transport equipment and vehicles 
for provisions delivered to the sick? While educational institutions are closed, it may be pos-
sible to quickly train students to deliver food and for other service duties etc.
12.2.2 Psychosocial support and services
The need for psychosocial support in disaster situations has been acknowledged in Finland 
for ten years. MSAH has issued instructions in 1998 for emergency situations and disasters. 
However, they have not addressed the quality and quantity of support demanded by a wide-
spread dangerous disease epidemic, requiring a new way of developing the issue. Neverthe-
less, the existing instructions provide some guidelines. 
The need for support is extensive. Workers in all sectors will be overloaded in their work 
while some of their colleagues and family are sick. They will need to swap duties and pos-
sibly perform duties different from their normal jobs. As the epidemic progresses, there may 
be deaths in their proximity. Stress reactions are very likely.
Organisation of psychosocial support has traditionally been the remit of social and health 
services. In a pandemic situation, these services are fully occupied with caring for the sick 
and providing services for them. Therefore, every administrative sector should consider how 
psychosocial support and services are organised in their preparedness plans. Support will be 
needed for employees, families and colleagues of the sick and deceased, the elderly, chil-
dren etc.
In addition, crisis groups of the basic and specialist services will be activated. The groups 
are multidisciplinary and operate across organisational and administrative boundaries. They 
include healthcare personnel, social workers, police offi cers, fi re and rescue offi cers, and in 
many groups also representatives of the church. 
As well as social and health service crisis groups, a considerable number of other cri-
sis groups operate in Finland. Many voluntary organisations, the church, the defence forces, 
occupational health services of large companies, the police, fi re services and some schools 
have their own crisis groups. When preparedness plans of different sectors are updated to 
correspond to a potential infl uenza epidemic in local authorities, Hospital Districts, private 
and public workplaces, thought should be given on the provision of psychosocial support lo-
cally in different sectors. Psychological and social peer support is important in coping with 
a pandemic. 
12.3 Preparedness plans in other sectors of society
12.3.1 Plans and measures of the Ministries in case of a pandemic
At their meeting on 21 October 2005, Heads of Preparedness of the Ministries formed a 
Heads of Preparedness Group for avian infl uenza and an infl uenza pandemic. The purpose 
of the Group is to reinforce and coordinate preparedness for the threatened pandemic of all 
administrative sectors. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health in its communication (MS
AH/2899/2005/2.11.2005) asked the Ministries for a report on the measures planned and ex-
ecuted in case of a pandemic. The present text is largely based on this report and on updates 
received on comments regarding the draft pandemic preparedness plan.
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Under section 40 of the Emergency Powers Act, the Government, public administrative 
authorities, public utilities and other public agencies and municipalities must ensure that 
their duties are discharged with as little disruption as possible also in emergency conditions, 
by virtue of preparedness plans and advance preparations of operations in exceptional cir-
cumstances and other measures. The preparedness process is directed, supervised and coor-
dinated by the Government and each Ministry in its own administrative sector.
Each sector has made preparations for various exceptional circumstances and emergen-
cies. The threat scenarios and procedures to be observed in preparedness are adjusted in ac-
cordance with the current threat scenario. Preparedness for avian infl uenza and an infl uenza 
pandemic is a part of this mechanism. 
Prime Minister’s Offi ce
Chaired by the Permanent Secretary of Prime Minister’s Offi ce, the Heads of Preparedness 
of the Ministries have agreed on the arrangements for the Government Meeting of the Heads 
of Preparedness. The Offi ce has prepared a report on questions of assignment of duties in the 
Government, related to avian infl uenza and pandemic infectious diseases.
In accordance with the policies agreed at the Government negotiation of 19.1.2006, pre-
paredness exercises for avian infl uenza were organised on 9.3.2006 and for an infl uenza pan-
demic on 20.4.2006.
The Government situational picture reporting has monitored the avian infl uenza situa-
tion, and the possible development of the situation into an infl uenza pandemic has been not-
ed in planning the situational picture operation. The Government Communications Unit has 
coordinated issues related to communications at regular meetings of the Ministries’ Heads 
of Communication. 
The vital societal function of Prime Minister’s Offi ce is governance of the nation. Its 
ability to lead in a pandemic situation has been ensured by arrangements for replacements 
for key persons in decision-making, its preparation and in communications. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Finland’s 97 foreign diplomatic missions are responsi-
ble for protecting Finnish nationals outside Finland’s borders. Their duties include drafting 
of pandemic preparedness plans for each country and mapping of the current alert situation 
for the safety of Finnish residents and tourists in the country. MFA and Finland’s diplomatic 
missions also collect and analyze pivotal information required to form a situational picture 
in each country, in support of decision-making by the national Government. If a global pan-
demic spreads, it is the duty of the foreign affairs administration to protect the interests of 
Finland and Finnish citizens in an altered international situation. This may also mean diplo-
matic means of safeguarding Finland’s security of supply and the safety of the citizens. 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has drawn up a plan of preparedness measures of the 
foreign affairs administration in 2006. The Ministry’s diplomatic missions represent the 
whole national Government and are in the front line in crisis situations possibly arising in 
foreign countries. South-East Asian missions in particular have been directed to draw up in-
dividual preparedness plans. Guidelines have been issued regarding occupational health and 
safety of diplomatic mission personnel in case of an infl uenza pandemic. 
At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, pandemic preparedness is coordinated, and opera-
tions led in a potential pandemic situation, by the Ministry Preparedness Group chaired by 
the Head of Preparedness. In addition to those mentioned above, crucial offi cials in terms 
of continuity of the functions of the administrative sector include the other senior offi cials 
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of the Ministry, persons working in consular and communications duties as well as passport 
and visa functions, and employees of the regional Departments and those of the Security 
Unit and occupational health and safety, who are responsible for the security of personnel. 
Persons maintaining data communications systems are also crucial for functional continu-
ity. 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs estimates that even a possible epidemic, with up to a 
quarter of the staff temporarily sick, would not result is serious shortcomings in terms of the 
Ministry resources, as its organisation and operational culture are fundamentally founded on 
change and multi-skilling. The Ministry has 1,600 direct employees and 900 workers em-
ployed from the various foreign base countries. Most of the personnel have lengthy expe-
rience abroad, and they are accustomed to stepping into other duties, if necessary at short 
notice, if priorities and functional capacity require it. If the duration of the sickness was no 
more than two weeks and everybody was not sick at the same time, it is unlikely that the 
functions would come to a total standstill. 
Diplomatic missions
In a pandemic situation, the greatest threat would concern foreign diplomatic missions with 
access to limited resources. Therefore, efforts are made to prepare as well as possible in ad-
vance for a possible infl uenza pandemic. Diplomatic missions in the South-East Asian risk 
area have been asked to update their preparedness and evacuation plans, taking into account 
measures required by a possible infl uenza pandemic and continuity of functions, including 
provision of consulate services, during a pandemic. Among other things, this means that dip-
lomatic missions have pre-planned the division of duties and responsibilities in the event of 
a pandemic situation. The plans include e.g. possible restriction of customer services (es-
pecially immigration services) and restriction of activities, such as moving over to distance 
working. In addition, the diplomatic missions are investigating the preparedness of local 
hospitals for diagnosing infections and treatment of foreign nationals in a possible pandemic 
situation. 
The Ministry has set up consulate secondment corps, acting as additional resources to be 
dispatched to diplomatic missions if necessary, if an epidemic or some other external disrup-
tive force unexpectedly jeopardised their operation. On the other hand, in a contagious dis-
ease situation, careful consideration would need to be applied as to the expediency of send-
ing healthy employees to an infection area. 
Safeguarding the health of personnel
The entire personnel, including family members in risk areas, have the option of free season-
al infl uenza vaccinations. Although the vaccination affords no protection against avian infl u-
enza or pandemic infl uenza, it facilitates diagnosis during a possible pandemic.
In addition, employees and family members of South-East Asian and South-East Euro-
pean (Turkey) countries with cases of transmission of avian infl uenza to humans have been 
sent supplies of the drug Tamifl u. These missions have also been permitted to purchase the 
drug locally for personnel employed from the base country, which most have taken up. The 
Ministry holds a small stock of drugs in its occupational healthcare facility. 
Situational analysis and associated measures are based on analyses and recommenda-
tions by WHO and NPHI. The situation is constantly monitored and directions issued, as the 
situation changes. 
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International cooperation
The Nordic countries and EU countries cooperate closely in the fi eld of crisis preparedness, 
which also includes preparing for a possible infl uenza pandemic. The countries exchange in-
formation on their measures, including their pandemic preparedness and evacuation plans. If 
the pandemic threat increases signifi cantly, both the Nordic and EU collaboration will play 
a central role e.g. in organisation of possible evacuations. Exercises for pandemic situations 
are also organised within the framework of EU coordination. The fi rst pandemic exercise of 
EU countries was held on 24. –25.11.2005. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs took part in the 
exercise. 
The foreign affairs administration coordinates Finland’s cooperation in international or-
ganisations, such as UNDP, WHO and the World Bank. One of the functions of the coopera-
tion is reinforcement of veterinary care and healthcare capacity in countries where the situ-
ation is the most critical in terms of pandemic prevention. 
On 17.–18.1.2006, the International Pledging Conference on Avian and Human Infl uen-
za was held in Beijing, where international fi nancing needs were assessed and a communal 
funding framework established in order to alleviate the impacts of avian infl uenza. A total of 
1.9 billion dollars in aid was pledged. Finland has pledged 2.7 million euros for a two-year 
project coordinated by UNDP in Vietnam. Other necessary cooperation is being assessed.
Information bulletins for travellers and advisory services for expatriate Finns
The travel information bulletins published on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs website 
are based on close monitoring of developments related to the pandemic in base countries. 
Recommendations to avoid travel will probably be issued at the prepandemic phase. How-
ever, the current expert opinion is that travel restrictions have no discernible effect during 
the pandemic phase.  
The EU countries have agreed to monitor the disease situation closely also from the per-
spective of travel information, and that bulletins are coordinated in accordance with the cur-
rent situation. 
Diplomatic missions pass on the information based on expert sources they have received 
from the Ministry also to Finnish nationals resident abroad (an example is the MFA and 
NPHI information bulletin published on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs formin website, 
and which missions have been able to publish at their discretion on their own websites or 
send to mailing lists).
These measures are intended to secure continuity of foreign affairs administration and 
the safety and welfare abroad of Finnish nationals and foreign nationals permanently resi-
dent in Finland, including in a possible pandemic situation. 
Ministry of Justice
For the most part, pandemic preparedness and prevention is a matter for the EU member 
countries. National measures implemented in order to prevent the spread of the disease may 
be such in nature as to clash in principle with EU law. Assessment of the limitations set by 
EU law is the duty of each Ministry in its own administrative sector. However, EU law rec-
ognises the prospect of so-called precautionary measures in emergency circumstances in 
several sectors. This means that EU regulation does not prevent measures that are justifi ed 
e.g. in order to protect human health and life (e.g. articles 30, 39, 46 and 95 of the EU Trea-
ty).
The current Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991) came into force on 1.9.1991. Its pur-
pose is to secure the livelihood of the population and the country’s economic system under 
emergency conditions, to maintain law and order, constitutional and human rights, and to 
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secure the territorial integrity and independence of the nation. The Emergency Powers Act 
section 2 defi nes emergency conditions, dividing them into fi ve groups. They refer to serious 
crises, not including a pandemic, however. Thus, the current Emergency Powers Act could 
not be invoked in a pandemic situation, but legislation for normal conditions would have to 
be applied, particularly the Communicable Diseases Act (583/1986). If the country’s eco-
nomic situation was weakened due to a pandemic, invoking the Emergency Powers Act may 
be considered. From healthcare point of view, however, this would be rather late in the day. 
The draft for the new Emergency Powers Act (Ministry of Justice KM 2005:2) defi nes 
as emergency conditions “a very widely spread dangerous infectious disease with impacts 
equivalent to those of a particularly serious disaster” (section 3 subsection 4), thus, a pan-
demic would be considered an emergency condition and the Emergency Powers Act could 
be applied. The proposed revised Emergency Powers Act contains the following powers for 
additional measures which could be implemented:
regulations on securing social and health services (sections 84 and 85)
regulations on exceptions to terms and conditions of employment 
(section 91 subsection 2) 
regulations on persons subject to obligation to work (section 93 subsection 2).
The Ministry of Justice has drafted a proposal for a new Emergency Powers Act, likely 
to be submitted to Parliament in the Government term beginning in 2007. 
Structure of the Ministry of Justice administrative sector
A typical feature of the Ministry of Justice administrative sector is that the judicial system, 
prosecution service and other units are rather small, usually from a few offi cials to a few 
dozen. It is therefore evident that pandemic preparedness of the administrative sector re-
quires support measures and special arrangements. Some of the sectors have a central au-
thority, such as the Criminal Sanctions Agency and the Offi ce of the Prosecutor General, but 
with others, the central organ is the Ministry of Justice.
Preparedness in the Ministry of Justice administrative sector
The judiciary system, legal aid and debt recovery
In the operation of the judiciary system, an emergency situation would hamper the work of 
the courts and prosecutors. The time taken to hear cases would increase, and the pandemic 
may add to the backlog of cases. Since it may be assumed that the indisposition rates of par-
ties to court hearings would be similar to those of staff, prosecutions and hearings will need 
to be postponed to some degree in any case, regardless of offi cial measures.
In order to safeguard the prompt discharge of judicial matters, implementation of con-
stitutional rights and security of justice, it is important that urgent matters, such as hearings 
on enforced measures, can be attended to without delay, regardless of staff shortages. This 
necessitates fl exible deputising arrangements in courts, and possible deputisations imple-
mented by cooperating area in the prosecution service. Continuity of the work of the senior 
civil servants of the agencies and their deputies is important in order to safeguard appropri-
ate use of personnel. 
The enforcement authorities should be able to deal with at least urgent security meas-
ures.
•
•
•
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Prison services
The greatest problems caused by a pandemic would be in prison facilities. In closed institu-
tions, prevention of the spread of infl uenza among both prisoners and guards would be espe-
cially challenging. The prison service has a dedicated healthcare organisation, which never-
theless is rather too lightweight for coping with and prevention of a pandemic.  
A pandemic may necessitate changes also in prisoners’ rights, such as restriction of con-
tacts or other measures designed to prevent the disease from spreading.
The Ministry and other services
In cases of a possibly prolonged pandemic or one with more signifi cant impacts than antici-
pated, it may be necessary to amend legislation quickly. In such a case, legal drafters of the 
Ministry of Justice are crucial.
Owing to their key duties, the authorities overseeing legality should be able to continue 
their duties even during an infl uenza pandemic. 
Communications
Highly effi cient communications are pivotal in an emergency situation. The Ministry of Jus-
tice and the central offi ces of the sectors carry the main responsibility for dissemination of 
information both within the sector and to the general public. Each offi ce takes care of local 
client communications. In the area of communications, directions on effective communica-
tions are observed.
Ministry of the Interior
On 19.10.2005, the Ministry of the Interior set up an internal working group with the remit 
of drafting the preparedness measures of the administrative sector in the event of an infl uen-
za pandemic. The working group comprises representatives of all departments and the Press 
and Communications Services. The International Security Affairs Unit, under the leadership 
of the Minister of the Interior, addresses infl uenza pandemic preparedness regularly.
The Ministry of the Interior administrative sector has been urged to prepare in its opera-
tive function for the possibility that in an infl uenza pandemic situation, 25-35 percent of the 
personnel may be absent from work, due to their own illness, for 1-2 weeks over about 2-3 
months. 
Department for Rescue Services
The Department for Rescue Services has sent a letter of instruction on preparedness for an 
infl uenza pandemic to its administrative sector on 13.12.2005. The administration has been 
urged to consider an infl uenza pandemic in its preparedness plans. During a possible infl u-
enza pandemic, the Rescue Services areas and emergency centres have been instructed to 
report any changes in capable human resources and on operational problems. Preparedness 
for an infl uenza pandemic is to be included in future preparedness exercises. The exercises 
must be used to evaluate preparedness and functioning in an infl uenza pandemic situation, 
the content of directions and their suffi ciency, and issues related to cooperation of different 
authorities. 
The Emergency Services College has been instructed to be prepared to interrupt voca-
tional training and short course activities altogether.
Police Department
The Police Department has sent its administrative sector an information bulletin on 1.12.2005 
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on preparedness for an infl uenza pandemic. The bulletin urges local preparedness for an in-
fl uenza pandemic and to consider the following in their planning: 
how to secure functionality of the leadership system and what plans are in place to safe-
guard senior positions;
who are the key persons of the unit and how are possible deputies ensured for them;
what are the practical resources of police units for cooperation with the municipal 
sector and Hospital Districts;
how to be ready to collaborate with other authorities;
how to be prepared for the possible closure of the whole police station or other unit; 
what are the budgetary plans of the unit in the event of a crisis.
One of the items on the agenda of infl uenza pandemic preparedness is organisation of ex-
tensive local, provincial or countywide exercises. 
Border Guard Headquarters
The Border Guard Department has issued a memorandum “Lintuinfl uenssa ja rajavartiolai-
tos” [Avian infl uenza and the Border Guard Department] on 4.11.2005. Under the memo-
randum, the Border Guard Department is prepared, if required, to implement short-term per-
sonnel transfers to ensure that operative leadership, border inspections and maritime rescue 
services are maintained in an infl uenza pandemic situation. With reference to conscripts un-
dergoing their national service in Border Guard Companies, preparations are made to decide 
at the time of an infl uenza pandemic outbreak, whether the date of commencement of nation-
al service is to be postponed, whether national service is to be suspended for the duration of 
the infl uenza pandemic, or whether the conscripts are treated in the garrisons. 
Department for Development of Regions and Public Administration
In an infl uenza pandemic situation, State Provincial Offi ces play a central role in implemen-
tation of regional and local preparedness and preventive measures, under the direction of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and Ministry of 
the Interior. State Provincial Offi ces also have a general role in preparedness for emergency 
conditions, and the standard procedures and organisation created for the purpose are also uti-
lised in infl uenza pandemic preparedness. State Provincial Offi ces’ preparedness measures 
have been discussed at Governors’ meetings. 
Each State Provincial Offi ce makes its own preparations for these situations and coordi-
nates preparedness in its area. Cooperation will be improved, especially with Hospital Dis-
tricts. Provincial preparedness committees discuss the issue regularly and include an infl u-
enza pandemic in their situational pictures for exercises. 
State Provincial Offi ces communicate proactively with regional and local authorities, 
and make use of e.g. the information on the National Public Health Institute website. Ma-
terial produced by the preparedness working group of the Ministry of the Interior is sent to 
Governors. The whole personnel of the administrative sector is kept informed in accordance 
with the common Ministry of the Interior communications plan. When the national plan is 
completed, the required measures will be addressed. 
Immigration Department
The Immigration Department issued a memorandum on 11.11.2005, entitled “Ulkomaalaist-
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en maahantuloa, maassa oleskelua, maassa liikkumista ja maasta poistamista koskevat sään-
nökset kansanterveydelliseltä kannalta katsottuna” [Regulations on entry of foreign nation-
als into the country, their stay, movements within the country and removal from the country 
from the public health perspective]. A letter has been sent to the Directorate of Immigration, 
outlining the operation of the National Working Group for Pandemic Preparedness and the 
Ministry of the Interior working group, and urging the Directorate to take into account the 
risk of a pandemic in its own preparedness plan. Particular attention should be paid to ap-
propriate protection from infection of those working in customer service and conducting in-
terviews, as well as how the work should be organised and prioritised, if a signifi cant pro-
portion of the personnel is on sick leave. No internal border controls are carried out in the 
Schengen zone, but they may be temporarily reinstated due to a possible threat to public 
health. 
Department for Municipal Affairs
The Department for Municipal Affairs has issued a memorandum on 17.11.2005 entitled 
“Toimenpiteet kuntaosaston toimialalla pandemiaan varautumisessa” [Pandemic prepared-
ness measures in the administrative sector of the Department for Municipal Affairs]. The 
Department is drafting guidelines for municipal management on preparations for a possible 
pandemic.
Press and Communications Services
The Ministry of the Interior Press and Communications Services are preparing the admin-
istration’s own communications plan, and taking part in drafting of the authorities’ shared 
communications plan. The Press and Communications Services have issued a memorandum 
“Infl uenssapandemiaan varautumiseen liittyvä viestintäsuunnitelma” [Communications plan 
for infl uenza pandemic preparedness]. The Service has included information on the infl uen-
za pandemic in online forums, references to which may have been included in information 
bulletins sent to the administrative sectors. 
Ministry of Defence
The Ministry of Defence has set up a defence administration avian infl uenza – infl uenza pan-
demic expert working group on 13.3.2006. The working group is investigating measures in-
curred by both the threat of avian infl uenza and an infl uenza pandemic, both in relation to 
operation of the defence administration and support required from it by the rest of society. 
The working group monitors the situation and planning of central government and issues 
recommendations on measures within the defence administration. 
Medical preparedness in the Defence Forces is the remit of its chief medical offi cer, as-
sisted by the Defence Staff Logistics Division and the Research Institute of Military Med-
icine. The Medical Division has issued its operational instructions on infl uenza pandemic 
preparedness.
The Defence administration preparedness plan was drawn up during March 2006. The 
plans for each sector and subsector were drawn up during 2006. 
In an infl uenza pandemic situation, the defence administration will continue to main-
tain its operational conditions in order to fulfi l its statutory duties, as well as being prepared 
to support functions of society by providing executive assistance. To secure the functional 
capacity of our own staff, the plans take into account both conscripts, employed personnel 
of the defence administration, crisis management troops, and collaborative and stakeholder 
groups. 
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Principal interfaces of the defence administration in an infl uenza pandemic situation:
cooperation with authorities at different levels
exchange of information between authorities
healthcare measures and arrangements
formation and dissemination of situational picture
preparedness for providing executive assistance 
The defence administration preparedness plan outlines the scenarios and assessments of 
the development of the situation, and measures to be taken by the administration on the ba-
sis of the scenarios. The scenarios describe preparedness, measures and collaboration of the 
defence administration during infl uenza pandemics of different degrees of severity, extent 
and speed. 
Continuity of the vital functions of the defence administration has been secured, as well 
as the effi cient use of the their support systems, personnel and skills resources. The operative 
leadership of the Defence Forces will issue orders on review and implementation of opera-
tional plans, if an infl uenza pandemic alert should make it imperative. The Defence Staff is 
monitoring the development of the infl uenza pandemic situation and the need for action. The 
leadership of the defence administration is kept informed of developments of the situation.
The Defence Staff has made assessments of burdening, impacts and necessary premis-
es and healthcare personnel in a pandemic. Detachments have been issued with criteria for 
assessing the impacts of sickness absences and on improving preparedness of the medical 
services. Deployment of conscripts, their tasks and possible changes of service periods and 
leave will be assessed together with healthcare authorities. 
The defence administration has collaborated in its planning with experts from the Min-
istry of Social Affairs and Health, National Public Health Institute, Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, Ministry of the Interior, and the Headquarters of the Border Guard. A repre-
sentative from the defence administration participated in the National Working Group for 
Pandemic Preparedness and collaborates with MSAH and NPHI. The Defence Forces have 
taken part in national and international exercises in 2005 – 2006. 
Ministry of Finance
The administrative sector of the Ministry of Finance drafts the Government economic and 
fi scal policy and operates as the authority on taxation policy. The Ministry is also responsi-
ble for drafting fi nancial markets policy. Operation of the Ministry of Finance will not be af-
fected by the possible rapid and widespread progress of a pandemic.
In the administrative sector of the Ministry, a pandemic situation may cause disruption 
in the taxation process, due to possible cases of sickness of data processing personnel. The 
basic functions would continue at an impaired standard, and any resulting errors would be 
corrected once the situation has returned to normal. Procurement and management of Gov-
ernment funds and paying out of pensions may be affected in a pandemic situation as the 
consequence of possible absence of key personnel. 
The whole Customs organisation would become overloaded by a pandemic, especially 
with the assumption that some of the staff are prevented from coming to work due to sick-
ness. For example, if border inspections are tightened because of the pandemic, this means 
transferring staff from other duties to border control. Maintaining the smooth operation of 
tax collection and foreign trade is an important issue for society under all circumstances. 
The organisation of the Customs would be capable of performing its customary basic 
•
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functions. However, this would mean prioritisation of duties and overtime. If, for example, 
more detailed border inspections, taking of samples or executive assistance duties become 
necessary due to avian infl uenza, all employees will be needed. Staff with expertise in cer-
tain specialist tasks (e.g. IT, payroll, small customs posts and certain expert duties) number 
so few that the simultaneous sickness of several people may seriously impair continuity of 
functions.
In Finland, customs offi cials have an important role and position in supervision of regu-
lations concerning veterinary medicine and plant health. 
The Government budget of 2006 includes a contingency fund of fi ve (5) million euros to 
cover unforeseen expenditure of the Ministry of Finance administrative sector. 
Ministry of Education
The Ministry of Education infl uenza pandemic preparedness plans focus on the activities 
crucial for the vital functions in the Ministry’s administrative sector, which include securing 
the operation of education and research, cultural, sport and youth policy, and arrangements 
for psychological crisis aid.  
Preparedness in communications
A functional and adequately resourced communications system is quickly able to respond 
to the needs of enhanced communications. The Ministry of Education is currently drafting 
a crisis communications plan to secure its preparedness. The offi ces and agencies of the ad-
ministrative sector are drafting corresponding plans and updating possible existing plans. In 
a pandemic situation, the National Board of Education and State Provincial Offi ces are cen-
tral actors also in communications. 
Collaboration with civic organisations ensures extensive dissemination of information 
and education.
Education and science policy sector
The Ministry of Education education and science policy sector covers pre-school and basic 
education, schoolchildren’s morning and afternoon club activities, upper secondary educa-
tion, vocational education, adult education, and polytechnics and universities. The number 
of full-time pupils and students in Finnish pre-school and basic education, upper secondary, 
and adult upper secondary education, vocational education and vocational further education 
is more than a million (2004 fi gures). Polytechnics have about 140,000 students and univer-
sities about 177,000. Measures brought about by an infl uenza pandemic concern a total of 
about 1,900,000 pupils, students, teachers and other staff of educational institutions.
The legislation does not contain statutory powers of suspending education or closing 
educational establishments or training units in case of a pandemic. Thus, the stipulations of 
sections 14 and 15 of the Communicable Diseases Act (583/1986) would apply. 
In a crisis situation, maintaining telecommunications and data communications links and 
participation in the necessary research and surveillance during a pandemic are important. 
Securing of functional data communications also compensates for possible other adverse ef-
fects caused by illness of university staff and students.
The aim is that teaching can be carried out through various arrangements also during 
an infl uenza pandemic. Under section 4 of the Basic Education Act, the local authority is 
obliged to organise pre-school and basic education. According to section 23 of the Basic 
Education Act, the school year starts on 1 August and ends on 31 July. The school year has 
190 days. 
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The teaching arrangements would be implemented e.g. via production and distribution 
of distance learning material, contact teaching via Finnish Broadcasting Company (YLE) 
channels and online teaching. The responsibility for planning and implementation rests with 
the Finnish National Board of Education, regional and local authorities and education pro-
viders. Organisation of the school matriculation examination and entrance examinations de-
mand special arrangements, depending on the situation.
All the agencies and units of the Ministry of Education administrative sector contain 
large numbers of people at the same time. During a pandemic alert, albeit low at the mo-
ment, preparation of a programme of preventive action would be necessary for the higher 
education system and at the same time for the executive organisations of the whole educa-
tion sector. 
The programme should consider 
prevention of infection both on individual level (e.g. improved hygiene) and on unit 
and organisational levels; 
preparation of a programme of preparedness measures to be disseminated to all lev-
els, to ensure both preventive preparedness and that of crisis situations; 
uniformity of operational principles, or that uniform operational principles exist in 
case of a crisis situation, with a previously issued ‘everyman’s guide’ in use. When 
e.g. in universities and schools, students and teachers are not present in their places 
of study or work at a set time, as is the case in customary workplaces, access to in-
formation may be inadequate and cause unnecessary risks.
Church affairs
In a pandemic situation, the importance of spiritual care is highlighted in the activities of re-
ligious communities. The work may be hampered by sickness of the personnel and possible 
restrictions on gatherings. Evangelic-Lutheran parishes are also obliged to maintain public 
cemeteries. With certain special arrangements, parish funeral services are believed to cope 
with a pandemic situation. If the circumstances dictate, funeral procedures may diverge from 
the regulations of the Funeral Services Act, under its section 25.
Culture, sports and youth policy sector
The Ministry of Education administrative sector of cultural policy covers the national cultur-
al and arts institutions, museums, theatres and orchestras receiving Government funding and 
subsidies, municipal cultural activities and libraries, and societies, associations and civic or-
ganisations in receipt of public funding. The Finnish sports and recreational sector is largely 
based on civic activity. The civic sporting activity is organised at national, regional and local 
levels. Organisers of public sporting events are usually sports associations. With regard to 
youth services, which are also mainly civic activities, our basic tasks are e.g. provision of fi -
nancial support for youth organisations and those involved in youth work, assisting national 
youth centres, developing workshop activities for young people, supporting after-school ac-
tivities for schoolchildren, and cultural activities for children and young people. 
In the event of an infl uenza pandemic, regulation of public events would be under the 
stipulations of the Communicable Diseases Act (1986/583; §14) and the Assembly Act 
(1999/530; §15).
1.
2.
3.
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Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
In the administrative sector of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, central areas in 
terms of vital functions are prevention of veterinary diseases and securing primary produc-
tion of other foodstuffs, water services, safeguarding the quality and safety of foodstuffs, 
and management of safety of dams and fl ood risks. In terms of preparedness, the critical ele-
ments to be maintained include veterinary surgeons’ duty roster systems at all administrative 
levels, particularly the exercises and equipment of preparedness vets trained in prevention of 
veterinary disease, as well as the diagnostic resources and duty rosters of the Finnish Food 
Safety Authority (Evira). In a disease situation, the critical factor is personnel resources at 
the various levels of the offi cial veterinary practitioner system. 
The sector has prepared for avian infl uenza through enhanced preparedness for a danger-
ous infectious veterinary disease as a part of normal activities of the veterinary authorities. 
The Ministry, and at regional level the State Provincial Offi ces, have drawn up detailed op-
erational instructions for veterinarians in case of avian infl uenza. Preparedness of the veteri-
nary practitioner system in prevention of veterinary disease epidemics was the subject of a 
pan-Nordic foot and mouth disease exercise covering all administrative levels in September 
2005. 
The Finnish Food Safety Authority (Evira) researches avian infl uenza antibodies in poul-
try and incidence of the virus in wild birds, as well as mapping the risk factors of avian infl u-
enza. In a case of a disease cluster on a poultry farm, spread of the disease is prevented and 
the disease eradicated in accordance with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Decision 
on Control of Newcastle Disease and Avian Infl uenza (3/EEO/96). If necessary, a decision 
will be made on emergency vaccination of poultry. The sector is prepared for transmission 
of avian infl uenza to humans and a possible new pandemic with human-to-human transmis-
sion, in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. 
The Customs and other relevant parties have been informed on import bans imposed on 
poultry and foodstuffs posing a potential risk of infection. Import licences for caged birds 
from infected areas are not granted. 
The MAF Press and Information Unit has prepared a communications plan in case of 
avian infl uenza, and maintains a communications code of practice for crisis and emergency 
situations. In addition, MAF maintains a constantly updated avian infl uenza website on the 
Internet.
The pandemic alert is also considered in the other functions of the Ministry administra-
tive sector. For vital functions of society, smooth operation of the food supply is crucial. Im-
proved preparedness planning is also under way in order to safeguard management of fl ood 
risks and dam safety, and water supplies of communities.
Ministry of Transport and Communications
The administrative sector of the Ministry of Transport and Communications covers the 
functions of many vital infrastructures of society, either directly or indirectly. An important 
element is transport, the smooth functioning of which impacts both on supplies for the citi-
zens and securing foreign trade. Many other social functions depend on data communica-
tions systems. Without operational communications links, many of society’s basic functions 
are at risk of disruption or complete shutdown. This would mostly have a serious impact on 
society.
In the administrative sector of the Ministry of Transport and Communications, possible 
rapid and widespread progress of a pandemic may bring about a situation with serious con-
sequences for functioning of society. According to the assessment carried out by the Minis-
try, the persons in key positions, for whom it would be diffi cult to fi nd replacements, include 
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e.g. drivers of various means of public transport, production personnel of the Post Offi ce, as 
well as the personnel of telecommunications companies.
In transport, e.g. energy and food deliveries are executed with particular effi ciency, and 
they require the kind of special know-how that is not easily replaced. Personnel in traffi c 
management is specially trained. They use complex information systems.
Preparedness plans for specifi c situations are mostly combined with normal prepared-
ness planning. Under normal procedure, reviewing and updating of preparedness plans is 
carried out annually. In the administrative sector of the Ministry of Transport and Communi-
cations, the nature of operative activity also includes plans for cover arrangements.
The management of the Finnair Group has made decisions on allocation of responsibili-
ties regarding surveillance of the situation and preparedness in case of an infl uenza pandem-
ic. Furthermore, a separate preparedness plan covering 13 subject areas has been drawn up. 
The Ministry and the sector organisations have the preparedness for immediate instigation of 
measures to reinforce preparations in case of a pandemic, should the situation demand it. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry
In the administrative sector of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, one of the key areas of 
its recent preparedness work has been reviewing of the foundations of preparedness plan-
ning. Due to a constantly changing operational environment, the Ministry has focused on re-
viewing of the foundations of preparedness planning in its own sector. The most important 
of them include amendment of the Act on Safeguarding Security of Supply and the scope 
of application of the concept of security of supply contained therein from 1.10.2005 to cor-
respond, in addition to emergency conditions, also to comparable serious disruptions (L 
688/2005), drafting of the new organisation of the National Board of Economic Defence and 
the bases of planning (new threat scenarios, sector-specifi c goals) for the period 2004–2008 
in cooperation with the National Emergency Supply Agency, as well as drafting of a new, 
more comprehensive code of practice for preparedness planning for Employment and Eco-
nomic Development Centres, carried out with the Committee for preparedness issues (in-
cludes MTI, MAF, MOL, EED Centres). 
At the same time, several Government level preparedness projects (e.g. work on strate-
gies for securing vital functions of society or VFS, the preparedness exercise of 2005, the 
EU pandemic exercise, review work of the Emergency Powers Act, and the Government 
real-time situational picture project), in which the Ministry of Trade and Industry has also 
been involved, are expected to increase the resources of the administrative sector (includ-
ing collaboration) in responding to the new threat scenarios of the present day. In connection 
with this work, the Ministry has carried out assessments of its own vital functions and per-
sonnel arrangements, and those of its administrative sector. The assessments are reviewed 
regularly. 
The National Emergency Supply Agency, one of the agencies under the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry, has ordered 1.3 million doses of infl uenza medication for its reserve stocks in 
case of avian infl uenza. In addition, the National Public Health Institute has signed a fi ve-
year advance reservation agreement for specifi c vaccine with a Dutch infl uenza vaccine 
manufacturer in December. Under the agreement, it undertakes to supply Finland with 5.5 
million doses of specifi c vaccine targeted at the pandemic virus, in the order of agreements, 
as the vaccine production progresses. Finland is the fourth in line. The National Emergency 
Supply Agency is liable for the reservation fees for the fi rst two years.
The Employment and Economic Development Centres autumn 2005 range of training 
courses included ‘Communications of EED Centres in emergency situations’ with an avian 
infl uenza situation as its exercise theme.
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Under the Act of Safeguarding Security of Supply (1390/1992), it is imperative under all 
conditions to create and maintain suffi cient resources to produce commodities and to man-
age production, distribution, consumption and foreign trade, in order to ensure security of 
supply. The Ministry of Trade and Industry is ultimately responsible for security of supply.
The Government set general targets for security of supply (GD 350/2002), defi ning the 
level of preparedness, taking into account the minimum requirements of the population 
and essential economic life, as well as national defence. Under the Government Decision 
350/2002, the fundamental supply sectors, to be safeguarded in order to assure security of 
supply, are the basic technical structures of society, transport, storage and distribution sys-
tems, food supplies, energy supplies, social and health services, and production and main-
tenance of systems supporting defence of the country. In accordance with the Government 
policy decision on safeguarding vital functions, the strategic tasks allocated to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry include energy supplies, food supplies (partially), and industrial and 
service production. Key actors for security of supply and administration are the key person-
nel in energy production and distribution, food production, trade and distribution, vital in-
dustrial and service production and the agencies.
Practical implementation of security of supply is based on collaboration between public 
authorities and the business sector. In this sense, the National Emergency Supply Agency 
and the National Board of Economic Defence (NBED) are administratively under the MTI. 
The NBED Central Section decided in its meeting on 1.12.2005 to send an infl uenza pan-
demic preparedness code of practice to the NBED sectors and pools, and also to the manage-
ments of companies in the highest category of importance (about 1,300). The code of prac-
tice is based on the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health defi nition of measures. The sectors 
and pools have been requested to note the code of practice, and if necessary, to improve the 
distribution and to provide additional guidelines to companies. The code of practice is also 
published on the National Emergency Supply Agency website, for general use for compa-
nies’ risk assessment and preparedness schemes.
The purpose of the code of practice is that companies should consider the threat of avian 
infl uenza and pandemic in their own risk assessments. The threat becomes a part of normal 
operational risk analysis, and therefore its impacts are considered in terms of overall com-
pany operation. Thus, attention is paid to the possible effect of the threat on raw material 
supplies, maintaining essential operational processes during extensive sickness of person-
nel, ensuring end product safety, reactions of the markets, customer information etc. NBED 
organises sector-specifi c training and exercises as required.
The National Emergency Supply Agency, as a secretariat of NBED, is in constant contact 
with private and public sector actors covered by NBED organisation (e.g. daily consumer 
goods supply, oil and electricity supply sectors), monitoring the status and development of 
preparedness. It has been found to be developing well. Furthermore, the National Emergen-
cy Supply Agency has agreed that the Government Institute for Economic Research (GIER) 
has applied the input-output model to run macro-economic forecasts on impacts of employee 
absences (See Section 6.2.).
As part of the normal public sector preparedness obligation, the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry administrative sector has the resources to secure the essential functions of its offi ces 
and agencies in an infl uenza pandemic situation. As part of its normal operation, the Minis-
try Media and Communications Services cooperate with the corresponding services of other 
Ministries and those responsible for communications in their administrative sector, and is 
prepared to enhance communications services as required. 
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Ministry of Labour
The vital function of the labour administration also in a pandemic situation is to assist other 
sectors in procuring and directing labour, in order to secure their vital functions to society 
(VFS).  The point of departure in securing the functions of society is that all administrative 
sectors in their preparedness plans have noted appointing of their VFS personnel, organisa-
tion of operations, transferring labour from less important tasks to VFS duties, etc. The la-
bour administration has attended to this issue in the preparedness plans of the Ministry and 
Employment Offi ces. 
In accordance with preparedness plans, the labour administration has drawn up codes 
of practice and organisation: the processes of directing the labour force have been defi ned, 
less important work will be suspended as dictated by the situation, arrangements for reserve 
personnel thought out, and agreements drawn up on extended shifts and shift work arrange-
ments. In addition, the administration’s internal communications will be improved and com-
munications preparedness raised so that every Employment and Economic Development 
Centre and Employment Offi ce has an appointed person responsible for communications. 
The labour administration estimates that arrangements under these plans are suffi cient to se-
cure its VFS functions, even if 25-35 percent of employees were sick during the pandemic 
waves.
Procuring extra healthcare personnel is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Af-
fairs and Health, and the Ministry of Labour will provide assistance under its own plans. 
Employment Offi ces will designate certain person already familiar with the sector to take 
special charge of recruitment of healthcare personnel, and the operation will be centralised 
to larger offi ces with healthcare institutions in their area. 
Safeguarding of the own operation of the labour administration also includes securing of 
staffi ng for reception centres and their operation. In this respect, we would be forced to rely 
on voluntary labour and help from e.g. Finnish Red Cross.
Ministry of the Environment
The preparedness measures of the environmental administration focus on maintaining its 
ability to function during an infl uenza pandemic. In addition, the administration is prepared 
to provide expert assistance to other sectors, e.g. in issues related to water services, treat-
ment of effl uent and waste management.
The Ministry of the Environment will ensure that its offi ces and agencies (Finnish Envi-
ronment Institute and Regional Environment Centres) are in possession of suffi cient infor-
mation in order to avoid the environmental risks possibly arising in a pandemic situation. In 
addition, the Ministry will make the necessary decisions and issue directions to the adminis-
tration under it. The Ministry of the Environment has put into place deputising arrangements 
in case of a possible pandemic, particularly for critical functions. In a pandemic situation, 
particularly important key persons and professional groups are the leadership of the Minis-
try and their secretaries, employees in IT management, those working with environmental 
risks and prevention of damage to the environment, the EU cooperation group and commu-
nications personnel. The reliability and effi ciency of the environmental administration’s own 
communication channels will be assessed and secured as well as possible in advance, for a 
variety of eventualities. 
Maintenance of the basic information technology infrastructure in the offi ces and agen-
cies of the sector is ensured through cooperation between the Finnish Environment Institute, 
West Finland Regional Environment Centre (Vaasa) and the Ministry of the Environment. 
Under the Environmental Administration Act, the Ministry of the Environment is pre-
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pared to assign the Environment Institute to discharge duties outside its sector and to order 
other assignments (section 3, subsection 1 and section 4, subsection 3). The preparedness 
group of the Finnish Environment Institute will review the adequacy of deputising chains 
and other preparedness. If necessary, the Finnish Environment Institute will make special ar-
rangements for discharging critical functions, including surveillance of environmental dam-
age and related prevention of oil and chemical accidents, expert assistance in water supplies, 
maintaining basic information technology infrastructure in environmental administration, 
and issues related to boundary waters regarding regulation of Lake Inari and drainage from 
Lake Saimaa. The key issue to consider is securing the functions of persons in critical posi-
tions in Regional Environment Centres. Such persons are the directors and unit managers, as 
well as persons in expert capacity who provide consultative services to other authorities, for 
example in the event of an environmental accident.
The Environment Centres direct and supervise management of water supplies (drinking 
water and waste water issues) and waste management in accordance with the conditions and 
stipulations of environmental permits. The Environment Centres give priority to the critical 
function of their operation, including direction and surveillance, monitoring and reporting 
on the state of the environment, maintenance of a situational picture, provision of informa-
tion (in support of national communications) and cooperation in the area. 
12.4 Other organisations and voluntary activities
12.4.1 Finnish Red Cross
The Finnish Red Cross (FRC) ensures its ability to assist and continuity of its activities un-
der normal conditions, disruptions to normal conditions and in emergency conditions. FRC 
applies the same operational principles in its preparedness as the authorities and public or-
ganisations. FRC maintains material preparedness and provides preparedness training. The 
purpose and regulations of the operation of FRC have been enforced by the Act on the Finn-
ish Red Cross (238/2000) and a Decree (811/2005).
FRC is organised in 12 districts and 593 branches. Every branch has a contact person 
responsible for raising the alarm in sudden accidents or other emergency situations in Fin-
land. 
The members include healthcare professionals who may be utilised to educate and in-
struct the public e.g. in health campaigns (hygiene, risk avoidance, reduction of contagion 
risk). Around 100,000 people avail themselves of FRC fi rst aid courses every year. In a pan-
demic situation, FRC is able to quickly open a national helpline, tel. 0203 66 266, and man 
it, if necessary, around the clock. The helpline may be used to offer crisis assistance and 
health advice. Volunteers have been trained to man the phone. The FRC Psychologists’ Pre-
paredness Group and FRC healthcare professionals back up the volunteers. FRC volunteers 
can also act as support for public social services, such as food transport, caring for lonely 
people or those living in remote areas, in evacuation situations or in assisting healthcare per-
sonnel (e.g. vaccinations). 
Under an agreement between FRC and the Ministry of Labour, EED Centres and FRC 
Districts agree the extent of the Red Cross contribution in preparedness for receiving asy-
lum seekers in a normal situation or in mass entry situations. Some of the FRC Districts have 
made more detailed plans on setting up reception centres. The centres may be suitable as 
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quarantine facilities in an epidemic. If required, the organisation may, as support to local au-
thorities, recruit personnel both for setting up the centres and the quarantine stage. Arrange-
ments regarding materials and protective equipment for the centres will be made separately 
with the authorities. 
The FRC fi eld hospital, which is of general hospital standard, can be used to provide 
treatment for 160 patients. To staff the fi eld hospital, FRC recruits from its international re-
serve healthcare professionals, logisticians and technicians who are not tied to their own 
workplaces. 
An assessment of necessary staff numbers has been made at the Finnish Red Cross Head-
quarters. In order to guarantee the promised services, about 40-50 of Headquarters offi cials 
must be available, as well as the same number from the Districts, or approx. 100 staff in all. 
In addition, the organisation is capable of recruiting even thousands of volunteers.
The Blood Service is a part of the Finnish Red Cross operation. Measures connected with 
its pandemic preparedness are outlined in section 2.1.4.
12.4.2 Churches
Churches and other religious communities play an important role in sustaining people’s ca-
pacity to cope with psychological crises.
According to the principles of preparedness planning of the Evangelic-Lutheran Church, 
the church must under all circumstances secure the care of religious life and religious activi-
ties, and provide all parish services, particularly the social service function associated with 
burying the deceased. The crisis networks should ensure that nobody is left alone. Hospital 
chaplains work in hospitals in cooperation with healthcare staff. Spiritual and other counsel-
ling help is available from the church Helpline, or by contacting a parish worker, priest or 
deacon. The parishes also have befriending services and grief peer support groups. See also 
www.evl.fi  / for those needing help.
12.4.3 Voluntary organisations
Voluntary organisations are an important resource in managing disasters and other emergen-
cy situations. They can provide assistance in various supply and service tasks and transport. 
The Finnish Red Cross coordinates the Voluntary Rescue Service (Vapepa) incorporating 47 
organisations, with members who are trained and equipped to assist the authorities. Vapepa 
organises e.g. emergency accommodation, clothing, food supplies, advisory services and 
counselling. The Vapepa network is countrywide, with 1,400 alert groups and about 20,000 
volunteers. Specialities of Vapepa member organisations include road services, physical ex-
ercise, national defence, rescue, fi rst aid and women’s services. (Appendix 11)
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13 COMMUNICATIONS
Cooperation with WHO and EU is described in sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2. 
13.1 Communications and information
Communications in the period immediately preceding and during a pandemic may be de-
fi ned as crisis communications. Communications form a part of the crisis management sys-
tem and are involved in all the processes where information is disseminated, matters agreed 
and decisions implemented. Crisis communications are only successful if they are well-
planned, integrated in management of emergency situations, and follow agreed game rules 
that are known by the whole organisation. 
13.1.1 Principles of internal communications
In a crisis situation, the importance of internal communications is paramount. The manage-
ment of the organisation decides who is responsible for communications in a crisis situation, 
and which experts support the communications unit in discharging its functions. Under nor-
mal circumstances, each expert communicates on his own area, but in an emergency situa-
tion it may be wise to centralise communications to certain persons, to give the crisis a face. 
At the very least, it must be ensured that the content of information given by different per-
sons on an issue is congruous.
Communication is interactive, and also includes provision of information by experts to 
their superiors on issues important in terms of crisis management, and that they in turn in-
form their own superiors, right up to highest political leadership. Heads of departments and 
units should always keep the entire personnel up-to-date as to the actions taken in managing 
the situation, and who is responsible for different functions. Everyone working in an organi-
sation must know to whom various queries or supplier contacts should be directed. In crisis 
situations, there is no longer time to establish operational responsibilities. 
Well-functioning communications in crisis situations are founded on well-planned and 
well-executed normal time communications. In crisis situations, new operational systems 
are no longer set up, but measures are taken to enhance operations of normal time organisa-
tions for the duration of the crisis.
13.1.2 Aims of public communications 
In a widespread epidemic affecting the whole population, communications support manage-
ment of the epidemic, maintenance of vital functions of society, and coping of the population 
with the epidemic as well as possible, both physically and psychologically. 
With a raised infl uenza pandemic alert (WHO phases 3–5) and during the pandemic 
(WHO phase 6), the core functions of communications are:
to slow down spread of infection through instruction on hygiene and protective 
measures 
to slow down spread of infection into Finland from possible geographically defi ned 
pandemic alert areas
•
•
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to support admission of those affected into appropriate treatment and to give in-
structions on home nursing
to provide the public with detailed instructions on implementation of vaccination 
programmes covering the whole population
to maintain the capacity of society to function by providing information and direc-
tions in support of sensible actions and by preventing inappropriate reactions
to prevent the spread of rumours and misinformation 
to sustain the spirits of the population and to monitor their fl uctuations 
A precondition of coping with a pandemic is that the citizens’ trust in the authorities is 
preserved. One of the most important factors in building confi dence is successful commu-
nications. In a pandemic situation, information issued by the authorities is of exceptionally 
high signifi cance. The information released must be:
truthful
suffi cient
easily accessible 
understandable and unambiguous
uniform and non-contradictory 
timely
available in Finnish, Swedish, English, partially also in Russian
take into account different target groups, their situations and needs
In terms of communications, preparedness proceeds in accordance with the World 
Health Organisation (WHO) pandemic alert (phases 3-5) and the pandemic phase (6), so 
that communications measures are augmented in accordance with an advance plan as the 
alert progresses. 
13.1.3 Parties responsible for communications 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, in cooperation with departments and agencies in 
its sector, particularly the National Public Health Institute, is responsible for planning and 
directing communications concerning the pandemic alert and pandemic. 
Each Ministry is responsible for communications within its own administrative sector 
with regard to the pandemic. Systematic cooperative procedures between the Ministries’ 
communications units will be agreed and the directions appended to each Ministry’s prepar-
edness plans concerning communications during a pandemic. 
Responsibility for communications always lies with the responsibility for directing op-
erations. If the responsibility for directing pandemic preparedness and a pandemic situation 
was transferred from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health to the Government (section 
8), the responsibility for communications would also pass to the Communications Unit of 
Prime Minister’s Offi ce.  
In a pandemic situation, the importance of regional and local communications is empha-
sised. The citizens must have very detailed instructions and information e.g. on places of 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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treatment. Such information must be provided as locally as possible, preferably by the local 
authority.
State Provincial Offi ces, Hospital Districts and health centres ensure that regional and lo-
cal communications plans regarding a pandemic are included in preparedness plans.
13.1.4 Target groups of communications 
population
social and health service professional personnel
media at home and abroad
personnel of each administrative sector (internal communications)
various interest groups
During the different pandemic alert phases and the full-blown pandemic, communica-
tions must, by necessity, be targeted at rather small, specifi c groups. Such target groups may 
be e.g. travellers entering or leaving the country.
13.1.5 Channels of communication 
media
Internet
Teletext
telephone helplines
replying to letters and emails from the public
printed information, e.g. for every home, school or workplace
paid advertising
The media 
The media constitute the most important tool in dissemination of information, making coop-
eration with them extremely important. The media are kept up-to-date at the various phases 
of the situation by stepping up normal communications directed at them. In addition to press 
and online releases, daily press conferences at a fi xed time will be organised for the media 
during the pandemic phase. As necessary, the Government will hold communal news confer-
ences, and the Ministries will also hold their own conferences.
If the pandemic situation demands restrictions of gatherings, the news conferences may 
be transmitted online. Telephone interviews with experts may also be arranged for report-
ers.
The media will also be directed to watch the WHO website, which will be kept updated 
with information on the pandemic situation worldwide. WHO has published a guide for re-
porters on its website, entitled “What every journalist should know about infl uenza”. The 
guide will be updated by WHO as necessary.
1.
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The communications units of the Ministries ensure that their administrative sectors have 
plans in place for servicing the media during the pandemic alert and full-blown pandemic. 
The plans include preparedness for increased human resources in communications units, and 
ensure that named content experts are designated, as necessary, as communications and me-
dia partners.
The Prime Minister’s Offi ce Communications Unit will ensure that the communications 
units of the Ministries have communal facilities at their disposal, with appropriate technol-
ogy for organising both joint and individual news conferences by the Ministries. 
Offi cial and emergency information bulletins
The media will monitor functioning of society intensively during the pandemic alert phase 
and the full-blown pandemic, and give it very varied exposure. In some situations, broad-
casting of offi cial or emergency bulletins may also be necessary.
The Finnish Broadcasting Company is obliged to broadcast offi cial information bulle-
tins both in exceptional situations under normal conditions and in emergency conditions that 
are less severe than war. Radio Suomi and Radio Vega are the most important FBC chan-
nels for regional operations by the authorities. Their networks may be divided for provin-
cial broadcasting. The importance of television is also great, although radio would be the 
primary tool.
An emergency bulletin may be broadcast when loss of human life or signifi cant damage 
to property are an imminent threat. FBC broadcasts the emergency bulletin through all its 
channels. It is broadcast simultaneously also on commercial radio stations and, as far as pos-
sible, on television channels. The emergency bulletin interrupts all ongoing programmes.
Other offi cial bulletins may be broadcast when the danger is not quite imminent. The 
bulletins are read as promptly as possible on Radio Suomi and Radio Vega, as well as on the 
commercial radio stations selected by the authorities.
The Internet 
The importance of the Internet – or online services – is emphasised when the alert phase 
reaches 4 or 5, as it is an ideal tool for disseminating up-to-date information to a large target 
group quickly. The prerequisite is that the load capacity of the various actors’ online services 
has been suffi ciently raised and that network service systems have backups to secure unin-
terrupted operation. In the actual pandemic phase, online services are the primary means of 
communication.
Each authority maintains and updates the information of their own sector on their online 
service and includes links on their websites to those of other authorities. The Government 
will compile a summary web page on its own website, with links to all other websites. 
All information should not be collated in one online service, as the user numbers on serv-
ers are likely to be extremely high during a pandemic, and spreading information across dif-
ferent servers will ensure its availability.
Operators must test the load capacity of the online services and if necessary, draw up 
plans for improving load capacity.
The National Public Health Institute online service contains information directed at both 
healthcare professionals and the public. At the time of implementation of the preparedness 
plan, the need for a dedicated online service for expert use, an extranet with passwords and 
usernames, will be assessed. 
To reduce the loading of both online services and telephone helplines, “Frequently asked 
questions” pages will be constructed and updated constantly as the situation demands.
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To secure maintenance of online services, training will be targeted at increasing website 
updating skills, as they are currently in the hands of too few. 
Teletext 
Teletext is a good channel for dissemination of information, especially if the Internet con-
nections fail. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health Information and Communications 
Unit is investigating dissemination of information on the infl uenza pandemic on Teletext 
with FBC. 
Telephone helplines
During a pandemic, the public must be able to rely on the political leadership and authorities 
directing operations effi ciently. Well-executed telephone advisory services build up public 
confi dence in the authorities and their work.
For example, the experiences gained from the tsunami show that in a crisis situation, suc-
cessful telephone helpline services hold a key position. Although information and advice is 
available online, in the media and distributed in other ways, a proportion of people will ask 
for instructions by telephone. Not everyone has an Internet connection at home, and when 
they or a family member are sick, they cannot seek Internet connections elsewhere. The In-
ternet connections may also be down, in which case information must be obtained elsewhere 
in an urgent case.
The pandemic will cause disruption in the various sectors of society, and people will 
need information and advice on what to do in problem situations. As well as the social and 
health service sector, advice and help may be needed from other sectors, too. This guidance 
must be available from people’s own local authority. The greatest pressure of telephone en-
quiries is on health centres, and they must pay particular attention in their preparedness plans 
on the capacity of their telephone advisory services to respond to the needs of the public. 
Facilities for citizens’ telephone advisory services were completed at Prime Minister’s 
Offi ce in February 2006. The facilities allow for taking 8-10 calls at a time; the intention is 
to later extend the service, so that calls can be redirected from the helpline directly to the of-
fi ces of Ministry offi cials. The facilities can be taken into use whenever enhanced commu-
nications and public telephone helplines are required. 
The Ministries and the experts in their sectors cannot be detached from their other work 
in managing the situation to telephone helplines, but external persons must be recruited for 
the job, or the service outsourced from elsewhere, e.g. from an organisation. The Finnish 
Red Cross has excellent resources for organising personnel for telephone helplines in mat-
ters linked to the pandemic. The telephone personnel undergo crash courses in their duties 
and have at their disposal ready-made question-answer lists, as well as the option of consult-
ing experts when necessary.
Each Ministry is responsible for its sector preparedness plan taking into account man-
agement of public telephone enquiries during the pandemic alert phase and full-blown pan-
demic. 
Letters and emails from the public 
During a pandemic, the numbers of letters and especially emails sent by the public to the au-
thorities will multiply. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, citizens’ letters and emails 
must be answered. 
Messages from the public must also be attended to during a pandemic, as far as possible. 
The feedback obtained from telephone calls, letters and emails from the public must be for-
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warded in the agreed manner within the organisation, for it to be taken into account, when 
necessary, in planning and directing operations.
Information material prepared in advance 
Information, instructions and recommendations contained on websites is continually up-
dated. Additionally, preparations must be made for enhanced dissemination of information, 
such as sending instructions to every household or their distribution to schools, workplaces 
etc. To this end, material is drafted to almost the print-ready stage, and updated in accord-
ance with latest information before dispatching. 
Each Ministry with its administrative sector decides the kind of advance material it is 
likely to need and ensures that the material is drafted. 
The National Public Health Institute works together with the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health in preparation of the necessary material on healthcare. Appropriate resources are 
required for the drafting process.
Paid advertising 
Although the media will address the pandemic from different angles, it may be necessary to 
use also paid advertising in newspapers and on radio and television. Paid advertising may 
be particularly appropriate when the population must be given detailed instructions on what 
action to take or how to behave.
13.1.6 Informing healthcare professionals 
The National Public Health Institute is responsible for advice and guidance of healthcare 
professionals. The Institute has a dedicated section for professionals on its website. It may 
also set up advisory telephone services related to infl uenza for healthcare professionals. The 
National Public Health Institute epidemic communications procedures are described in more 
detail in Appendix 13. 
To make sure that information disseminated on the pandemic by different interest groups 
is uniform and non-contradictory, cooperation between the various actors must be system-
atic and seamless.
13.1.7 Communications resources
For enhanced communications, additional resources are required at all levels of the opera-
tion: employees, equipment and cash. 
Personnel 
In the Ministries and their administrative sectors and in State Provincial Offi ces, some extra 
manpower may be released for communications by prioritisation of functions and transfer-
ring employees to communications tasks within the Ministries or sectors.
Wherever it is implemented, public telephone advisory services and replying to letters 
and emails requires suffi cient numbers of staff.
In Hospital Districts and health centres, management of both public communications and 
the media is a particularly challenging prospect, as not all units by far have communications 
specialists. This highlights the responsibility of experts for communications.
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In planning personnel resources, it should be considered that much of experts’ work in-
put is tied up with managing communications both independently, e.g. in expert interviews, 
and in acting as content experts in communications and media units. 
Transferring staff to other duties demands training. The entire personnel of communica-
tions units, alongside other personnel, requires training on issues specifi cally related to the 
pandemic. 
Tools
Enhanced communications demand extra capacity, e.g. on the Internet. In a crisis situation, 
the authorities must have at their disposal a system that
is capable of servicing large visitor numbers in exceptional situations
publishes new material quickly
provides consistent security of service 
recovers quickly from malfunctions
provides a channel also for offi ces and agencies of the administrative sector
The security of service of the Internet concerns direction and management of the whole 
situation, as well as communications. Today, more and more operationally essential infor-
mation is transmitted online. The communications systems of the EU, WHO and ECDC (Eu-
ropean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control), among others, rely on online services.
In crisis situations, mobile phone networks quickly become overloaded. As far as possi-
ble, functioning of telephone connections should also be ensured in advance.
Funds 
Suffi cient funds must be set aside for communications, in order to purchase e.g. services 
from advertising agencies, production and distribution of various materials, and paid adver-
tising. Reserve funds must also exist for overtime payments.
13.1.8 Monitoring of communications 
During and after the pandemic, implementation of advance plans, how well the operation 
worked in general and where improvements might be made, will be evaluated. It must be en-
sured that monitoring of realisation of communications is included in these plans. 
13.2 Internal communication
Finland’s Public Authority Network (VIRVE) is a system developed for internal communi-
cations. It is a digital radio telephone network based on the TETRA Standard, and covers 
the whole of Finland. The system permits extremely fast connections between different au-
thorities with the aid of pre-planned call groups. New call groups can be formed quickly as 
required. Individual calls and group messages are also possible. Group calls are a quick and 
effi cient way of issuing instructions and disseminating information, making the Public Au-
thority Network eminently suitable for exchanging information is situations such as a pan-
demic. The call group structure is designed with both normal and emergency conditions in 
•
•
•
•
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mind, and may be used as required nationwide or regionally. Approved users of the VIRVE 
terminals include the authorities ensuring national and municipal security and organisations 
that have contracted to cooperate with them. 
For collaboration between authorities to be successful, it is crucial that all those entitled 
to use VIRVE obtain a terminal and use it. Profi ciency in using the telephone is best main-
tained by using it daily. 
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14  LEGISLATION
14.1 Current legislation on communicable diseases 
The powers and obligations stipulated in the Communicable Diseases Act (583/1986) are 
pivotal in combating an infl uenza pandemic, and they form an adequate basis for govern-
ance. The obligations stipulated concern all administrative levels and public healthcare ex-
perts: the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, State Provincial Offi ce, local municipal 
authority, National Public Health Institute and Hospital District. The authorities are under 
obligation to take urgent action, if the population is in danger of being exposed to a spread-
ing contagious disease fulfi lling the criteria of a dangerous communicable disease. The deci-
sions of the authorities may be executed immediately, regardless of submission or appeal.
The Act also regulates on direction and experts, the obligations of whom are discussed 
in more detail in section 8.2. 
When prompt action is required in order to prevent the spread of an infectious disease 
posing a serious threat to public health, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and, on 
provincial level, the State Provincial Offi ce may make the necessary decisions. The decision 
permits implementation, during a fi xed term, of measures that are applied in cases of infec-
tious diseases involving danger to the public.
The local authority is obliged to organise the work of infectious disease prevention in its 
area, as part of primary public healthcare. Under the Primary Health Care Act, implementa-
tion of primary healthcare is organised by an organ set up by the municipality with multiple 
membership. In the Communicable Diseases Act, this is called the municipal body responsi-
ble for the prevention of communicable diseases.
The municipality may organise the duties of social services and healthcare by taking care 
of the functions itself, by agreement jointly with another local authority or authorities, by be-
ing a member of a joint municipal board to which the activities are entrusted, or by obtaining 
the services from the state, another local authority, a joint municipal board or other public or 
private service provider.  
Therefore, a local authority may agree to organise prevention and control of contagious 
diseases with a neighbouring municipality or municipalities, in such a case as e.g. having no 
doctors in its employment. In that case, the municipality will obtain the expertise from the 
medical practitioner responsible for contagious diseases in the neighbouring local authority. 
The proposal is issued by a municipal offi cial who does not need to be a doctor. 
A situation may arise in a Hospital District that it does not have a physician responsible 
for contagious diseases, or it is otherwise unable to cope with the situation brought about by 
an infl uenza pandemic alert or pandemic. In that case, it may agree with another joint mu-
nicipal board (Hospital District) or municipality on treatment of patients affected by the in-
fectious disease. If an agreement cannot be reached, the Government may order an agree-
ment to be made.
Each health centre has a medical practitioner responsible for contagious diseases, obliged 
to establish the type and spread of a suspected or confi rmed infectious disease, and to take 
the necessary action in an effort to prevent the spread of the disease. He is further responsi-
ble for communications, health education and advisory services in the health centre catch-
ment area. He is in charge of examinations, tests and treatment of the person affected or sus-
pected of being infected by a communicable disease that is a danger to public health, as well 
as issuing instructions to prevent transmission. 
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If these measures are insuffi cient to prevent the spread of the disease, the municipal body 
responsible for control of communicable diseases may order an infected person or one with 
suffi cient grounds to suspect him of being infected to absent himself from work, daycare or 
an educational institution. 
A person infected by a contagious disease posing a risk to public health, or one with 
suffi cient grounds to suspect him of being infected, may be isolated in a healthcare facil-
ity, if the risk of the disease spreading is apparent, and if there is no other way of preventing 
the spread of the disease, or if the person cannot or is unwilling to agree to other necessary 
measures to prevent the spread of the disease.
At the place of isolation, a person suffering from an infectious disease involving danger 
to the general public may be administered treatment necessary to prevent the spread of the 
disease, regardless of his wishes.
Moreover, when prompt action is required in order to prevent the spread of an infectious 
disease posing a serious threat to public health, or an infectious disease fulfi lling the crite-
ria of one, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and on provincial level the State Pro-
vincial Offi ce, or the municipal body responsible for controlling infectious diseases, may 
order quarantine for a fi xed period for a person who has been exposed or may on suffi cient 
grounds be suspected to have been exposed to a dangerous infectious disease, but who is not 
in need of hospitalisation because of his state of health. The place of quarantine may be e.g. 
the person’s home, a hotel or a refugee reception centre. The aims and content of the actions 
are described in more detail in section 10.2.
A person may be ordered to be quarantined also regardless of his wishes. The maximum 
period of enforced quarantine is one month. In reality, the decision to quarantine is made for 
the necessary period, depending on the incubation period of the disease, for example for a 
week or a fortnight. The Administrative Court may, on submission by the decision-making 
authority, continue the quarantine by a maximum period of two months, if the salient rea-
sons still exist, and it must be discontinued immediately such reasons no longer exist. The 
decision to discontinue the quarantine is made by the health centre physician responsible for 
infectious diseases. 
In an urgent case, the health centre physician responsible for infectious diseases may 
make the decisions e.g. on enforced quarantine, absence from work, absence from daycare 
or educational institution and isolation. The decisions must be immediately submitted for 
enforcement by the municipal body responsible for prevention and control of communica-
ble diseases. 
In an infl uenza pandemic situation, the municipal body responsible for prevention and 
control of communicable diseases may order the isolation of dwellings and service institu-
tions in its area, as well as closure of educational institutions and daycare centres, ban events 
causing gatherings or issue orders restricting them. It may also order cleansing and disinfec-
tion operations to be carried out. 
If the State Provincial Offi ce, the municipal body responsible for control of communica-
ble diseases or the health centre doctor responsible for infectious diseases decides that there 
is no other effective means of preventing the spread of an infectious disease posing a danger 
to the general public, the police must provide offi cial assistance on request.
Under the Act on Client Fees in Social Welfare and Health Care (734/1992), examina-
tions, treatment and medications prescribed for treatment of an infectious disease posing a 
risk to the general public, as well as isolation in a healthcare institution of the infected per-
son or one suspected to be infected, are free healthcare services. Vaccines are free to the lo-
cal authority.
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A person who has been ordered to absent himself from his employment, to isolation or 
quarantine, in order to prevent the spread of an infectious disease, is entitled to sickness ben-
efi t in accordance with the Sickness Insurance Act. The same applies to the guardian of a 
child, if a child under 16 has been ordered to be kept at home for the above reason, and the 
guardian is therefore prevented from going to work. In addition to the daily sickness benefi t 
allowance, the person is entitled to reimbursement of lost earnings.
The Government proposal on the amendment to the Communicable Diseases Act, effec-
tive from 1 December 2006, suggests that in a situation where passengers on international 
transport need to be ordered to quarantine, the Government should stand the costs resulting 
from the arrangement. 
Primary responsibility for directing a patient infected by a generally dangerous or notifi -
able disease, as well as others who may have been infected, to examinations and treatment 
lies with the doctor treating the patient. If he cannot do this himself, he must pass on the task 
to the doctor responsible for infectious diseases in the health centre or Hospital District.
Doctors and laboratories are under obligation to issue a communicable disease notifi ca-
tion to the Hospital District on cases of notifi able infectious diseases likely to endanger the 
general public. This duty of notifi cation would also apply to infl uenza classifi ed as posing 
a danger to the general public during a pandemic alert phase and full-blown pandemic. The 
National Public Health Institute maintains a National Register of Infectious Diseases. The 
notifi cation procedure and registration of infectious diseases are precisely stipulated by law, 
taking into account data protection. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health may decide that in order to prevent or control 
an infectious disease epidemic posing an imminent threat to public health, and in order to 
treat the disease and complications caused by it, an exception to the stipulations of the Med-
icines Act (395/1987) may be made and use of a pharmaceutical product permitted without 
a sales licence issued by the National Agency for Medicines or the relevant European Un-
ion agency.
A hospital pharmacy and dispensary may supply medical products to other social and 
healthcare units without a licence issued by the National Agency for Medicines under sec-
tion 62 of the Medicines Act, and the healthcare unit may supply a person attending a sur-
gery with the medication required for his treatment.
The National Public Health Institute must ensure that suffi cient quantities of vaccines, 
antigens and testing materials used in prevention of infectious diseases are available, moni-
tor the effectiveness and impacts of vaccines used in prevention of infectious diseases, take 
action to investigate a confi rmed or suspected complication of vaccination, and ensure that 
the vaccines are appropriately distributed. 
With the growing importance of infectious diseases, preparedness of healthcare must be 
stepped up to intervene in time in such issues that prevent the spread of infectious diseases, 
creation of microbe strains that are resistant to antimicrobial drugs, and hospital infections. 
For instance, State Provincial Offi ces can make suffi ciently high standards of hygiene a li-
cence condition for private service providers. The municipal offi cer inspecting the premises 
of such service providers should pay attention to this. More general guidelines are required. 
The obligation to provide them already exists.
The current Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991) obliges local and national authorities 
to ensure functions as free of disruption as possible under emergency conditions, by means 
of preparedness plans and other measures. The concept of major disaster has not covered 
preparedness for dangerous contagious disease epidemics as clearly as preparedness for me-
chanical, chemical and radiation accidents. The increased need for preparedness for biologi-
cal threats has only emerged in recent times. 
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14.2 Labour legislation
The Occupational Safety and Health Act (738/2002) defi nes the minimum requirements for 
working conditions and good occupational safety and health practices in the workplace. It is 
a general law covering all employment. 
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Government resolution on choice and 
use of personal protection at work (1407/1993) and the Government resolution on personal 
protection (1406/1993) have been passed.
The Act on Occupational Safety and Health Enforcement and Cooperation on Safety and 
Health at Workplaces (44/2006) contains stipulations on the rights of the occupational health 
and safety inspector and the occupational health and safety representative.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act also covers biological risk factors at work. It 
stipulates that the exposure of an employee to a biological factor constituting a danger to his 
safety or health must be limited to such a degree that such a factor does not cause harm or 
constitute a danger to the employee’s health or reproductive health. Under the relevant sec-
tion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Government decision on protection of 
employees from danger caused by biological factors at work (1155/1993) and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health decision on classifi cation of biological factors (229/1998) have 
been given. 
The above regulations defi ne the employer’s obligations, such as assessment and identi-
fi cation of risks, measures to minimise risks, personal protection, information and training 
of employees, notifi cations to competent authorities, registers of exposed employees, pre-
paredness plans in case of failure of physical barriers, and the issues of employer–employee 
cooperation in addressing the issues covered by these regulations. The employer’s obliga-
tions are partially dependent on the risk classifi cation of the biological factor. The current 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health decision (229/1998) classifi es the infl uenza A virus in 
the least serious group II causing disease in humans. The above-mentioned Government de-
cision (1155/1993) also contains regulations on vaccinations at the employer’s expense for 
employees who are exposed or will possibly become exposed.
The preventive measures must be based on workplace risk assessment, which is the em-
ployer’s responsibility, as are measures to minimise the risks. General protective measures 
take precedence over individual measures.
The Occupational Health Care Act (1383/2001) and the subsequent Government Decree 
on medical examinations in work that presents a special risk of illness (1485/2001) contain 
the regulations on medical check-ups to be carried out by occupational healthcare due to bi-
ological factors. 
The medical examination requirement is based on the assessment of danger and risk fac-
tors carried out in the workplace. When a risk of exposure has been established, the employ-
ee must be given both an initial medical examination and a second one after a set period. 
Under the Government Decree (1485/2001, section 5), the aims of the medical examination 
are 
to identify health risks inherent in the working conditions and to produce informa-
tion for taking preventive action;
to investigate the employee’s exposure and the likely changes in his capacity and 
state of health resulting from it;
to establish the employee’s suitability for work resulting from his state of health or 
changes in his state of health; 
1.
2.
3.
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to inform the employee of the health risks inherent in his work and to provide in-
structions on preventing the adverse effects;
to direct the employee to medical investigations and treatment when suspecting an 
occupational illness; and
to monitor the impacts of implemented occupational safety and health measures and 
other changes. 
The Working Hours Act (605/1996) includes regulations on mandatory notifi cations to 
occupational safety and health authorities in exceptional situations.
The Commission for Local Authority Employers has collated regulatory and contract 
material relevant to occupational health and safety and working in a pandemic situation, to 
provide guidelines to employers in case of a pandemic. The memorandum may be found on 
the Commission for Local Authority Employers website: www.kuntatyonantajat.fi , search 
word ‘pandemia’.
14.3 Assessing the need for revision of legislation
When assessing the need for revision, the intention is that in prevention of infectious dis-
eases, as effective action as possible could be taken within the framework of normal legis-
lation. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the State Provincial Offi ces should be 
provided, also when normal legislation is in force, with the option of ordering fi xed-term 
changes to the organisation of social and health services in a pandemic situation. These pow-
ers would be likely to be needed on rare occasions. Drafting of an amendment to the Com-
municable Diseases Act is desirable. The Emergency Powers Act obliges the public sector, 
including healthcare, to make advance preparations in order that execution of its functions in 
emergency conditions would be as trouble-free as possible. In addition to emergency condi-
tions, it has recently been emphasised that the preparedness should also concern exceptional 
circumstances. A widespread infectious disease epidemic would be such a circumstance.
14.3.1 Distribution of free drugs 
In a pandemic situation, it is epidemiologically justifi ed to ensure that the patient obtains the 
drugs he needs, stored in national reserve stocks, free of charge from the healthcare units 
where his diagnosis is established. It is not justifi able that the infected person moves on from 
the infl uenza clinic to a pharmacy, and thus likely contributes to the spread of the pandem-
ic. 
14.3.2 The medical practitioner responsible for infectious diseases and other 
employees under various contracts
The Communicable Diseases Act and Decree set out the duties of the medical practitioner 
responsible for infectious diseases working under a municipal body or agency. This respon-
sibility can only be conferred on a doctor in a permanent post, and consequently a local au-
thority with no appointed doctor should draw up an agreement with a neighbouring authority 
4.
5.
6.
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with a view to executing the work of infectious disease prevention and control in coopera-
tion, or to outsourcing expert services from the neighbouring municipality or a private serv-
ice provider.
Healthcare units employ, under various types of contract, persons such as locum or agen-
cy doctors, self-employed persons and students. Their contracts should take into account 
continuity of the employment also in emergency conditions and exceptional circumstances.
14.3.3 Humans infections caused by the A/H5N1 avian infl uenza virus
The Communicable Diseases Decree will be amended with the addition of a human case of 
infection by the infl uenza A/H5N1 virus, known to have caused epidemics of avian infl uen-
za, to the list of communicable diseases constituting a danger to the general public. Drafting 
of this amendment has begun at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. Later, if neces-
sary, any other infl uenza virus subtype causing an infl uenza pandemic will also need to be 
classifi ed as a communicable disease constituting a danger to the general public.
14.3.4 Preparedness obligations of private healthcare
The Private Health Care Act includes the option that State Provincial Offi ces may set con-
ditions essential for securing patient safety, regarding the quantity of services, personnel, 
premises, equipment and materials, and procedures. Discussions have taken place on statu-
tory obligation of preparedness also for large private healthcare units, such as hospitals.
14.3.5 Regulations on non-urgent treatment
The Primary Health Care Act and the Act on Special Medical Care regulate on access to 
treatment. For non-urgent cases, a maximum period is stipulated, within which the assess-
ment of the need for treatment must be carried out and the maximum period within which 
the treatment must be commenced.
In a pandemic situation, it may not be possible to fulfi l these set periods, since the number 
of patients requiring acute treatment is so great that the assessment and commencement of 
other non-urgent treatment will have to be postponed. To this end, both statutes should in-
clude a mention that a great number of patients requiring urgent treatment justifi es the local 
authority and Hospital District in issuing new, temporary directions on access to non-urgent 
treatment. This would be specifi c to Hospital District or municipality, as the situation does 
not necessarily affect the whole country simultaneously. 
The new draft Emergency Powers Act acknowledges that unexpected situations may 
arise in emergency conditions, where the capacity of the healthcare system is not suffi cient 
to execute all the duties of normal conditions. For this reason, a Government Decree would 
allow for exceptions to the periods set for non-urgent treatment under the Primary Health 
Care Act and the Act on Special Medical Care.
133
14.3.6 The Emergency Powers Act
The powers under the Emergency Powers Act only apply under emergency conditions. Un-
der emergency conditions, the Government has a considerable number of rights that it does 
not have under normal conditions. In order to safeguard public healthcare, orders may be 
issued to medical treatment and research institutions, health centres, pharmaceutical manu-
facturers, pharmaceutical wholesalers, pharmacies and producers and service providers of 
goods required in healthcare. Manpower may be targeted as necessary, and its use directed.
The defi nition of emergency conditions under the present Emergency Powers Act does 
not include an infl uenza pandemic or any other major epidemic. Nor is an infl uenza pandem-
ic regarded, within the constraints of the current Act, as such a situation comparable to a ma-
jor disaster that the Emergency Powers Act would be invoked. As the pandemic progresses, 
economic implications may possibly accelerate its invocation, but this justifi cation has not 
been deemed to be very likely either. 
The emergency powers legislation is currently under review. The intention is for the 
Emergency Powers Act to comply with the requirements of the 2000 Constitution of Finland 
and for the powers of the authorities to be reviewed. A signifi cant amendment in the case of 
an infl uenza pandemic is likening a widespread infectious disease to a major disaster. A very 
exceptional state of disruption would also arise if a WHO pandemic alert phase 5 situation 
was to occur in Finland. In such a case, emergency measures may be required even before 
the actual pandemic begins.
In order to secure adequate manpower during emergency conditions, the Government 
may, both under the present Emergency Powers Act and the proposed new Act, order a per-
son resident in Finland who has received training in the sector or is otherwise suitable for 
healthcare duties to perform such tasks as he is capable of, commensurate with his training 
or experience. Under the current Act, the order covers people aged 17-64, and under the pro-
posal those aged 18-68.
Private healthcare should be under obligation of preparedness for emergency conditions 
and exceptional circumstances, such as a dangerous disease epidemic. Under the new pro-
posed Emergency Powers Act, the obligation of preparedness through preparedness plans 
and advance preparations would continue to apply only to public healthcare. Regulations on 
preparedness in other private sectors are included in other legislation concerning them. Nev-
ertheless, the Private Health Care Act does not include an obligation of preparedness. The 
private healthcare sector should also be under obligation of preparedness, since it constitutes 
an ever growing part of healthcare services. 
Under the proposed revised Emergency Powers Act, moving healthcare units around 
and making operational changes in them in emergency conditions within a province would 
be under the powers of the State Provincial Offi ce, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health would have the option of making decisions on changed location and operation con-
cerning pharmaceutical manufacturers and wholesalers, pharmacies, and self-employed per-
sons who supply goods or services to healthcare or otherwise operate in the healthcare sec-
tor. Under the proposal, powers would be delegated by the Government to the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health and to State Provincial Offi ces.
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15 IMPLEMENTATION, PREPAREDNESS EXERCISES, EVALUATION 
AND UPDATING OF NATIONAL PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS 
PLAN
Developing preparedness in accordance with the National Pandemic Plan requires measures 
in all administrative sectors. The highest offi cial responsible for preparedness in each min-
istry is the Permanent Secretary. In coordination and integration of the activities of the dif-
ferent administrative sectors, the Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness and Permanent Sec-
retaries plays a central role. If it deems necessary, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
may appoint a working group to support and supervise the execution of the plan in the social 
and healthcare sector. The working group must cooperate closely with the Pandemic Work-
ing Group of the National Public Health Institute and the Advisory Board on Communicable 
Diseases and the Advisory Board for Health and Welfare in Emergency Conditions operat-
ing within the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health. The Ministry will ensure that it has at 
its disposal suffi cient human resources to supervise the execution in the social and health-
care sector, and to support and monitor drafting of preparedness plans of other administra-
tive sectors. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and the National Public Health Institute moni-
tor development of the global pandemic situation and preparedness at transnational level (by 
international organisations, global and regional organisations and individual countries). The 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health cooperates with the Heads of Preparedness in monitor-
ing progress in national preparedness. 
Each ministry is responsible for progress of preparedness in its own administrative sector 
and for ensuring that more detailed sector-specifi c preparedness plans are drawn up. Prepar-
edness objectives will be incorporated as appropriate in the budgets and strategies of minis-
tries and performance agreements of administrative sectors, making monitoring of their im-
plementation a part of the departments’ annual activities.
Regional preparedness will be supervised and coordinated by the Provincial Offi ces that 
will utilise the expertise of Hospital Districts for support in developing preparedness in 
healthcare services. They will update their own preparedness plans to comply with the na-
tional plan, and ensure that the plans of their own regional healthcare services (Hospital Dis-
tricts and health centres), as well as those of other administrative sectors and local authori-
ties are compatible. 
An essential part of ensuring the appropriate function of preparedness plans is their test-
ing in exercises. Two extensive preparedness exercises have been held in 2005, to test pre-
paredness on national level in a pandemic situation. An avian infl uenza preparedness ex-
ercise testing the functioning of the management system was held in March 2006, and an 
infl uenza pandemic exercise in April 2006. The lessons learned through them on the prob-
lems in preparedness have been utilised in drawing up this plan. 
When updating of provincial level plans has been completed, their functioning should be 
tested through an exercise specifi cally designed for assessing the operation of Provincial Of-
fi ces and regional levels of different administrative sectors. Based on lessons learned from 
this exercise, the national plan will be updated as appropriate, and the revised plan should be 
tested in a national preparedness exercise.
Each ministry must check that the plan is up-to-date with regard to issues under their own 
administrative sector at least once a year, and make revisions as required. As a consequence 
of a changing pandemic alert or international preparedness situation, updating and revision 
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may be necessary more frequently than in the annual evaluation process. Each ministry ap-
proves changes that only concern its specifi c administrative sector. Any required revisions 
with a signifi cant effect on the national plan and operation of other administrative sectors 
are submitted to the Government Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness. Once the Ministries 
and the Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness have approved the revisions, they are record-
ed in the offi cial version of the National Pandemic Plan, published on the Internet. Thus, the 
plan may be updated as necessary. The assessment and approval procedure of the Meeting of 
Heads of Preparedness ensures compatibility of the activities by different ministries. 
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16 FURTHER PREPAREDNESS ACTIONS
16.1 Preparedness plans
The Prime Minister’s Offi ce ensures the collaboration of all administrative sectors in prepar-
ing for and prevention of an infl uenza pandemic.
All the ministries ensure that municipal, regional and national preparedness plans are up-
dated to cover preparations for an infl uenza pandemic, and that economic, legal and other 
prerequisites for the preparations are in place. 
All ministries will take care of preparedness planning of their own administrative sec-
tors, taking into consideration the information included in this Preparedness Plan and its 
subsequent revisions, on measures that may be taken to slow down the spread of infl uenza at 
the different phases of the pandemic, and to limit the damage it causes.
Continuity of the vital functions of society requires advance planning of sector-specifi c 
prioritisation and alternative mechanisms. The preparedness planning must take into account 
that 25-35% of the labour force may be absent from work, due to their own illness, for 1-
2 weeks over a period of about 2-3 months. In addition, absences from work may arise due 
to caring for a sick child or other family member, or possibly due to caring for a child sent 
home from daycare or school. Concentration of absences over the 2-3 busiest weeks of the 
epidemic peak in each locality is possible. 
The preparedness plans include implementation of hand and coughing hygiene, and as 
far as practicable, increasing social distance in workplaces, institutions and public premises. 
The potential for temporary distance working should be assessed in relevant sectors (section 
7.1, appendix 3). 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health Preparedness Unit is taking steps to set up sit-
uational management resources in its Control Centre. The necessary agreements on intra-
sector transfer of personnel will be drawn up. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will 
set up a Pandemic Coordination Group, once the level of disruption caused by the pandemic 
alert or pandemic, as declared by WHO, warrants this measure. 
State Provincial Offi ces will direct, coordinate and oversee regional preparedness and 
protection measures in their areas. State Provincial Offi ces will ensure that Occupational 
Health Services are included as an active participant in regional and local pandemic plans. 
State Provincial Offi ces must set up registers of private healthcare service providers and pro-
fessionals and ensure functional contact channels to private healthcare.
Hospital Districts, jointly with State Provincial Offi ces and municipalities, will draw up 
regional healthcare preparedness plans. State Provincial Offi ces, Hospital Districts and mu-
nicipalities will ensure that suffi cient resources are in place for the measures laid down in 
the plans.
Municipalities and health centres must draw up their own preparedness plans, taking into 
account collaboration with private health services and voluntary organisations in local plan-
ning. When inviting tenders and signing contracts on outsourced services, municipalities 
must make sure that they guarantee security of service also in situations of biological threat 
and other catastrophes.
The plans are tested through preparedness exercises, targeted primarily at the sections of 
the pandemic preparedness plan that are problem areas in inter-sector cooperation, or other 
identifi ed targets for improvement.
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16.2 Legislation   
The Ministry of Justice has drafted the revised Emergency Powers Act. It defi nes as emer-
gency conditions a very widely spread infectious disease equivalent to a particularly serious 
disaster. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has drafted a Government Proposal on re-
moving the clauses on Government guarantees from the Emergency Powers Act, so that vi-
tal transportations for Finland could be secured also in circumstances less severe than those 
defi ned in the Emergency Powers Act.
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has prepared amendments to the Act and De-
cree on Communicable Diseases on authorising quarantine and decreeing human cases of 
infl uenza A/H5N1 during pandemic alert phases 3-5 as an infectious disease endangering the 
public. The amendments concerning quarantine have already been passed by parliament.
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is preparing amendments to the Primary Health 
Care Act and the Act on Specialised Medical Care (regulations on the provision of non-ur-
gent treatment) in such a way as to create the conditions for successful control of a pandem-
ic.
16.3 Costs
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will determine how the considerable additional 
costs incurred by a pandemic would be divided between the state and local authorities. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will also clarify allocation of quarantine costs. 
In a quarantine situation, costs will be incurred by loss of earnings, treatment costs, employ-
ment of additional staff, cost of drugs and vaccines, equipment and protective materials, 
premises, training, social insurance and increased need for other social security. 
16.4 Epidemiological surveillance and guidelines
The National Public Health Institute and STAKES will improve epidemiological infl uenza 
surveillance through improvements to data collection on cause-specifi c use of health servic-
es, developing the National Infectious Disease Register, and by constructing a sentinel sur-
veillance system to permit transmission of up-to-date and reliable information through on-
line technology for use by local, regional and national healthcare authorities. 
The National Public Health Institute will maintain online guidelines on infl uenza sur-
veillance, ascertainment of cases, and control measures relevant for healthcare personnel, as 
well as relevant guidelines for the public.
16.5 Infection control
The National Public Health Institute will assess the information management procedures re-
quired for use of quarantine and surveillance of those exposed to the virus.
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, in collaboration with the National Agency for 
Medicines, the National Emergency Supply Agency and the National Public Health Insti-
tute, is preparing a decision-making procedure, through which regulated use of antiviral in-
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fl uenza drugs may be adopted at the pandemic stage, when the drugs are only available from 
the central emergency reserves.
Hospital Districts and health centres will draw up regional and local pandemic plans in 
such a way that transmission of infections is avoided during the treatment chain, including 
the reception, transport and placement of patients at all stages of the pandemic.
The Department for Occupational Safety and Health of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health and the Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, in collaboration with the National 
Public Health Institute and other relevant parties, will prepare the operational principles and 
guidelines in case of a pandemic for labour protection and occupational health services in 
such a way that they are compatible with those in other health services. 
16.6 Strengthening expertise and know-how
In the supplementary budget for the latter part of 2006, the Hospital Districts were allocated 
a total of 2.5 million euros, to be used on strengthening the preparedness of Hospital Dis-
tricts and regional know-how in infectious disease epidemiology. The Government proposal 
for the 2007 budget contains a 2 million euro allocation for the Hospital Districts, to be used 
for the same purpose.  
Hospital District, health centre and other health service employers must provide infor-
mation and training on occupational health and safety for their staff in accordance with the 
relevant regulations, and ensure that suffi cient quantities of protective equipment are avail-
able in healthcare units. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will improve the preparedness of healthcare 
personnel to meet the pandemic situation by supporting ethical debate and preparing guide-
lines for management of infectious patients.
The Ministry of Education and Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will jointly prepare 
a plan of training employees involved in outpatient and inpatient care of infl uenza patients, 
when recruited from other duties, and incorporating material on infectious disease threats 
such as a pandemic in basic training curricula. 
The National Public Health Institute and Hospital Districts will organise training to im-
prove trace-back investigation necessitated by infl uenza and numerous other infectious dis-
eases, and to defi ne the objectives, implementation and prerequisites in primary healthcare 
of quarantine, which has been little used in the last decades. The State Provincial Offi ces will 
participate in organisation of training for regional preparedness planning, cooperating with 
Hospital Districts and the National Public Health Institute. The National Public Health In-
stitute will support regional training by producing teaching materials. They will cover trace-
back investigation of infections and quarantine.
The Finnish Institute for Occupational Health will assess the types of protective equip-
ment required by various occupational groups, as well as informing and training occupation-
al safety and health and labour protection personnel. 
16.7 Material preparedness
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will continue negotiations on setting up joint Nor-
dic vaccine production. The Government budget framework for 2008–2010 includes an an-
nual allocation for ensuring a place in the queue for a specifi c vaccine. 
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The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health is drafting a resolution on use of prototype 
vaccines. The National Public Health Institute will prepare for vaccination campaigns to be 
implemented using prototype and specifi c vaccines (procurement and distribution of vac-
cines, training of and provision of guidelines to healthcare personnel, and provision of infor-
mation for the general public). 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the National Public Health Institute, the Finn-
ish Institute for Occupational Health, the National Agency for Medicines and National Emer-
gency Supply Agency will assess the additional requirements is terms of reserve stocks. 
The National Agency for Medicines jointly with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 
will develop the procedures for securing appropriate obligatory stocks of vaccines, antiviral 
drugs, medications required for treatment of complications from infl uenza, and supplies for 
prevention and control of infection, as well as for their controlled release in a pandemic sit-
uation. For treatment and prevention of pandemic infl uenza, the National Emergency Sup-
plies already contain antiviral drugs and vaccines, as well as a limited quantity of inocula-
tion equipment. With the exception of these materials, Hospital Districts and health centres 
should assess their drug, materials and protective equipment needs and implement the nec-
essary purchases.
Having consulted the experts (FIOH, NPHI, infectious diseases specialists of University 
Hospital Districts), the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has estimated the quantities of 
respirator masks and eye protectors required for pandemic alert phases 4 and 5 and for treat-
ment of intensive care patients during phase 6. The Ministry will issue a recommendation, 
based on the above, to Hospital Districts. As a further measure, the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health or the Finnish Institute for Occupational Health, jointly with experts, will assess 
the protective equipment required for inpatient and outpatient care. National guidelines on 
procuring them can only be prepared once the assessment is completed. 
MSAH recommends that the Hospital Districts acquire at least a stock of 500 treatment 
courses of oseltamivir for possible use in pandemic alert phases 3-5.
The Hospital Districts may negotiate with the National Emergency Supplies Agency re-
garding the incorporation of regional centralised procurement of materials and protective 
equipment within the contract framework of National Emergency Supplies. In such an in-
stance, the Hospital District will be responsible for circulating the stocks and replacing used 
of possibly outdated materials.
Each healthcare unit must relate the number of patients requiring intensive care and res-
pirator treatment to available resources and draw up a plan of their optimal use in a pandem-
ic situation, as well as making the necessary additional purchases. 
16.8 Communications
The Ministries will ensure that they have the preparedness for communications concerning 
their own administrative sector with regard to the pandemic. Information, guidelines and 
recommendations on the websites will be continually updated. 
Each operative party should test the load capacity of the online services and if necessary, 
draw up plans for improving load capacity.
The preparedness plans should include provisions for telephone helplines. The adminis-
trative sectors must prepare for enhanced communications and prepare material in advance 
for this purpose.
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The Preparedness Units of the Ministries will ensure that use of the VIRVE telephone 
system, developed for communication between authorities, and training for its use, is ex-
panded and made more effi cient.
16.9 Other additional measures
The Insurance Department of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health will assess the li-
abilities for compensation in a situation where the authorities have accepted certain risks in 
releasing products (e.g. drugs and vaccines) for use. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour, 
will continue to reserve quarantine facilities and draft an agreement for use when reception 
centres are reserved for use as quarantine facilities.
The Department for Occupational Safety and Health of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, jointly with the parties in the labour market, will prepare the organisational issues 
concerning the work of their administrative sector in the various pandemic phases, plans for 
services obtained from the authorities, and related issues of collaboration in the area of com-
munications. The business sector will also ensure its own preparedness through its own fo-
rums.
MSAH (under the direction of the Department for Family and Social Affairs) will initi-
ate the pandemic planning of the social services and update the guidelines for psychosocial 
support.
The National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs will draw up guidelines for healthcare 
units on determination of cause of death in a pandemic situation. 
The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities will issue guidelines to mu-
nicipalities on invitations to tender and contracts with the private sector or other parties, to 
guarantee continuity of supplies or services also in emergency conditions, such as a pan-
demic.
16.10 International actions
Finland supports the EU systems for communicable disease control, particularly strength-
ening the role of the ECDC. Finland participates in exchange of information and the search 
for common policies with other EU countries, as well as taking part in joint EU prepared-
ness exercises. 
Finland plays her part in providing aid to South-East Asian and African countries and in 
other international measures to improve pandemic control coordinated by the UN.
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APPENDIX 1
Regional and local preparedness plans or an infl uenza pandemic – 
HOSPITALS
In preparing for an infl uenza pandemic, local preparedness plans of Hospital Districts and 
hospitals must consider both the large patient numbers and prevention of infection. Suspect-
ed infl uenza patients should be kept isolated from other patients up to the time of discharge, 
in order to avoid additional infections. If possible, staff caring for infl uenza patients should 
not care for other patients. This affects placement of patients and staff working arrange-
ments. 
The checklist below is intended to assist in drafting of regional and local preparedness 
plans.
The pandemic plan should be appended to existing other preparedness plans drawn up 
for other emergency situations and to the plans on increasing preparedness included in them, 
and should be consulted when drafting the pandemic plan.
Regional and inter-organisational cooperation is benefi cial in drafting the plans.
Collaboration between healthcare and social services is necessary. 
The plans will need to be reviewed and updated in a pandemic situation and as the pan-
demic progresses.  
The following issues must be covered by local preparedness plans:
Coordination of operations 
There must be a named pandemic manager who is in charge of coordinating 
infection prevention and control during a pandemic
The hospital Board and the body responsible for customary preparedness for 
major disasters must acknowledge the importance of infection prevention 
and control in a pandemic situation
A steering group is set up for a pandemic situation, if one is not already in 
place. Normal management systems should be followed as far as possible. 
The steering group should have appropriate representation from the follow-
ing sectors:
Hospital District/hospital board
infection prevention team (infection doctor, hygiene nurse, clinical 
microbiology specialist)
occupational safety and health, occupational health representative
medical superintendents and chief nurses of all specialities
x-ray, laboratory, pathology departments
transport services, primary care outside hospital
property management, equipment maintenance, waste management, 
laundry, catering services
central stores
pharmacy
echnology unit 
telephone exchanges, typing, IT
recruitment
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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communications specialist/person responsible for PR
head of fi nance
possible other spheres of responsibility
State Provincial Offi ce
Infection prevention 
plan to train all personnel involved with patients in infection prevention 
training of departmental hygiene contact persons to implement training of 
other staff
Reorganisation of operations and facilities
preparedness for a prolonged emergency situation, with greatest pressure 
likely to last 6-8 weeks
plan of suspension of non-urgent operation and reorganisation of activities
e.g. elective surgery, day surgery, rehabilitation
plan of suspected infl uenza patient reception and assessment facilities, posi-
tioned separately from premises used by other patients
plan of placing large numbers of patients in facilities that must be separate 
from areas used by other patients (cohorting)
preferably separate building/wing/section
preferably own reception area
preferably own entrance
no shared ventilation with other areas; minimum requirement: doors 
locked between cohort and non-cohort areas
no excess furnishings, all surfaces must be easy-clean
minimum distance between patient beds one metre
no shared social areas
reservation of isolation rooms for patients requiring aerosol-forming 
procedures, if possible
plan of placing patients requiring intensive care and respirator care
e.g. operating theatres and recovery wards freed from elective activ-
ity 
plan of cohorting patients who have another infection (e.g. MRSA) requir-
ing isolation, in addition to infl uenza
plan of transporting infl uenza patients to cohort facilities
plan of clear signposts to cohort facilities 
plan of where suspected infl uenza patients are x-rayed
plan of reserve hospital premises 
plan of bed surveillance during the pandemic
Admission of patients into hospital – plans in cooperation with primary health-
care
plan of where, on what criteria and who triages the patients and promptly 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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decides the correct place of treatment: home, outpatient care, home hospital, 
primary healthcare hospital, special hospital
preparedness for criteria of hospitalisation probably being tighter than in 
normal situations
plan of organised monitoring of patients nursed at home 
Discharging of patients from hospital – plans in cooperation with primary 
healthcare
preparedness for avoidance of moving patients within the hospital or from 
one hospital to another
plan for placing patients who require long-term continued care for condi-
tions other than infl uenza
plan of discharging patients from hospital 
plan of transport for patients discharged from hospital
Organisation of staff shifts in such a way that
spread of infection is avoided: cohorting of staff
suffi cient capable staff is guaranteed in each unit
everyone is allowed suffi cient rest periods
Recruitment – plans on 
recruitment of additional manpower
taking into account that staff may be forced to undertake duties of which 
they have no prior experience
taking into account that each unit should have staff who are able to instruct 
others in precautionary measures 
surveillance and coordination of staff movements so as to prevent the spread 
of infection: cohorting of staff
Occupational safety and health – plans on 
where and how employees with respiratory symptoms are assessed
administration of antiviral drugs in accordance with instructions 
organisation of staff vaccinations
absence surveillance, including temporary employees
psychological and social support of staff
Central stores – reserves of materials and equipment 
plan to ensure that there are suffi cient supplies during the pandemic of e.g.
staff uniforms and protective clothing, gloves, mouth, nose and eye 
protectors and respirator masks 
disinfectants used for disinfection of hands 
disinfectants used for disinfection of skin
disinfectants used for instruments
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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disinfectants used in cleaning
needles, syringes, infusion equipment and fl uids
an inventory of current stocks is carried out 
an assessment is made of whether ordering more materials and equipment is 
feasible and whether there is room to store it
an assessment made of the extent stocks need to be supplemented and the 
schedule 
Drug supplies
plan to ensure suffi cient supplies during the pandemic of e.g.
antibacterial drugs for treatment of complications, especially pneu-
monia
basic drugs
an inventory of current stocks is carried out 
an assessment made of whether ordering more drugs is feasible and whether 
there is room to store it
an assessment made of the extent stocks need to be supplemented and the 
schedule
Mortuary facilities
exceptionally high mortality should be taken into consideration by ensuring 
that adequate appropriate mortuary facilities are available
Training of staff in infection prevention
familiarisation of senior doctors and nurses in principles of infection pre-
vention 
familiarisation of support service unit management in principles of infection 
prevention 
practical exercises in use of FFP2 and FFP3 class respirator masks for staff 
who would be likely to need them 
practical exercises for all staff involved in patient care in infection preven-
tion: particularly hand hygiene, protection from droplets, use of personal 
protective equipment
Communications/media
Plan of using communications in training on infection prevention
plan of posters and guidebooks designed for staff, patients and fami-
lies
plan of using an intranet in training and dissemination of informa-
tion during a pandemic, in order to avoid personal contacts 
Plan of other communications within the hospital and communications 
directed outside
Training in use of Finland’s Public Authority Network (VIRVE)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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APPENDIX 2
Local preparedness plans for an infl uenza pandemic – PRIMARY 
HEALTHCARE
In preparing for an infl uenza pandemic, local primary healthcare preparedness plans must 
consider both the large patient numbers and prevention of infection. Suspected infl uenza pa-
tients should be kept isolated from other patients, in order to avoid additional infections. If 
possible, staff caring for infl uenza patients should not care for other patients. This affects 
placement of patients and staff working arrangements. 
The checklist below is intended to assist in drafting of local preparedness plans.
Health centres must draw up their plans to correspond with the regional pandemic pre-
paredness plan coordinated by the Hospital District and State Provincial Offi ce.
The pandemic plan should be appended to existing other preparedness plans drawn up 
for emergency situations and to the plans on increasing preparedness included in them, and 
should be consulted when drafting the pandemic plan.
Regional and inter-organisational cooperation is benefi cial in drafting the plans.
Collaboration between healthcare and social services is necessary. 
The plans will need to be reviewed and updated in a pandemic situation and as the pan-
demic progresses.  
The following issues must be covered by local preparedness plans:
Coordination of operations
There must be a named pandemic manager who is in charge of coordinating 
infection prevention and control during a pandemic
The unit management must acknowledge the importance of infection pre-
vention and control in a pandemic situation
A steering group is set up for a pandemic situation, if one is not already in 
place. Normal management systems should be followed as far as possible. 
The steering group should have appropriate representation from the follow-
ing sectors:
unit management
medical practitioner and nurse responsible for infectious diseases 
occupational safety and health, occupational health representative
all medical superintendents and chief nurses 
x-ray, laboratory
transport services, paramedics
property management, equipment maintenance, waste management, 
laundry, catering services
central stores
pharmacy
technical unit 
telephone exchanges, typing, IT
recruitment
communications specialist/person responsible for PR
head of fi nance
•
•
•
•
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possible other spheres of responsibility
social services
local authority/joint municipal board management 
Prevention of infection  
plan to train all personnel involved with patients in infection prevention 
training of hygiene contact persons to implement training of other staff
Reorganisation of operations and facilities
preparedness for a prolonged emergency situation, with greatest pressure likely 
to last 6-8 weeks
plan of suspension of non-urgent operation and reorganisation of activities
plan of suspected infl uenza patient reception and assessment facilities, positioned 
separately from premises used by other patients
plan of setting up infl uenza clinics
number and location of infl uenza clinics must be pre-planned
clinics must be easily accessible
plan must be functional in local circumstances
at infl uenza clinics: 1. triage of patients to be directed to doctor’s surgery 
or hospital emergency room, and 2. decision as appropriate on prescrip-
tion of an antiviral drug, and issue to the patient. 
the infl uenza clinic should be on-call in nature, preferably 24 hours a day, 
where the assessment is made quickly and the patient’s waiting time is as 
short as possible.
before starting the operation, suffi cient quantities of protective equipment 
must be available for staff and they must be trained in their use 
the public must be informed of local arrangements; dissemination may 
be through the media, post, local telephone helpline and online services 
(Internet)
home nursing
need for home visits will increase, as some of the patients are unable to 
seek treatment due to poor state of health
monitoring of home-nursed, reasonably well patients must be organised, 
preferably by telephone
home hospital
need for home hospital services will increase
social services
caring for basic needs of patients nursed at home will considerably in-
crease burdening on social services
ambulance services
need for ambulance services will increase
primary healthcare hospitals: 
plan of placing large numbers of patients in facilities that must be sepa-
rate from areas used by other patients (cohorting)
•
•
•
•
•
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preferably separate building/wing/section
preferably own reception area
preferably own entrance
no shared ventilation with other areas; minimum requirement: doors 
locked between cohort and non-cohort areas
no excess furnishings, all surfaces must be easy-clean
minimum distance between patient beds one metre
no shared social areas
reservation of isolation rooms for patients requiring aerosol-forming 
procedures, if possible
plan of cohorting patients who have another infection (e.g. MRSA) 
requiring isolation, in addition to infl uenza
plan of transporting infl uenza patients to cohort facilities
plan of clear signposts to cohort facilities 
plan of where suspected infl uenza patients are x-rayed
plan of reserve hospital premises 
plan of bed surveillance during the pandemic
Referring patients to hospital – plans in cooperation with outpatient care and 
hospitals
plan of where, on what criteria and by whom patients are triaged and the 
correct place of treatment promptly decided: home, outpatient care, home 
hospital, primary healthcare hospital, special hospital
preparedness for criteria of hospitalisation probably being tighter than in 
normal situations
plan of organised monitoring of patients nursed at home 
Discharging patients from hospital – plans in cooperation with outpatient care 
and hospitals
preparedness for avoidance of moving patients within the hospital or from 
one hospital to another
plan for placing patients who require long-term continued care for condi-
tions other than infl uenza
setting up of convalescent wards: residential homes for the elderly, 
premises other than for hospital use
plan of discharging patients from hospital 
plan of transport for patients discharged from hospital
Organisation of staff shifts in such a way that
spread of infection is avoided: cohorting of staff
suffi cient capable staff is guaranteed in each unit
everyone is allowed suffi cient rest periods
•
•
•
•
•
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Recruitment – plans on
recruitment of additional manpower
taking into account that staff may be forced to undertake duties of which 
they have no prior experience
taking into account that each unit should have staff who are able to instruct 
others in precautionary measures 
surveillance and coordination of staff movements so as to prevent the spread 
of infection: cohorting of staff
Occupational safety and health – plans on
where and how employees with respiratory symptoms are assessed
administration of antiviral drugs in accordance with instructions 
organisation of staff vaccinations
absence surveillance, including temporary employees
psychological and social support of staff
Central stores – reserves of materials and equipment 
plan to ensure that there are suffi cient supplies during the pandemic of e.g.
staff uniforms and protective clothing, gloves, mouth, nose and eye 
protectors and respirator masks 
disinfectants used for disinfection of hands
disinfectants used for disinfection of skin
disinfectants used for instruments
disinfectants used in cleaning
needles, syringes, infusion equipment and fl uids
an inventory of current stocks is carried out 
an assessment is made of whether ordering more materials and equipment is 
feasible and whether there is room to store it
an assessment is made of the extent stocks need to be supplemented and the 
schedule 
Drug supplies
plan to ensure that there are suffi cient supplies during the pandemic of e.g.
antibacterial drugs for treatment of complications, especially pneu-
monia
basic drugs
an inventory of current stocks is carried out 
an assessment is made of whether ordering more drugs is feasible and 
whether there is room to store them
an assessment is made of the extent stocks need to be supplemented and the 
schedule 
planning of antiviral drug distribution and securing necessary premises
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
149
Plan on organising vaccinations
Mortuary facilities
exceptionally high mortality should be taken into consideration by ensuring 
that adequate appropriate mortuary facilities are available
Training of staff in infection prevention
familiarisation of senior doctors and nurses in principles of infection pre-
vention 
familiarisation of support service unit management in principles of infection 
prevention 
practical exercises in use of FFP2 and FFP3 class respirator masks for staff 
who would be likely to need them 
practical exercises for all staff involved in patient care on infection preven-
tion: particularly hand hygiene, protection from droplets, use of personal 
protective equipment
Communications/media
Plan of using communications in training on infection prevention
plan of posters and guidebooks designed for staff, patients and fami-
lies
plan of using an intranet in training and dissemination of informa-
tion during a pandemic, in order to avoid personal contacts 
Plan of other communications within the unit and communications directed 
outside
Training in use of Finland’s Public Authority Network (VIRVE)
Instructing call centre staff
•
•
•
•
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APPENDIX 3
Recommended preventive measures not based on using vaccines or drugs
Key to symbols:
Y = yes, should be implemented at this stage
N = no, not necessary at this stage
C = should consider
NR = not relevant
National measures during WHO pandemic development phases (3-6)
Measures
Pandemic alert Pandemic 
Comments
Phase 3 Phases 4 and 5 Phase 6
Provision of information and education to citizens
Information on infection risks and avoiding them 
for general public (modifi ed according to target 
group) 
Y Y Y
Information for various professionals Y Y Y
Guidelines on general hygiene Y Y Y
Information preparing for next phase Y Y Y
Measures to reduce the risk of those affected spreading the infection
Restriction of movements:
Plan required for situation with 
large numbers of severe cases
Restrictions on movement of those infected (mild-
ly and severely) according to situation; medical 
treatment and social support must be secured
Y Y Y
Mouth-nose mask:
Persons with symptoms in areas with other peo-
ple present Y Y Y Must plan logistics
Exposed persons: risk assessment to include evi-
dence of human-to-human infection, proximity of 
exposure, repeated exposure
C C C Recommendations based on risk assessment
Respiratory tract infection patients seeking treat-
ment in reception area Y Y Y
Insuffi cient information particularly 
in case of healthy persons
Measures to reduce the risk of those exposed spreading the infection
Tracing and surveillance of the exposed Y Y N Not possible once pandemic un-der way
Voluntary quarantine of those exposed (at home) 
and monitoring of state of health; medical treat-
ment and social support must be secured
N Y N
Voluntary quarantine also covers 
exposed persons who are taking 
prophylactic medication (uncertain-
ty over its effi cacy)
Monitoring of own state of health and notifi cation 
of sickness, no restrictions on movements Y C N
Does not concern exposed persons 
under quarantine
Instruction of those exposed in order to reduce 
social interaction N NR N
Does not concern exposed persons 
under quarantine See also meas-
ures increasing social distance
151
Measures
Pandemic alert Pandemic 
Comments
Phase 3 Phases 4 and 5 Phase 6
Advice to those exposed to postpone travel to ar-
eas with no pandemic alert situation N NR Y
Does not concern exposed persons 
under quarantine. Principle of cau-
tion observed, when unclear wheth-
er human-to-human infections 
occurring.  See also measures tar-
geted at travel
Prophylactic antiviral medication for those ex-
posed Y Y N
Early aggressive measures to pre-
vent development of pandemic
Measures to reduce social interaction
Voluntary staying at home of person with symp-
toms of respiratory tract infection Y Y Y
Need measures to reduce infection 
risk to other members of household
Closure of schools and educational institutions in 
conjunction with other measures (e.g. restrictions 
of leisure activities), reducing interaction of chil-
dren and teenagers
N C C
Signifi cance of these communities 
regarding infections depends on 
epidemiological situation
Measures directed at whole population to reduce 
interaction of adults (sending home non-essential 
staff, distance working, closure of workplaces, re-
striction or banning of mass events)
N C C
Depends on signifi cance of expo-
sures at work or other community 
on infections
Mouth-nose masks in public spaces N N N No evidence of effectiveness; per-mitted but not recommended
Measures to reduce the delay between onset of symptoms and isolation
Information to help early recognition of own ill-
ness Y Y Y
Self-implemented temperature taking at least 
once a day for whole population of alert area N N N
Telephone helpline for patients with fever and 
home visit if necessary N C N
Separate fever clinics with appropriate protection 
from infection N C N
Temperature-taking in public spaces using remote 
thermometers N N N
Not effi cient; would require treat-
ment and preventive measures 
targeted at identifi ed persons with 
fever
Hygiene and disinfection measures
Hand washing Y Y Y
Cleaning of contaminated surfaces in households Y Y Y
Extensive disinfection of environment N N N
Disinfection of air N N N
Measures directed at persons entering and leaving a pandemic area within the country
Advice to avoid risk environments, e.g. infected 
poultry farms and poultry markets Y Y Y
Recommendations to postpone non-essential 
travel to infected areas N Y Y
If signifi cant areas within country 
free of infection
Restriction of travel between infected and non-in-
fected areas within the country N N N
Travel restrictions regarded as 
inappropriate in most countries. 
Probably implemented voluntarily, 
when public realises risk attached 
to travel
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Measures
Pandemic alert Pandemic 
Comments
Phase 3 Phases 4 and 5 Phase 6
Complete isolation of area N N N Regarded as inappropriate 
Disinfection of clothing, shoes and other items of 
persons leaving infected areas N N N
Not recommended to safeguard 
public health, but veterinary author-
ities may demand to prevent animal 
infections
International measures
Measures
Pandemic alert Pandemic
Comments
Phase 3 Phases 4 and 5 Phase 6
Measures at borders targeted at person entering or leaving the country
Provision of information to travellers:
Message must be appropriate to 
current phase. Although decision to 
travel is personal, must provide suf-
fi cient information to make decision. 
Traveller may incur consequences 
concerning health and fi nance.
Information bulletin on epidemic Y Y Y
Recommendation that those travelling to an area 
with avian infl uenza epidemic caused by highly 
pathogenic virus avoid poultry farms and animal 
markets
Y Y C
Recommendation to postpone non-essential in-
ternational travel to infected area N Y Y
Recommendation to postpone non-essential in-
ternational travel from infected areas See Screening measures
Measures at borders targeted at international travellers (person entering or leaving infected areas)
Information bulletins on health risk for travellers to 
or from infected areas N Y Y
WHO to negotiate with relevant or-
ganisations (e.g. IATA) to ensure 
distribution of leafl ets; WHO sup-
ports use of standard format infor-
mation leafl ets in different countries
Surveillance of travellers:
Daily self-taking of temperature for those coming 
from infected area N Y Y
Daily self-taking of temperature for those arriving 
in infected area N N Y
Contact healthcare, if defi ned symptoms appear 
after staying in infected area Y Y Y Person exposed to defi nite cases 
advised to monitor their health. 
Quarantining may be justifi ed. Per-
sons who have been on same pub-
lic transport with infected person 
must be traced and informed of the 
situation. 
Advice on procedures if traveller becomes sick 
after trip to infected area (seeking medical treat-
ment, disclosing destination of trip, laboratory 
testing for infl uenza); if pandemic virus identifi ed, 
patient must be isolated and health authorities 
notifi ed, including WHO.
Y Y Y
Screening on arrival of travellers arriving from in-
fected area
Since no health benefi t proven, 
practice permitted (political reasons 
or to build up trust of public), but 
not encouraged. Instead, travellers 
should be provided with appropriate 
information on epidemic.
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Measures
Pandemic alert Pandemic
Comments
Phase 3 Phases 4 and 5 Phase 6
Screening of symptoms (visual observation) N N N
Screening on arrival may be con-
sidered if the country deems 
screening on departure (see below) 
to have been inadequate at depar-
ture point of public transport
Screening for risk group by passenger health 
declaration or questionnaire N N N
Screening through temperature-taking N N N
Medical examination N N N
Screening on arrival using above methods in geo-
graphically isolated areas (islands) N Y N
Implementable, may prevent entry 
in the country with pandemic vi-
rus. May also be considered when 
country’s internal surveillance sys-
tem has limited capacity
Screening on departure of all travellers from ar-
eas with confi rmed human infections
More implementable than screen-
ing on arrival for early detection of 
cases
Screening of symptoms (visual observation) N N N Not feasible due to large passenger numbers
Screening for risk group by passenger health 
declaration or questionnaire N Y Y
Remote temperature-taking or taking temperature 
from the ear N Y Y
Remote temperature-taking is less 
sensitive and less accurate meth-
od, but more implementable than 
taking temperature from the ear
Travel ban register of isolated or quarantined per-
sons N N N
May be implementable in some 
countries, but not recommended
Recommendation for sick persons to postpone 
travel Y Y Y
Medical examination of travellers belonging to 
risk groups or with high temperature N N N Cannot implement on borders
Measures in countries with infected nearby areas in neighbouring country, and no adequate means of controlling border 
crossings
Promotion of surveillance and preventive mea-
sures, e.g. increasing social distance, quarantine 
and protective isolation, by providing information 
on them to healthcare and public 
N Y Y
WHO provides appropriate recom-
mendations on its website, for use 
in information. Useful to curb ru-
mours.
Measures on international public transport targeted at travellers leaving infected area
Recommendation to tell staff about infl uenza-like 
symptoms. N Y Y
Placement of sick passengers in separate section 
(if possible) N Y Y
On fl ights departing from pandemic 
areas all passengers are provided 
with mouth-nose mask  
Notifi cation of sickness of passenger  to health 
authorities of his country of departure and arrival 
and country where change of means of transport 
took place (airline is obliged to notify only country 
of arrival)
Y Y Y
Established requirement for country 
of arrival, but not uniformly imple-
mented in practice
Notifi cation of epidemiological information neces-
sary for tracing those exposed to health authori-
ties or relevant countries
N Y Y
Countries are in direct contact in or-
der to effect appropriate transfer of 
information
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APPENDIX 4
Reducing the risk of human infection during an avian infl uenza epidemic 
affecting poultry
Summary
For those working with birds, the risk of avian infl uenza infection is small, but it appears to 
vary between different avian infl uenza virus types with high pathogenicity. Infection takes 
place through direct contact from infected birds, their secretions, and products derived from 
them.
Protective measures are based on the following principles:
Infection prevention in birds/poultry
Minimisation of number of potentially exposed persons
Technological measures
Provision of information and education
Appropriate use of personal protective equipment
Appropriate use of antiviral drugs
Seasonal infl uenza vaccination, particularly during infl uenza season
Close surveillance of exposed persons/employees
Every preventive measure must be evaluated in accordance with local situation and risk 
assessment.
Risks for people working with birds
For those working with birds, the risk of infection is small, and appears to vary between dif-
ferent avian infl uenza virus types with high pathogenicity. The risk of infection by the avi-
an infl uenza virus considered the most dangerous, A/H5N1, would seem to be very low. In 
South-East Asia, the avian infl uenza epidemic (A/H5N1) has been considerably widespread 
in recent years, but relative to extent, surprisingly few human infections have occurred. Pro-
tection of employees involved in destruction of poultry has often been inadequate, but in 
spite of this they have not been found to become infected. Although symptom-free infec-
tions in humans are possible, it is unlikely that severe forms of the disease would have re-
mained undetected.
Finnish and EU occupational safety and health legislation
Section 40 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (738/2002) covers biological risk fac-
tors at work. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Government decision on 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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protection of employees from danger caused by biological factors at work (1155/1993) and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health decision on classifi cation of biological factors 
(229/1998) have been given. They have taken into account the equivalent European Union 
directives that have since been collated into a combined European Parliament and Council 
Directive (2000/54/EU) on the Protection of Workers from Risks Related to Exposure to Bi-
ological Agents at Work.
The above regulations defi ne the employer’s obligations, such as assessment and identi-
fi cation of risks, measures to minimise risks, personal protection, special measures for lab-
oratories, animal housing and industrial processes, information and training of employees, 
notifi cations to competent authorities, records on exposed employees, and issues of employ-
er-employee cooperation in addressing the issues covered by these regulations. The Occupa-
tional Health Care Act and the subsequent Government Decree on medical examinations in 
work that presents a special risk of illness (1383/2001;1485/2001) contain the regulations on 
health checks to be carried out by occupational healthcare due to biological factors.
The preventive measures must be based on workplace risk assessment, for which the 
employer is responsible, as he is also for measures to minimise the risks. General protective 
measures take precedence over individual measures.
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Government resolutions on personal 
protection (1406/1993) and on choice and use of personal protection (1407/1993), that have 
implemented the corresponding European Union Directives, must be taken into account 
when using protective devices.
Examples of activities whereby direct contact with infected birds or contaminated mate-
rial may occur
Activity on a poultry farm with infected fowl
Veterinary examinations and autopsy
Destruction of poultry
Storage and handling of droppings
Cleaning and disinfecting of contaminated premises
Taking samples
Working in a diagnostic laboratory
Other activities whereby humans are exposed to infection confi rmed in birds or 
animals, e.g. quarantine staff
On the basis of local risk assessment, it may be expedient to include under potential ex-
posures also persons who live near an infected poultry farm.
Transmission mechanisms
Birds infected by the avian infl uenza virus excrete large quantities of the virus in their drop-
pings. They may also secrete it through coughing and sneezing, although there is some ev-
idence that the respiratory tract is less signifi cant as infection route in avian infl uenza A/
H5N1. Viruses are not generally stable outside a living cell, but may survive in dust and fae-
ces for several days, even weeks, depending on virus strain and environmental conditions. 
In humans, avian infl uenza causes primarily conjunctivitis and respiratory tract infections, 
although they may also lead to more serious forms of the disease. The conjunctiva of the eye 
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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and membranes of the upper respiratory tract are the most likely infection routes of these 
viruses. People are infected by avian infl uenza from direct contact with live infected birds, 
their faeces or other fl uids or secretions of their organs. Touching a contaminated cage, shed 
or surfaces of other premises where birds have been kept, or touching infected dead birds, 
may also cause infection and illness in humans, for example if the eyes or nose are rubbed 
or if feathers lodge under the protective goggles.
When diseased birds are handled in order to destroy them, fl apping wings and other 
movements of the birds, as well as human activity, may cause dust which adds to the risk of 
infection.
Handling of raw infected poultry meat and blood may cause a risk, if they come into direct contact 
with the eyes or nose. Cooking poultry meat inactivates/kills the virus and guarantees its safety.
Principles of protection
The directions are based on the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
guidelines to minimise the risk of humans acquiring highly pathogenic avian infl uenza from 
exposure to infected birds or animals.
(http://www.ecdc.eu.int/avian_influenza/H5N1_Occupational_Guidance_ECDC_
051019.pdf
Protective measures of employees against work-based infection are based on the follow-
ing principles:
1. Fast and safe infection prevention in birds/poultry
The principle is simple: the fewer infections in birds and the sooner the infections 
are under control, the lower the number of people exposed and infected.
People can mechanically spread the infection from one fl ock of birds to another via 
contaminated hands, shoes and clothing. Therefore, observing appropriate precau-
tions is key in prevention and control of infections. Avian infl uenza epidemics in 
poultry are subject to strict control measures under EU legislation (Council Direc-
tive 92/40/EEC on Community measures to control avian infl uenza).
2. Minimising the number of exposures by keeping people away from infected animals
Destruction of birds must be carried out by only the necessary number of people.
Farm employees and owners who are not directly involved in the destruction should 
avoid exposure to known and potential sources of avian infl uenza, e.g. by avoiding 
touching fowl, ducks and other poultry whenever possible.
Other people living on the farm (e.g. family members) should also avoid exposure 
to known and potential sources of avian infl uenza virus.
It may be useful to restrict people’s local movements to and from the relevant area. 
Cleaning and handling of laundry and waste should at all stages be carried out 
safely, until the risk of infection has been eliminated.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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3. Technological measures
When handling birds and contaminated materials (e.g. sections of organs, tissues, blood, 
feathers and secretions, as well as birds’ nests) care should be taken not to produce dust or 
aerosols. Possible measures are:
destroy the birds either by fi lling the chicken shed with carbon dioxide (N.B. must 
ensure suffi cient ventilation after gassing, before entering) or, according to EFSA 
recommendation, by placing the animals in suitable containers in an inert gas mix-
ture, such as argon (not more than 2% oxygen). See Council Directive 93/119/EC 
dampen the dead birds with fi ne misting of water vapour 
dampen surfaces before cleaning
use mechanical means of collecting and handling carcasses
transport dead birds and contaminated material in tightly closed containers
4. Provision of information and education
All persons who are potentially in contact with infected birds and materials must be provid-
ed with information and education on human infection by avian infl uenza and its symptoms, 
and on preventive and protective measures.
All employees must have at their disposal appropriate personal protective devices, and 
they must be given directions and training on their use. 
5. Use of personal protective equipment
The employer must provide the following required personal protective equipment:
Waterproof disposable gloves or strong rubber work gloves that withstand disinfec-
tion 
The gloves must be removed immediately after use and disposed of safely, 
before touching non-contaminated objects and surrounding surfaces
A respirator mask with at least class P2 biosafety level, the close fi tting of which on 
the face has been personally tested.
A fan/fi lter mask with a hood or visor (class TH2P or higher) may be easier 
while working, and may be used instead of respirator mask and goggles. It 
should be noted that if any potentially dangerous gaseous substances are 
used, other respirator masks may be necessary, depending on the situation 
and/or substance. This is a minimum requirement, but in the absence of such 
equipment, any mask that covers the nose and mouth is likely to offer some 
benefi t.
Protective clothing includes: head cover that fully covers the hair; preferably dis-
posable clothing or overalls and waterproof apron, or long-sleeved surgical protec-
tive coat with tight cuffs and a waterproof apron.
Closely-fi tting mask-type eye protectors or goggles, with side shields to prevent 
virus from entering conjunctiva
Disposable shoe covers or rubber or polyurethane boots that can be cleaned and 
disinfected
•
•
•
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There must be a facility for safe cleaning and disposal of protective equipment after 
use. Disposable personal protective equipment must be correctly disposed of, and re-usable 
equipment must be cleaned and disinfected in accordance with customary disinfection pro-
cedures.
Employees must be trained in the correct techniques in putting on, taking off and dispos-
al of personal protective equipment, so they do not contaminate themselves.
Order of removing protective equipment and hand hygiene:
remove gloves
remove protective coat
wash/disinfect hands
remove eye protector
remove mask/respirator
wash/disinfect hands
6. Correct but limited use of antiviral drugs
Use of antiviral drugs must be restricted and it must take place under supervision of a doc-
tor:
to minimise risk of adverse effects
to prevent development of drug resistance
to preserve stocks
Countries with no confi rmed epidemic caused by highly pathogenic avian infl uenza virus
No prophylaxis required for poultry workers.
Countries with one or more confi rmed epidemics caused by highly pathogenic avian infl uenza virus
All employees who are exposed to infected birds or poultry (including birds directly linked 
to an epidemic caused by highly pathogenic avian infl uenza virus and birds in adjacent areas 
that are destroyed as part of local control measures) must be offered prophylaxis. Persons 
who are retrospectively identifi ed as having been exposed must also obtain prophylaxis.
The local veterinary surgeon and health authority must cooperate in risk assessment, 
which is based on the local situation, avian infl uenza virus type and expert assistance, when 
deciding which persons should be classifi ed as being at risk of exposure.
Pre-exposure prophylaxis. With the exception of situations where the drug is con-
traindicative, employees must be given 75 mg of oseltamivir daily, during the time 
they are in contact with infected poultry and contaminated surfaces. This must 
continue for seven days after the end of the exposure.
Oseltamivir is not currently recommended for continuous use of more than six 
weeks. The risk of side-effects from long-term use is unknown. Canadian health 
authorities recommend that persons who have used continuous oseltamivir prophy-
laxis for more than six weeks should have a two-week break before re-starting 
it. During this time, they should not work in an environment where they may be 
exposed to a highly pathogenic avian infl uenza virus.
•
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Post-exposure short-term prophylaxis: administered after exposure to infected 
birds, started within 48 hours and continued for at least seven days. With adults 
and children over 12 months, the dosage is the same as in treatment (according to 
weight), but administered only once a day rather than twice.
If oseltamivir has not been administered as prophylaxis and employees present with 
symptoms indicative of infl uenza, oseltamivir treatment must be started within 48 
hours, adult dosage 75 mg twice daily for fi ve days.
In order to avoid mistaken ideas of full protection, employees taking prophylaxis must 
be made aware of the need for general protective measures.
7. Seasonal infl uenza vaccination
Targeted seasonal infl uenza vaccination is recommended as one of many measures to reduce 
simultaneous human infections by avian and human infl uenza viruses. At the same time as 
reducing potential double infections, opportunities for genetic modifi cation/reorganisation 
of the virus and appearance of a new infl uenza virus with pandemic potential are reduced.  
It should be noted that this vaccination does not afford protection from avian infl uenza 
infection. This must be made clear to exposed persons, so that they understand the necessity 
of general protective measures.
In addition to the usual target groups, the following should be noted in seasonal infl uen-
za inoculations:
All persons expected to come into contact with poultry or a poultry farm with a 
possible infection/epidemic caused by a highly pathogenic avian infl uenza virus, 
especially those involved in destruction of birds and those living and working on 
the farms in question.
Healthcare personnel who in their daily work are in contact with strongly suspected 
or confi rmed human cases of avian infl uenza.
Healthcare personnel in frontline medical services in areas with confi rmed infec-
tions in birds caused by a highly pathogenic avian infl uenza virus. 
Close contacts of human cases of avian infl uenza
8. Close surveillance of potentially exposed persons
All persons who have been exposed to poultry, birds or their secretions, must remain under 
surveillance of themselves, their employer and health authorities. The responsibility for this 
rests with the employer and through him with the health authority. Occupational healthcare 
services must be informed, so that they can monitor the employees’ health and work capac-
ity, as required by the Occupational Health Care Act. This should be particularly noted in 
case of relief or temporary employees. Persons who have been involved in destruction of 
poultry should take their temperature twice daily for two weeks after the last contact with 
poultry or its surroundings. Any illness (temperature ≥38ºC, cough, sore throat, tightness of 
chest, but also nausea and diarrhoea) affecting either themselves or their family members 
must be immediately reported to the health authority. Persons with symptoms must seek out 
medical examinations and treatment, not self-medicate, limit their social interaction, and 
stay at home until they have been free of fever for at least 24 hours, except if a diagnosis of 
infl uenza has been eliminated. 
Employers and subcontractors must keep a register of those exposed. An undertaking 
to this and the above-mentioned protective measures must be recorded in service contracts. 
Once the epidemic has ended, a report must be submitted to the health authorities.
•
•
•
•
•
•
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APPENDIX 5  
Normal areas of responsibility of various organisations and administrative 
levels and decision-making during the various phases of pandemic alert 
and pandemic
WHO phases 1 and 2 (interpandemic period)
Defi nition of phase
Phase 1: New infl uenza A virus subtypes have not been found in humans. Animals may carry a 
subtype of the virus which has in the past caused infections in humans, but the risk of infection 
and illness in humans is small.
Phase 2: New infl uenza A virus subtypes have not been found in humans, but the virus subtype 
carried by animals poses a signifi cant risk of infection and illness in humans.
Principal assumptions as basis of planning
The number of cases will not exceed operational capacity of the system
The fi rst cases of a potential pandemic virus occur outside Finland, and develop-
ment leading to a pandemic follows the phases described by WHO
Key perspectives
Must maintain and reinforce functions aimed at
detection of new infl uenza virus variants and subtypes
Detection of annual seasonal infl uenza
Disease loading caused by infl uenza morbidity and mortality
Supporting annual infl uenza vaccination scheme 
Decision-making and dissemination of information according to normal procedure 
of administrative sectors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Action
The following permanent surveillance and preparedness actions continue
On national level Responsible body
National Register of Infectious Diseases NPHI
Virological surveillance of infl uenza in reference laboratory (molecular-epidemiological analysis, an-
tiviral drug resistance defi nitions) NPHI
Clinical surveillance of infl uenza NPHI
Excess mortality linked to seasonal infl uenza NPHI, STAKES
Direction of clinical microbiology laboratories NPHI
Mapping of antibody protection of population through sampling NPHI
Exchange of information with WHO Infl uenza Network NPHI
Exchange of information with EU Infl uenza Surveillance Scheme EISS NPHI
Exchange of information with the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) NPHI
Assessment of pandemic alert and dissemination of information based on international information MSAH, NPHI
Maintenance and annual updating of infl uenza pandemic preparedness plan NPHI
Pandemic preparedness exercises as collaboration between various organisations MSAH
Surveillance and control of infl uenza in animals MAF, Evira
Other functions (maintenance and development of individual preparedness plans of each adminis-
trative sector) Each administrative sector
On regional level
Clinical microbiology laboratories report incidences of infl uenza to National Register of Infectious 
Diseases Laboratories, HD
Units of clinical-virological surveillance network send virus samples to national reference laboratory Laboratories
Review (evaluation) and updating of regional infl uenza pandemic preparedness plan annually (in-
cluding private healthcare plans) SPO, HD
Regional surveillance and control of infl uenza in animals SPO, Evira
Municipal level
Annual public vaccination campaign HC
Detection of local epidemics in schools and daycare centres HC
Clinical-virological sentinel surveillance centres HC
Reviewing and updating of preparedness plan HC
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WHO phase 3 (pandemic alert period) 
Defi nition of phase
New infl uenza A virus subtype infections from animals to humans occur, but the virus is 
not transmitted human-to-human, or at most is transmitted occasionally through close con-
tact. 
WHO declares transition to phase 3
Principal assumptions as basis of planning
First cases occur outside Finland
Key perspectives
Decision-making and dissemination of information according to normal procedure 
of administrative sectors
Need for communications within healthcare, between administrative sectors and to 
the public increases
Must ensure that Finland has resources to promptly detect human or animal infec-
tions caused by a new infl uenza subtype and to cut off infection chains
Action
The following permanent surveillance and preparedness actions continue
On national level Responsible body
Enhanced situational communication to administrative sectors MMPS, GMHP, MSAH
NPHI infl uenza pandemic working group steps up its situational assessment procedure NPHI
Inter-sector cooperation MSAH
Assessment of international information and dissemination of information based on it MSAH, NPHI, MAF
Procurement and adoption of reagents required in diagnostics of new subtype NPHI, Evira
Securing and coordination of clinical and laboratory diagnostics in healthcare NPHI
Potential vaccine supplies and reservations MSAH, NPHI, NAM
Essential reserve supplies (vaccines, drugs, materials) MSAH, NPHI, NAM, NESA 
Updating of national pandemic plan according to new information MSAH, NPHI, MAF
Ensuring regulations relevant to pandemic situation are up-to-date MSAH
Functions of other administrative sectors: preparedness in own sector for e.g. morbidity peaks, 
sickness absences, avoidance of public gatherings and other situations carrying risk of infection, 
needs for resources, supporting social and health services and cooperation in communications. 
All Ministries
Regional level (see also Appendix 1 Regional and local preparedness plans for an infl uenza 
pandemic – hospitals)
Set up regional pandemic preparedness group with regular meetings SPO, HD
Review (evaluation) and annual updating of regional infl uenza pandemic preparedness plan SPO, HD
Ensure that clinical and laboratory arrangements in healthcare are in order, for early detection of 
possible infections caused by new subtype  HD
Primary healthcare (see Appendix 2 Local  preparedness plans for an infl uenza pandemic 
– primary healthcare) Local authorities
•
•
•
•
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WHO phase 4 (pandemic alert period)
Defi nition of phase
A new infl uenza A virus subtype has caused small disease clusters, indicating that human-to-
human transmission is limited. Infection chains are very localised, indicating that the virus 
is not yet well adapted to humans.
WHO declares transition to phase 4
Principal assumptions as basis of planning
Clusters occur outside Finland
Key perspectives
Must ensure that Finland has resources in clinical services and laboratory diagnos-
tics to promptly detect infections caused by a new infl uenza subtype and to cut off 
infection chains
Need for communications within healthcare, between administrative sectors and to 
the public increases
Action
Depending on the nature and geographical location of the clusters, phase 4 procedures 
are implemented according to detailed description of phases 3 or 5, as follows: 
Events denoting phase 4 are in countries from which there is no extensive direct 
passenger traffi c to Finland:  Procedure as in phase 3.
Events denoting phase 4 are in countries from which there is extensive direct pas-
senger traffi c to Finland: Procedure as in phase 5.
WHO phase 5 (pandemic alert period)
Defi nition of phase
A new infl uenza A virus subtype has caused geographically limited large disease clusters. 
This means increasing adaptation of the virus to humans. Human-to-human transmissibility 
of the virus does not yet appear fully effective. Pandemic threat is considerable.
WHO declares transition to phase 5
Principal assumptions as basis of planning
First cases occur outside Finland
Key perspectives
Decision-making and communications follow emergency procedure: MSAH ap-
points pandemic coordination group and centralises decision-making in important 
areas in terms of pandemic prevention and control and social impacts to the Gov-
ernment.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Must ensure that Finland has resources in clinical services and laboratory diagnos-
tics to promptly detect infections caused by a new infl uenza subtype and to cut off 
infection chains
Need for communications within healthcare, between administrative sectors and to 
the public increases
Action
On national level Responsible body
At instigation by MSAH, Government may assume decision-making and coordination particularly in 
following areas
Prioritisation of resources of administrative sectors for prevention and control of pandemic alert
Allocations of responsibility between administrative sectors
Organisation of responsibilities regarding communications
Statutory amendments required 
Recommendations regarding restrictions of movement of the public
Decisions related to international relations or coordination
EU: substantive procedures to achieve consensus
WHO: substantive procedures to achieve consensus
Neighbouring countries: special issues concerning cross-border traffi c
Restriction of international trade
Initiation of mass vaccinations using appropriate prototype vaccine
Prioritisation of population groups on medical or other grounds (antiviral drugs, vaccines), re-
viewing previously established principles on basis of new information
Emergency supplies and release of supplies in reserve stockpiles
Rationing of other materials
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
MSAH, GOV, MMPS
Centralised coordination adopted in communications related to above areas Government
Set up control centre for pandemic management MSAH
Appoint Pandemic Coordination Group (PCG) MSAH
Coordination of inter-sector technological preparedness cooperation MSAH, PCG
Reassessment and new guidelines for precautionary measures for healthcare personnel and labo-
ratory operations MSAH, NPHI, FIOH
Amassing and analysis of epidemiological, clinical and virological information on new virus subtype/
disease  (WHO, EISS/ECDC) NPHI, Evira
Management and effi cient dissemination of accumulating new information NPHI, Evira
Procurement, development and adoption on different levels of reagents required in diagnostics of 
new subtype NPHI, Evira
Procedures to implement sensitivity defi nitions of new virus strain NPHI
Securing and coordination of clinical and laboratory diagnostics in healthcare required for diagnosis 
of active cases NPHI
Information gathering and management procedures of real-time case surveillance NPHI, STAKES
Reassessment and new guidelines for grounds of therapeutic and prophylactic use of antiviral drugs MSAH, PCG, NPHI
Integration of antiviral drug manufacture, distribution and monitoring procedures to modifi ed criteria 
for use  MSAH, PCG, NAM
National telephone helpline of healthcare specialists, to direct communications NPHI
Procurement, orders and release for consumption of vaccines MSAH, NPHI, NAM
Assessment of immunity in population through antibody sampling NPHI
Essential reserve supplies (vaccines, drugs, materials) GOV, MSAH,  PCG, NPHI, NAM, FIOH, NESA
Updating of national pandemic plan according to new information MSAH, PCG, NPHI, MAF
Manpower and training arrangements for management of large case numbers MSAH, MOE, MOL
•
•
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On national level Responsible body
Ensuring regulations relevant to pandemic situation are up-to-date
e.g. temporary suspension of treatment guarantee regulations GOV, MSAH
Information campaign on preventive measures targeted at public GOV, MSAH, PCG
 Each administrative sector has a plan covering its functions in case of high incidence of sickness 
absence and emergency measures related to the sector 
Travel restrictions
Entry into country, border control
International traffi c (fl ights, shipping, rail)
Animals
Education system
Trade restrictions
Ministry of Labour (reserve staff, reception centres)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Each administrative sector
Regional level (see also Appendix 1 Regional and local preparedness plans for an infl uenza 
pandemic – hospitals)
Regional pandemic preparedness group steps up its operation SPO, HD
Direction of cases of sickness among population (Internet, telephone, media) HD
Detailed codes of practice on dealing with suspected cases fulfi lling criteria in treatment chain, in-
cluding private healthcare HD, SPO
Case surveillance based on case defi nition specifi c to epidemic situation HD
Regional measures of restricting public gatherings in cases of possible clusters SPO, HD
Primary healthcare (see Appendix 2 Local  preparedness plans for an infl uenza pandemic 
– primary healthcare)
Direction of cases of sickness among population (Internet, telephone, media) HC, municipalities
Local home quarantine surveillance and support measures HC, municipalities
WHO phase 6 (pandemic)
Defi nition of phase
The virus is fully adapted to humans and spreads among the population, causing widespread 
epidemics crossing geographic boundaries. A worldwide pandemic is imminent. 
Previous experience shows that the fi rst pandemic wave may be followed by a second 
and possibly even a third wave, caused by a new virus 3-9 months after the fi rst wave ended. 
The second wave may be as severe or more severe than the fi rst. 
Principal assumptions as basis of planning
Clusters or local epidemics indicating the start of the pandemic have occurred 
geographically far away; there is an interval of a few weeks before the pandemic 
arrives in Finland
Key perspectives
Emergency procedures are adopted in decision-making and communications, if this 
has not already taken place at phases 4-5 (may be omitted). If an epidemic situation 
is included in the Emergency Powers Act, invocation of emergency regulations is 
also possible.
•
•
166
Must ensure that Finland has resources in clinical services and laboratory diagnos-
tics to promptly detect fi rst infections caused by a new infl uenza subtype 
Main focus on obtaining pandemic vaccine and preparing for prompt vaccination of 
the population
Extensive information disseminated on measures to reduce infections
Endeavour to quickly detect possible changes in virus properties
Geographical surveillance of spread of cases
At the peak of the epidemic, burdening on healthcare will exceed its normal capac-
ity and emergency arrangements are necessary. Timing of the pandemic peak may 
vary signifi cantly across the regions.
Action
On national level Responsible body
At instigation by MSAH, Government may assume decision-making and coordination particularly in 
following areas
Prioritisation of resources of administrative sectors for prevention and control of pandemic 
Allocations of responsibility between administrative sectors
Organisation of responsibilities regarding communications
Statutory amendments required
Recommendations regarding restrictions on movement of the public
Decisions related to international relations or coordination
EU: substantive procedures to achieve consensus
WHO: substantive procedures to achieve consensus
Neighbouring countries: special issues concerning cross-border traffi c
Restriction of international trade
nitiation of mass vaccinations using appropriate prototype vaccine
Prioritisation of population groups on medical or other grounds (antiviral drugs, vaccines), re-
viewing previously established principles on basis of new information
Emergency supplies and release of supplies in reserve stockpiles
Rationing of other materials
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
MSAH, GOV, MMPS
Centralised coordination adopted in communications related to above areas Government
Appointment of Pandemic Coordination Group (PCG) MSAH
Coordination of inter-sector technological preparedness cooperation. PCG establishes daily proce-
dures for regular contact between key organisations MSAH, PCG
Reassessment and new guidelines for precautionary measures for healthcare personnel and labo-
ratory operations MSAH, NPHI, FIOH
Amassing and analysis of epidemiological, clinical and virological information on new virus subtype/
disease (WHO, EISS/ECDC) NPHI, Evira
Management and effi cient dissemination of accumulating new information NPHI, Evira
New defi nitions on use of clinical and laboratory diagnostics in healthcare, required for case surveil-
lance NPHI
Redefi nition of aims of clinical laboratory diagnostics and code of practice to prevent overloading of 
laboratories MSAH, NPHI
International reporting of cases (WHO, EU) NPHI
Daily national reporting of cases and situation MSAH, PCG, NPHI
Procurement, development and adoption on different levels of reagents required in diagnostics of 
new subtype, schedule as allowed by development NPHI, Evira
Sending of virus strains detected in Finland to WHO system NPHI
Procedures to implement sensitivity defi nitions of new virus strain NPHI
Information gathering and management procedures of real-time case surveillance NPHI, STAKES
Reassessment and new guidelines for grounds of therapeutic and prophylactic use of antiviral drugs GOV, MSAH, PCG, NPHI
•
•
•
•
•
•
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On national level Responsible body
Guidelines on use of other antimicrobial drugs according to accumulating clinical and epidemiologi-
cal knowledge
NPHI, infection spe-
cialists
Collection of clinical-microbiological data on infections causing complications in infl uenza patients NPHI, HD
Integration of procedures of manufacture, distribution and surveillance of antiviral drugs with modi-
fi ed criteria for use MSAH, PCG, NAM
National telephone helpline of healthcare specialists, to direct communications NPHI
Procurement of vaccines STM, KTL
Decisions on use of vaccines (prioritisation issues) GOV, MSAH, PCG, NPHI
Organising mass vaccinations of population MSAH, NPHI
Surveillance of coverage of vaccinations and side-effects NPHI
Assessment of immunity in population through antibody sampling NPHI
Manpower and training arrangements for management of large case numbers MSAH, MOE, MOL
Ensuring regulations relevant to pandemic situation are up-to-date
- e.g. temporary suspension of treatment guarantee regulations GOV, MSAH
Information campaign on preventive measures targeted at public GOV, MSAH, PCG
 Based on new epidemiological knowledge, each administrative sector reviews its  plan covering all 
its functions in case of high incidence of sickness absence and emergency measures related to the 
sector.
Travel restrictions
Entry into country, border control
International traffi c (fl ights, shipping, rail)
Animals
Education system
Trade restrictions
Ministry of Labour (reserve staff, reception centres)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Each administrative 
sector
Information material to take into account new knowledge of virus causing the pandemic and neces-
sary revisions made
Bodies responsible for 
communications and 
media
Guidelines on suspension of emergency measures as pandemic wave subsides MSAH, PCG, NPHI
On regional level
Direction of cases of sickness among population (Internet, telephone, media) HD
Emergency measures in specialist healthcare due to high patient load HD
Detailed codes of practice on dealing with cases fulfi lling criteria in treatment chains, including pri-
vate healthcare HD, SPO
Regional organisation of antiviral drugs distribution HD
Regional supervision of antiviral drugs use HD
Regional arrangements for storage and distribution of vaccines HD
Case surveillance based on case defi nition specifi c to epidemic situation HD
Reporting of case and situational surveillance to national level:  Hospital District to NPHI and State 
Provincial Offi ce to MSAH  SPO, HD
Regional measures of restricting public gatherings in cases of possible clusters SPO, HD
Primary healthcare
Direction of cases of sickness among population (Internet, telephone, media) HC
Emergency measures in primary healthcare due to high patient load HC
Home nursing procedures HC, municipalities
Real-time case reporting to Hospital District and State Provincial Offi ce HC
Organising mass vaccinations HC, municipalities
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Latter stage of pandemic and postpandemic period
WHO declares end of pandemic phase. In Finland, the pandemic has ended when the epide-
miological indicators of a pandemic have returned to base levels.
During the latter stage of the pandemic and postpandemic period, evaluation of the op-
eration and its results is important.
Vaccines may only be available at this phase.
On national level Responsible body
At proposal by MSAH, the Government makes the decision to return to normal practice from emer-
gency measures required by exceptional circumstances. MSAH, GOV, MMPS
Risk assessment of new epidemic waves and need for mass vaccinations, if it has not been possi-
ble to organise them previously MSAH, NPHI
Assessment of resources required to combat possible subsequent waves of infl uenza pandemic, 
and to evaluate the impacts of the pandemic and of implemented preventive and control measures GOV, MSAH,  MMPS
International cooperation in evaluation of impact of the pandemic and effectiveness of preventive 
and control measures
GOV, MMPS MSAH, 
NPHI, administrative 
sectors
Establish morbidity rate and protection against possible subsequent pandemic waves through anti-
body sampling of population NPHI
Execution of mass vaccinations on basis of assessment MSAH, NPHI
Surveillance of epidemiology and properties of the virus NPHI
Updating of pandemic plans Administrative sectors, NPHI
On regional level
Participation in assessment of impact of pandemic SPO, HD
Participation in possible implemented mass vaccinations SPO, HD
Updating of pandemic plan SPO, HD
Primary healthcare
Participation in assessment of impact of pandemic Municipality
Participation in possible implemented mass vaccinations Municipality
Updating of pandemic plan Municipality
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APPENDIX 6
Using respirator and surgical mouth-nose masks in healthcare
Surgical mouth-nose mask
A surgical mouth-nose mask is usually used by medical and nursing staff to protect the pa-
tient from pathogens possibly present in their exhalations. This mask, worn over the mouth 
and nose, does not protect the wearer from airborne infections. If protection from airborne 
infections is necessary and no appropriate respirator masks are available, staff caring for the 
patient must wear a surgical mouth-nose mask until respirator masks have been obtained. 
Surgical mouth-nose masks are used throughout the world to protect from blood and se-
cretion spray e.g. during procedures or in caring for isolated patients. If the treatment situa-
tions carry a risk of blood or secretion spray, a protective coat and gloves, as well as a visor 
or goggles are worn.
On mouth-nose masks carrying CE markings as medical devices, the mark signifi es that 
the mask complies with Council Directive 93/42/EEC concerning medical devices (in Fin-
land the Medical Devices Act 1505/1994). Thus, their intention is to protect the patient, but 
they do not afford the wearer any kind of protection against airborne infection.
In situations where a patient who is infectious through airborne or droplet routes must 
be transported, the patient may be given a mouth-nose mask. It should be noted that a pa-
tient must not be given a respirator mask equipped with an exhalation valve, since it only 
fi lters the air one way and thus only protects the wearer, but does not prevent the spread of 
microbes with exhaled air.
It is also important to teach the patient the correct coughing hygiene. It means placing a 
disposable tissue tightly over the mouth and nose when coughing, disposing of the tissue im-
mediately, and washing the hands after blowing the nose, sneezing and coughing.
Respirator masks
Respirator masks are used when caring for a patient with a contagious airborne infection 
(particle size under 5μm). Medical and nursing staff must use an appropriate respirator mask 
that complies with the standards when treating a patient with a contagious airborne infec-
tion. For this purpose, the respirator mask is personal and disposable (single procedure and 
patient room visit).
Disposable masks both with and without an exhalation valve are available on the mar-
ket.  Respirator masks are classifi ed according to the degree of protection they afford (table). 
Standard SFS EN 149: 2001 contains the protective capacity requirements and testing meth-
ods of these masks. The protective capacity of an FFP*2 class mask must be higher than 
92%. The protective capacity of an FFP3 class mask (equivalent to American N-95 mask) 
must be higher than 98%.
The masks must also carry the CE mark, showing that they comply with Council Direc-
tive 89/686/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to personal 
protective equipment (in Finland Government Resolution 1406/93). 
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Personal protective devices obtained to protect medical and nursing staff must comply 
with the above Government Resolution. (Government Resolution 1407/93).
*FF=fi ltering facepiece, P=particle
Putting on the respirator mask
The FFP2 and FFP3 respirator mask is put on according to manufacturer’s instructions (on 
packaging) in such a way that it fi ts closely against the face. The tightness of fi t must be 
tested after putting on the mask. The tightness of fi t is tested by breathing in deeply after 
putting on the mask, when the possible airfl ow between the face and the edge of the mask is 
discernible.
Table. Respirator masks
Class Protection capacity 
Standards denoting 
requirements and 
testing methods
Legislation Indication for use
Filtering half-mask
FFP1 78%* EN149:2001^
89/686/EEC
GovR 1406/93
Low hazard dusts 
(particle size over 
1μm)
Not recommended 
against microbes
Filtering  
half-mask
FFP2
92%* EN149:2001 89/686/EECGovR 1406/93
Against dusts haz-
ardous to health 
e.g. common tu-
berculosis (particle 
size over 0,3μm)
Filtering half-mask
FFP3 98%* EN149: 2001
89/686/EEC
GovR 1406/93
Against dangerous 
particles e.g. MDR 
tuberculosis
Half-mask and fi lter 
P3* 98%
EN 140:1998
EN 143:2000
89/686/EEC
GovR 1406/93
Against dangerous 
particles e.g. MDR 
tuberculosis
Filter mask with fan 
with a hood or visor 
TH3P* 
99% EN 12941:1998 89/686/EECGovR 1406/93
Against dangerous 
particles e.g. MDR 
tuberculosis
N-95 95%** NIOSH 42 CFR 84^^
sale prohibited in 
Finland without 
EN149:2001 
standard marking
Against dangerous 
particles e.g. MDR 
tuberculosis
*   tested using 0,6μm particles (NaCl) and 0,3μm paraffi n oil particles
** tested using 0,6 μm particles (NaCl)
^    European
^^  American
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APPENDIX 7
General hygiene instructions for prevention of respiratory tract infections
Respiratory tract infections, such as RS virus (respiratory syncytial virus), whooping cough 
and SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) are transmitted through:
Coughing and sneezing
Hands contaminated by respiratory tract secretions
Stop the spread of microbes:
Cover your mouth and nose with a disposable tissue when coughing or sneezing
If you have no tissue, cough or sneeze into the upper part of your sleeve, not into 
your hands 
Dispose of used tissue immediately
At medical examinations and treatment in a healthcare establishment, you may be 
asked to wear a paper mouth-nose mask to protect staff and other patients from 
infection in case you cough or sneeze
Cleanse your hands immediately after coughing or sneezing:
Wash hands with soap and water
or
Cleanse hands with disinfecting hand wipes
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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APPENDIX 8 
Classes of precautionary measures
Customary precautionary measures (including blood precautions) are always taken; the rest 
are selected according to the microbial transmission route. A microbe may spread via a 
number of transmission routes, in which case several concurrent classes of precautionary 
measures should be applied. In such a case, particular attention should be paid to the order 
of removing the protective equipment, in order to avoid creation of a situation where a per-
son with his own hands contaminates the membranes of the eyes, nose or mouth or spreads 
the microbe into the environment:  1) remove protective coat/overall and gloves 2) disinfect 
your hands 3) remove eye protector 4) remove respirator mask 5) disinfect your hands.
Customary 
precautionary 
measures
Contact isolation Droplet isolation Airborne isolation
Disinfection of 
hands with alco-
hol rinse
Before and after 
patient contact
As in customary precau-
tions and on entering and 
leaving room 
As in customary precau-
tions and on entering 
and leaving room
As in customary 
precautions and on 
entering and leaving room
Protective gloves
Handling secre-
tions, broken skin, 
mucous mem-
branes, contami-
nated areas of pa-
tient
Disinfection of 
hands before put-
ting on gloves and 
after taking them off
As in customary precau-
tions and in close contact 
patient care
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
Polythene apron 
or single-visit pro-
tective coat/over-
all1
When risk of blood 
or secretion spray
As in customary precau-
tions and in close contact 
patient care
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
Surgical mouth-
nose mask
When risk of blood 
or secretion spray
As in customary precau-
tions 
When working at less 
than 1 m distance from 
patient
Visor or goggles When risk of blood or secretion spray
As in customary precau-
tions 
When working at less 
than 1 m distance from 
patient
As in customary 
precautions
Respirator mask2
Respirator mask 
(biosafety class FFP3 or 
FFP2) always on entering 
room
Patient room
Normal patient ro-
om. 
Single room, if pa-
tient contaminates 
surroundings with 
secretions
Single room with own 
WC and washing facilities
Single room with own 
WC and washing facili-
ties
If not possible, patients 
must be kept suffi ciently 
far apart (over 1 m)
Single room with separate 
ventilation system from 
other premises, negative 
pressure that can be 
monitored, and air 
replaced 6-12 times per 
hour. Door to patient room 
must be kept closed
Patient transport No special measures
Transport only in essen-
tial situations. 
Care taken not to con-
taminate surroundings 
during transport
Transport only in 
essential situations. 
Patient is taught cough-
ing and hand hygiene3 
and if necessary, 
equipped with surgi-
cal mouth-nose mask to 
prevent spread of drop-
lets into surroundings 
Transport only in essential 
situations.
Patient is taught coughing 
and hand hygiene3 and if 
necessary, equipped with 
surgical mouth-nose mask 
to prevent spread of par-
ticles into surroundings
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Customary 
precautionary 
measures
Contact isolation Droplet isolation Airborne isolation
Examination and 
treatment 
equipment
Cleansing, 
disinfection or 
sterilisation 
depending on 
method of use
Single room use and dis-
posable recommended, 
stored ready in room 
Re-useable to be 
cleansed and/or mechan-
ically or chemically disin-
fected or destroyed
Single room use and 
disposable recommend-
ed, stored ready in room 
Re-useable to be 
cleansed and/or 
mechanically or chemi-
cally disinfected or 
destroyed
Single room use and dis-
posable recommended, 
stored ready in room4
Re-useable to be 
cleansed and/or mechani-
cally or chemically disin-
fected or destroyed4
Must note possible aero-
sol created when cleans-
ing bronchoscopes, when 
person preparing instru-
ments should use protec-
tion by respirator mask
Stains from 
secretions
Suitable disinfec-
tant, e.g. with 
chlorine 500 ppm
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
Cleaning Customary clean-ing equipment and 
cleaning agents
Dedicated cleaning 
equipment for each 
room, disposable clean-
ing cloths and customary 
cleaning agents (disinfec-
tants may be used in ac-
cordance with standard 
hospital practice)
Dedicated cleaning 
equipment for each ro-
om, disposable cleaning 
cloths and customary 
cleaning agents (disin-
fectants may be used in 
accordance with stan-
dard hospital practice)
Dedicated cleaning equi-
pment for each room, dis-
posable cleaning cloths 
and customary cleaning 
agents (disinfectants may 
be used in accordan-
ce with standard hospital 
practice)4
Cutlery No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions No restrictions
Entertainment 
equipment
Wiped and disinfec-
ted as necessary
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
Bedding
Mattress and pillow 
protected if neces-
sary
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
Secretions
Sluiced as normal, 
packaged if neces-
sary
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
Laundry Careful packaging Careful packaging in isolation room
As in customary 
precautions
As in customary 
precautions
Waste
Careful packaging 
according to waste 
classifi cation
Careful packaging 
according to waste 
classifi cation
Careful packaging 
according to waste 
classifi cation
Careful packaging 
according to waste 
classifi cation
1  Protective apron, coat or overall selected according to microbe carried by patient. Long-sleeved coat re-
commended e.g. when treating SARS and protective overall when treating hemorrhagic fever patient
2  In case of patient in airborne isolation, risk of infection is high during aerosol-producing procedures. 
They include e.g. endotracheal aspiration, intubation, bronchoscopy, induction of sputum, incorrect hand-
ling of secretions containing tuberculosis bacteria, physiotherapeutic treatment of respiratory tract, speech 
therapy, dental treatment, autopsy
3  Teach patient to cover mouth and nose closely with a tissue and then to dispose of the tissue in a covered 
waste bag. After blowing the nose and coughing, the hands are washed with soap and water and/or using 
hand rub.
4  Not necessary in case of patient with stain-positive respiratory tuberculosis
References:
Ylipalosaari P, Mäkeläinen R, Kujala P. Potilaan eristäminen infektioiden torjunnassa. In: Héllsten S, ed. Infektioiden 
torjunta sairaalassa. 5th edition. Helsinki 2005.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Guidelines for isolation precautions: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/
hip/ISOLAT/Isolat.htm
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APPENDIX 9
Antiviral drug logistics in a pandemic situation 
The Finnish Government has made preparations for an infl uenza pandemic by supplement-
ing the emergency drug stocks with antiviral agents of the neuraminidase inhibitor group. 
The country has obtained 530,000 treatment courses of Tamifl u preparation (oseltamivir) 
and approx. 770,000 courses of the same oseltamivir preparation in powder form. The inten-
tion is to replace the powder preparation later with a licensed preparation in capsule form. 
The drugs are in a pharmaceutical wholesaler’s store ready for a decision to release them. 
The emergency stocks also contain 100,000 courses of the preparation Relenza (zanamivir) 
and 1 million courses of Atarin (amantadine).
A small part of the emergency stocks is placed within Hospital Districts, relative to pop-
ulation numbers.  
Since the effi cacy of antiviral agents held in emergency stockpiles is conditional on its 
administration within 48 hours of the onset of symptoms, availability, release of emergency 
stocks and smooth distribution of the antiviral drugs will be critical for the successful out-
come of drug therapy. 
Government Decree No. 279/2006 stipulates the grounds for releasing emergency stocks. 
Under it, drugs in emergency stores may be released for use when the Ministry of Social Af-
fairs and Health has decided that it is necessary. 
Release of antiviral drugs from emergency stockpiles for consumption   
The Tamifl u capsules, as well as the Relenza and Atarin preparations acquired for emergen-
cy stocks, have current retail licences allowing them to be released for use without addition-
al measures. 
Small quantities of licensed Tamifl u capsules in the reserve stocks should be distributed 
to hospital pharmacies, e.g. relative to population numbers, as early as the transition stage 
from WHO pandemic phase 4 to phase 5. The procedures for releasing the reserve stocks 
and the body responsible for initiation of deliveries must be defi ned. The Government makes 
the decision to release reserve stocks and initiation of deliveries is directed by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health. The National Agency for Medicines is the body responsible 
for planning the distribution. With regard to initiation of deliveries, the National Agency for 
Medicines collaborates with the National Emergency Supply Agency, the National Public 
Health Institute, Hospital Districts and pharmaceutical distributors.
Distribution of antiviral drugs from pharmaceutical wholesalers to infl uenza clinics
Under the legislation on medications, a pharmaceutical wholesaler is permitted to supply 
drugs for retail distribution to pharmacies, branch pharmacies, hospital pharmacies and dis-
pensaries. Individual health centres with no dispensary cannot have drugs delivered direct 
from the pharmaceutical wholesalers. Using procedures stipulated in section 62 of the Med-
icines Acts, hospital pharmacies and dispensaries may redistribute drugs to primary health-
care units situated in the area of the same local authority, joint municipal board, or a local 
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authority adjacent to them. In addition, with permission from the National Agency for Medi-
cines, a hospital pharmacy or dispensary may, subject to certain limitations, supply drugs to 
a private healthcare unit or another social and healthcare institution and pharmacy. This li-
censing procedure requires an application in accordance with the Medicines Act, section 62, 
subsection 4, which in a pandemic situation must be capable of being discharged through 
a quick, simplifi ed procedure, or the section of the law must be amended in this respect in 
case of a pandemic situation. Amendment of the Medicines Act will need to be considered, 
in order that the National Agency for Medicines licensing and hearing procedure may be by-
passed in a pandemic situation.
Alternatively, the drugs may be delivered from the pharmaceutical wholesaler’s stocks 
to a pharmacy, and from the pharmacy to health centres. By delivering drugs via the phar-
macy network, the normal medical supplies distribution network may be utilised, one of the 
operational principles of which is that pharmaceutical wholesalers deliver within 24 hours 
of the order. On the other hand, this method of distribution disperses antiviral drug stocks to 
hundreds of interim stores (about 800 pharmacy outlets in total), making monitoring of drug 
consumption and quantities more diffi cult, as well as securing of stocks. 
Because the quantity of antiviral drugs in the reserve stocks is fi nite, the risk of break-ins 
to drug warehouses in a pandemic situation increases, and particular attention must be paid 
to the security of drug transportation and stores; constant guarding of drug warehouses must 
be considered.
Supply of antiviral drugs to patients 
In a pandemic situation, it is epidemiologically justifi ed to ensure that the patient obtains 
the medications he needs from the healthcare units where his diagnosis is established. It is 
not justifi able that the infected patient moves on from the infl uenza clinic to a pharmacy, 
and thus likely contributes to the spread of the pandemic. This procedure does not require 
amendments in the relevant legislation. 
Because distribution of drugs from health centres, with the exception of stand-by packs, 
is not a part of the normal operation of health centres, the procedures must be planned in ad-
vance. The additional storage facilities required for the drugs and the personnel resources 
required for their distribution must be assessed. Under normal circumstances, pharmacies 
are responsible for ensuring that patients are given suffi cient information and instructions 
for the safe use of a drug. Employees of health centres do not have equivalent expertise or 
statutory duty to provide drugs advice, which must be taken into account in the markings on 
the packaging and content of the instructions for use of the drugs to be distributed. Alterna-
tively, distribution of drugs at an infl uenza clinic might be implemented as collaboration of 
the local pharmacy and health centre, so that the pharmacy provides its pharmacists for the 
use of the health centre to dispense the drugs.  
In order that the desired benefi t is gained from the exceptional method of distribution of 
antiviral drugs (instead of the pharmacy, the patient obtains his drugs from the health cen-
tre), created in order to curb the spread of a pandemic, it is important that after the visit to 
the infl uenza clinic, the patient does not need to go to the pharmacy to obtain the drugs in-
tended for self-medication. The public must be instructed to obtain the necessary self-medi-
cation preparations to be kept at home before the pandemic begins, at the latest at transition 
to WHO pandemic phase 5.
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Monitoring of antiviral drug consumption
Under normal circumstances, the National Agency for Medicines monitors consumption of 
drugs and maintains statistics based on sales fi gures obtained from pharmaceutical whole-
salers. These statistics are based on the numbers of drug packs supplied by the wholesalers. 
Since the stocks of antiviral agents held in emergency stockpiles are limited, in a pandemic 
situation it is important to possess constant information also of the drug quantities available 
in retail distribution outlets. Procedures must be created for this monitoring of consumption, 
so that the information on available drug quantities and their storage locations may be uti-
lised in epidemiological surveillance of the pandemic situation. 
Proposed measures:
Release of antiviral drugs from emergency stockpiles for consumption  
The National Agency for Medicines initiates planning of the release of pharmaceu-
tical preparations held in emergency stocks  
The National Agency for Medicines assesses whether, in a pandemic situation, all 
the antiviral drugs to be used should be distributed via hospital pharmacies to infl u-
enza clinics, or whether the normal drug logistics network might be utilised. 
The National Agency for Medicines draws up the guidelines to protect drug stocks 
and transportation from break-ins
The National Agency for Medicines plans the procedures for real-time monitoring 
of consumption of drugs in emergency stockpiles 
In planning measures and procedures, the National Agency for Medicines works 
in cooperation with the  National Public Health Institute Department of Infectious 
Disease Epidemiology, in order that the progress of the epidemic may be taken into 
account in distribution of the drugs and monitoring of consumption.
Supply of antiviral drugs to patients (under section 65 of the Medicines Act)
The National Agency for Medicines plans the distribution logistics for infl uenza 
clinics and the supply requirements 
Healthcare institutions ensure that infl uenza clinics have suffi cient facilities for ap-
propriate and secure storage of the drugs
The National Agency for Medicines designs the procedures for collaboration be-
tween healthcare and pharmacies, to enable drugs advice when dispensing drugs 
from health centre to patient
The National Agency for Medicines draws up instructions for obtaining self-medi-
cation drugs from pharmacies, and is responsible for their publication jointly with 
NPHI 
Monitoring of antiviral drug consumption
The National Agency for Medicines sets up the procedures for monitoring drug 
stocks at treatment centres: reporting procedures and responsibilities for database 
maintenance to be agreed
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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APPENDIX 10
Development phases of a pandemic
Interpandemic period 
Phase 1
New infl uenza A virus subtypes have not been found in humans. 
Animals may carry a subtype of the virus which has in the past caused infections in humans, but the 
risk of infection and illness in humans is small.
Phase 2 New infl uenza A virus subtypes have not been found in humans, but the virus subtype carried by animals poses a signifi cant risk of infection and illness in humans.
Pandemic alert period
Phase 3
New infl uenza A virus subtype animal-to-human infections occur, 
but the virus is not transmitted human-to-human,  
or at most is transmitted occasionally through close contact.
Phase 4
A new infl uenza A virus subtype has caused small disease clusters, indicating that human-to-human 
transmission is limited. 
Infection chains are very localised, indicating that the virus is not yet well adapted to humans.
Phase 5
A new infl uenza A virus subtype has caused geographically limited large disease clusters. 
This means increasing adaptation of the virus to humans. 
Human-to-human transmissibility of the virus does not yet appear fully effective.
Risk of a pandemic is considerable.
Pandemic period
Phase 6
The virus is fully adapted to humans and spreads in the population, causing widespread epidemics 
crossing geographic boundaries. 
A worldwide pandemic is imminent. 
Postpandemic period
Return to interpandemic period.
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APPENDIX 11
Voluntary Rescue Service member organisations 
Autoliitto / Automobile and Touring Club of Finland
Finlands Svenska Marthaförbund
Folkhälsan
Johanniitat / St. John Ambulance Finland
Maa- ja kotitalousnaisten Keskus / Rural Women’s Advisory Organisation
Maanpuolustuskoulutus ry / National Defence Training Association of Finland 
Maanpuolustuskiltojen liitto / Finnish Defence Guilds’ Federation
Maanpuolustusnaisten liitto [Defence forces women’s federation]
Mannerheimin Lastensuojeluliitto / Mannerheim League for Child Welfare
Marttaliitto / Martha Organisation
Reserviläisliitto / Finnish Reservists’ Association
Sukeltajaliitto / Finnish Divers’ Federation
Suomen Ilmailuliitto / Finnish Aeronautical Association
Suomen Latu / Central Association for Recreational Sports and Outdoor Activities
Suomen Liikunta ja Urheilu / Finnish Sports Federation
Suomen Meripelastusseura / Finnish Lifeboat Society
Suomen Metsästäjäliitto [Finnish hunting federation]
Suomen Mielenterveysseura / Finnish Association for Mental Health
Suomen Moottoriliitto / Finnish Motorcycling Federation
Suomen Palveluskoiraliitto / Finnish Working Dog Association
Suomen Partiolaiset / Guides and Scouts of Finland
Suomen Pelastusalan Keskusjärjestö / Finnish National Rescue Association
Suomen Pelastuskoiraliitto / Finnish Association of Search and Rescue Dogs 
Suomen Punainen Risti / Finnish Red Cross
Suomen Radioamatööriliitto / Finnish Amateur Radio League
Suomen Reserviupseeriliitto / Finnish Reserve Offi cers’ Federation
Suomen Sinibarettiliitto [Suomen Rauhanturvaajat] / Finnish Blue Berets Peace-
Keeping Veterans
Suomen Taksiliitto / Finnish Taxi Association
Suomen Tiepalvelumiehet [Finnish voluntary roadside assistance]
Suomen Tiepalvelumiesliitto [Finnish voluntary roadside assistance federation]
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Saving
Suomen Veneilyliitto / Finnish Boating Association
Veteraanisuunnistajat [Veteran orientieers]
WWF Finland
Finnet-liitto / Finnet Association
Naisten Valmiusliitto [Women’s preparedness association]
Suomen Ammattiliittojen Keskusjärjestö / Central Organisation of Finnish Trade 
Unions (SAK)
Suomen Humanitaarisen Oikeuden Seura [Finnish society for humanitarian justice]
Suomen Kuntaliitto / Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
Suomen Lääkäriliitto / Finnish Medical Association
Suomen Naisjärjestöjen Keskusliitto / National Council of Women of Finland
Suomen Nuorisoseurojen Liitto / Finnish Youth Association
Suomen Osuuskauppojen Keskuskunta / S Group
Tapio
Teollisuuden ja Työnantajain Keskusliitto / Confederation of Finnish Industries 
Työturvallisuuskeskus / Centre for Occupational Safety
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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APPENDIX 12
National Public Health Institute communications during the pandemic alert 
and pandemic
1 Informing the population
The National Public Health Institute disseminates information to the population mainly via 
healthcare personnel. Information is provided on the NPHI website for the needs of the au-
thorities, healthcare personnel, reporters and the public. The aim is that the citizen should 
receive information that is reliable, clear and consistent, as locally as possible, from his own 
doctor, health centre and local paper, so that he is able in his part to act in the desired safe 
manner. 
The responsibility for training the personnel in such a way that the questions and needs 
of the public are answered as well as possible, and panic reactions are avoided, remains with 
the Hospital District.
Prepared material on A/H5N1 avian infl uenza may be found on the NPHI website at 
www.ktl.fi /lintuinfl uenssa. The website is updated continuously.
Topics 5.12.2006
The epidemic situation
Questions and answers on avian infl uenza
Questions and answers on avian infl uenza and pandemic vaccinations
Frequently asked questions on avian infl uenza
Articles
Guidelines to travellers
Finland prepares for the pandemic
National preparedness plan for an infl uenza pandemic – MSAH 
General hygiene instructions
Avian infl uenza instructions for healthcare
Prepared material on infl uenza on NPHI website www.ktl.fi  – Tietoa terveydestä – Infek-
tiotaudit - Infl uenssa.  The website is updated continuously:
Topics 5.12.2006
Infl uenza
Infl uenza surveillance 
Frequently asked questions on infl uenza vaccinations
Infl uenza laboratory
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2 Informing healthcare actors
Communications follow the same standard procedure as is followed in an epidemic or other 
situation demanding particular attention. The existing system is secured and reinforced by 
adding new recipients as necessary, mainly agencies of the authorities (see diagram).  
Dissemination of information follows a graded model, with the responsibility for dis-
semination shared both nationally, regionally and locally between several authorities. The 
information is distributed by email, fax and text message. The main focus is on maintenance 
of the websites.
Each organisation is responsible for its own communications and their development. 
However, NPHI seeks close cooperation with other organisations in epidemic communica-
tions.
Prepared material on A/H5N1 avian infl uenza may be found on the NPHI website at 
http://www.ktl.fi /portal/suomi/osiot/terveyden_ammattilaisille/ohjeita_ja_suosituksia/
uudet_ohjeet_lintuinfl uenssasta_a_h5n1/ . The website is updated continuously.
Topics 5.12.2006
Suspected human case of A/H5N1 avian infl uenza
Microbiological tests
Safety requirements in viral culture
Using respirator masks in healthcare
Classes of precautionary measures
Guidelines to travellers www.ktl.fi /lintuinfl uenssa
More information on avian infl uenza www.ktl.fi /lintuinfl uenssa
Guidelines during an avian infl uenza epidemic of poultry or wild birds 
Prophylactic use of oseltamivir in exposure situations
General hygiene instructions
Presentations of pandemic seminars
2.1 Target groups and their defi nitions
In defi ning target groups, NPHI takes into consideration the recipients’ responsibilities, du-
ties and operational opportunities in the Hospital District, province and between authori-
ties. 
Named reserve persons should be designated for all primary recipients. 
2.1.1 Hospital Districts
Primary recipients of information in Hospital Districts are persons responsible for infectious 
diseases: doctors in charge of infectious diseases in the Hospital District and hygiene nurses. 
Within Hospital Districts, the recipients of the information are in charge of its dissemination 
to local authorities, doctors and nurses responsible for infectious diseases in health centres. 
Within the health centre, the recipients of the message ensure that the information is passed 
on to their operational units. The Hospital District is also responsible for internal communi-
cations in hospitals to the management, laboratory and key operational units. 
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2.1.2 Provincial Medical Offi cers
Provincial Medical Offi cers are responsible for informing private healthcare units. The State 
Provincial Offi ces have a national and up-to-date register of addresses of all private health-
care operational units. 
2.1.3 Other authorities
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finnish Food Safe-
ty Authority (Evira), Finnish Institute for Occupational Health (FIOH), Defence Forces and 
Border Guard Department distribute the information bulletin to their own target groups. 
NPHI has agreed with the Finnish Institute for Occupational Health that the latter will dis-
tribute the information bulletin to all occupational health operational units, including in 
health centres.
Emergency actions
Telephone meetings and video conferences may be held and contacts maintained between 
the authorities through the VIRVE telephone network. 
2.1.4 NPHI internal distribution
has been specifi ed, and includes e.g. the Director General, Deputy Director General, Com-
munications Manager, Heads of Departments, telephone exchange.
2.1.5 The Finnish News Agency (FNA) and Finfood 
are listed as recipients of NPHI epidemic bulletins.
Emergency actions
2.1.6 As required, new executive authorities are added to the distribution list.
2.2 Maintaining contact details of target groups and testing the operation
Contact details are maintained in the NPHI contacts management system, with changes made 
in the system automatically updated both on the NPHI email server and the Sonera CStream 
service as an FTP transfer. NPHI has a number of staff who are able to operate the contacts 
management system and update and view addresses. To send a release or information bulle-
tin (email, fax and text message), the Sonera CStream service is used, with the email service 
maintained by the NPHI IT unit as backup. The connections are tested at least once a month 
by sending an email to all the recipients in the Hospital Districts and provinces. This way, 
obsolete addresses are updated, and the Hospital Districts are able to check for the necessity 
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of updating their own recipient addresses. The Department has drawn up written instructions 
on sending an epidemic bulletin.
2.3 Pros and cons of graded responsibility
Information about an incident fi rst reaches the Hospital District which is responsible for pre-
vention of infectious diseases in its area and for providing information on them. The NPHI 
bulletin does not contain detailed regional operational instructions, but indicates the aims 
and operational model of the action. When forwarding the bulletin, the Hospital District ex-
pert on infections issues regional detailed instructions for action and agrees on regional di-
vision of duties. 
The strength of the Hospital District is its knowledge of the functions and human re-
sources in its own area. Addition of the Hospital District comments and guidelines adds to 
the delay in the bulletin reaching health centres, but facilitates subsequent overall manage-
ment of the situation.  It is extremely important that the time delay is also noted at NPHI. 
The bulletin or advance warning of it must be sent in suffi ciently good time for all parties to 
be able to respond to it.
2.4 Improving communication plans of Hospital Districts
Hospital Districts should draw up clear written instructions on regional communications 
policy. The instructions should stress the obligation of all recipients to forward the infor-
mation, especially in a pandemic situation. Detailed mapping of the Hospital District helps 
to identify weak and strong areas in the region. When they are known in advance, the weak 
links that need to be strengthened are identifi ed.
The instructions must clearly defi ne: Who are responsible for forwarding the information 
to local authorities? Who are the regional contact persons? Who maintains contact details? 
Where are the contact details maintained? What methods are used? Email, fax, Internet or 
intranet. Who are the reserve persons? Consideration should also be given to which func-
tions may be outsourced. The need for IT support and persons responsible for communica-
tions should be included in the plan.
The communications plan should be released so that all parties are clear on what is ex-
pected of each other.
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Passage of epidemic bulletin
NPHI epidemic bulletin sent by email and fax 
NPHI – internal 
distribution
MSAH, MFA, 
EELA, MAF, 
FIOH, Evira, 
Defence Forces, 
Border Guard 
DepartmentHospital Districts 
Provincial
Medical Officers STT, Finfood 
Hospital internal 
distributionHealth centres 
HC internal 
distribution
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Abbreviations
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USA
DG SANCO Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs, EU 
ECDC  European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
EISS European Infl uenza Surveillance Scheme
EMEA European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products
NABHCE National Advisory Board on Health Care Ethics 
EU  European Union 
EVIRA Finnish Food Safety Authority
NESA National Emergency Supply Agency
KELA Social Insurance Institution of Finland
NPHI  National Public Health Institute 
MTI Ministry of Trade and Industry
SPO State Provincial Offi ce
NAM National Agency for Medicines 
MTC Ministry of Transport and Communications
MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
GMHP Government Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness 
OIE World Organisation for Animal Health
MOJ Ministry of Justice
MOE Ministry of Education
PCG Pandemic Coordination Group 
MOD Ministry of Defence
NBED  National Board of Economic Defence
HD Hospital District
MOI Ministry of the Interior
FRC Finnish Red Cross
STAKES National Research and Development Centre for Welfare and Health
MSAH Ministry of Social Affairs and Health
EED Centre Employment and Economic Development Centre
NAMA National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs
HC health centre
MOL Ministry of Labour
FIOH  Finnish Institute for Occupational Health 
MFA Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MOF Ministry of Finance
GOV Government
PMO Prime Minister’s Offi ce
WHO  World Health Organization 
VFS vital functions of society
ME Ministry of the Environment
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